


NTC TRENDS COMPENDIUM

No. 99-1

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
3QFY97 through 2QFY98

*A Collection of Trends, with
Techniques and Procedures that Work!*

**CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1350**



National Training Center (NTC)
TRENDS COMPENDIUM
3QFY97 through 2QFY98



CONTENTS

Section I - User's Guide
Section II - NTC Trends Frequency Matrix
(1QFY96-2QFY98)
Section III - Positive Performance Trends
with Techniques and Procedures
Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends
with Techniques and Procedures

CENTER FOR ARMY
LESSONS LEARNED

Director
Colonel Michael A.
Hiemstra

Managing Editor
Mr. Rick Bogdan

CTC Analyst
Mrs. Becky Doyal

CALL has many products of interest to the Total Force. A partial listing may be found at the back of this publication. We invite you to visit our web site at:

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The intent of CALL publications is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner. This CALL publication is not a doctrinal product. The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) observed and reported in this publication are written by soldiers for soldiers. If you have, or your unit has, identified other relevant TTP for the U.S. Army, contact the Managing Editor, Mr. Rick Bogdan, at Coml (913) 684-9581 or DSN 552-9581; FAX DSN 552-9583; e-mail: <bogdanr@leav-emh1.army.mil>. Articles must be submitted in either Word Perfect or Word format. Graphs, slides and clipart must be submitted separately from the document in either ppt, pcx or wpg format.

SECTION I - USER'S GUIDE
NTC TRENDS COMPENDIUM
3QFY97 through 2QFY98

WHAT IS THIS DOCUMENT?

The *NTC Trends Compendium* is a compilation of repeated NTC trends, both positive and negative, along with their associated tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), taken from CALL's previously published *CTC Trends* for the NTC. It covers one year (four quarters) of NTC trends (3-4QFY97 and 1-2QFY98).

The *NTC Trends Compendium* contains positive performance and needs emphasis trends that appeared *more than once* in all *CTC Trends* for NTC during the period covered. These trends and recommended TTPs are a compilation of quarterly *NTC observer/controller-derived observations*.

WHO IS THIS DOCUMENT FOR?

The *NTC Trends Compendium* is for tactical field units to use at Home Station as a one-stop reference for a roll-up of important performance trends and TTPs.

The *NTC Trends Compendium* is for TRADOC analysts and researchers to use for identifying potential doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier (DTLOMS) issues and O/C-recommended solutions to performance shortfalls at the tactical operations level.

The *NTC Trends Compendium* is for TRADOC doctrine writers to identify successful techniques and procedures to include in updates of doctrinal publications.

The *NTC Trends Compendium* is for CTC Operations Groups to use as an historical audit trail of reported observations and TTPs from the NTC.

HOW DO I USE THIS DOCUMENT?

Trends and associated techniques are listed by Battlefield Operating System (BOS), and are grouped into the following sections:

	<u>PAGES</u>
Section II - Trends Frequency Matrix (1QFY96-2QFY98)	3-5
Section III - Positive Performance Trends and Techniques	6
Section IV - Needs Emphasis Trends and Techniques	7-XXX

SECTION II

Section II is a trends frequency matrix chart. The trends are grouped according to common subject matter within their respective BOS. The matrix shows the number of times per two-quarter period an observer/controller (O/C) documented a trend or observation on that particular subject matter.

EXAMPLE:

<u>INTELLIGENCE BOS</u> (TA.5)	<u>1-2QTR</u> <u>FY96</u>	<u>3-4QTR</u> <u>FY96</u>	<u>1-2QTR</u> <u>FY97</u>	<u>3-4QTR</u> <u>FY97</u>	<u>1-2QTR</u> <u>FY98</u>
<u>Subject:</u> R&S Plan development and execution	4	2	4	6	4

In this example, *Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan development and execution* is listed under the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (BOS). The chart shows, at a glance, how many times in each 2-quarter period the O/Cs reported trends on the subject of *R&S Plan development and execution* (i.e., 4 times in 1-2QTR FY96; 2 times in 3-4QTR FY96, etc.).

NOTE: Battlefield Operating System (BOS) “index” codes are annotated throughout the document. These codes are based on the battlefield structure and definitions presented in **TRADOC Pam 11-9, *Blueprint of the Battlefield***. The *blueprint* provides a common structure of the functions performed by the Army. It serves as a common reference system for field commanders, combat developers, analysts, trainers and planners for analyzing and integrating operations at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. The observations and trends in this *Compendium* are at the tactical level. In “TA.5”, for example, the TA refers to the tactical level of war; the number “5” is the Intelligence BOS number.

SECTION III

Section III contains **Apositive performance@trends** as they were published in *CTC Trends* for NTC during the last four quarters. The recommended **techniques to sustain performance** are presented in summary format at the end of each subject category.

NOTE: SECTION III OF THIS COMPENDIUM CONTAINS NO POSITIVE PERFORMANCE TRENDS. There were no recurring positive performance observations reported by the O/Cs during the past four quarters.

SECTION IV

Section IV contains the **Aneeds improvement@trends** and associated techniques as they were published in *CTC Trends* for NTC during the last four quarters. Again, the recommended **techniques to improve performance** are presented in summary format at the end of each subject category.

SECTION III - POSITIVE PERFORMANCE TRENDS

There were no recurring positive performance trends submitted by the O/Cs for the period 3QFY97 through 2QFY98.

SECTION IV - NEEDS EMPHASIS TRENDS

INTELLIGENCE BOS (TA.5)

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan Development and Execution

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	4	2	4	6	4

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Task Force (TF) S2s and assistant S2s continue their role as the only planners in the R&S effort. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Leaving the TF S2 to develop the R&S plan by himself results in a product that lacks integration and synchronization.
2. Fire integration, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and task and purpose are often left out.
3. NAIs are often not prioritized; infiltration routes and OP repositioning plans are not addressed.
4. Weak PIRs are not linked to NAIs.
5. Scouts are often sent out late without an enemy SITEMP. Most TFs only provide the scouts with an R&S matrix, frequently giving inaccurate start and stop times.

OBSERVATION 2: Task forces often task only scout platoon assets for R&S execution. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. As the rotation progresses, the scout platoon is tasked to conduct either reconnaissance or surveillance on a constant basis.
2. Some missions may require a larger number of assets to cover NAIs than the scout platoon can provide.
3. Little consideration is given to allowing time to rest, conduct rehearsals, or perform maintenance.
4. No other elements are tasked to replace or augment the scout platoon mission.
5. METT-T is not taken into consideration when executing the R&S plan.
6. The scout platoon is over-tasked and unable to maintain the level of readiness required to achieve the R&S mission.

OBSERVATION 3: Brigade staffs rarely think of R&S as a continuous process. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. When brigade staffs plan the R&S effort in support of a mission, they rarely identify R&S as a continuous process.
2. Once R&S assets are in place, the staff rarely follows-up to ensure collectors provide the information that they were tasked to provide.
3. When the brigade issues the R&S order, subordinate units are rarely tasked to provide their plans back to the brigade to be deconflicted.
4. Major issues such as terrain management, identification of gaps or conflicts in collection tasks, and verification of surveillance coverage are not readily identified or resolved prior to R&S execution.

OBSERVATION 4: Although reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning is fundamentally sound at the task force (TF) level, TFs do not follow-up with the brigade on many R&S issues during the later stages of R&S planning and preparation. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. TFs seldom plan for air movement for the COLTs that were OPCON to them.
2. TFs seldom plan for the employment of ground surveillance radar (GSR) in their zone.
3. TFs still have difficulty with terrain management in their area of operation (AO). They often do not verify exact locations of brigade assets in their AOs.

OBSERVATION 5: Engineer efforts in support of R&S are normally inadequate. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. The engineer battalion rarely plays a major part in the brigade's R&S planning.
2. Proposed locations for the assets going forward, i.e., COLTs, scouts, C2, ADA, IEW etc., are not addressed by the engineers.
3. A relationship between the assistant battalion engineer (ABE) and the R&S planning cell is rarely established.
4. When engineers accompany task force (TF) scouts or COLTs on a collection mission, they normally cross the forward line of own troops (FLOT) with minimal guidance.

OBSERVATION 6: Situation Templates (SITEmps) are often not available for use in R&S Planning. (TA.5.3.4.)

DISCUSSION:

1. Task forces (TFs) are not able to distinguish between *possible* infiltration and *required* infiltration, the latter being necessary to achieve the reconnaissance objective.

2. TFs repeatedly underestimate the enemy's commitment to counter-reconnaissance.
3. There is a lack of understanding of planning factors for reconnaissance, resulting in unrealistic expectations.
4. HMMWV scouts frequently select or are given routes right through enemy security zone positions.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97.)

OBSERVATION 2: Task force and squadron S2s, S3s, and commanders continue to have difficulty planning and supervising R&S operations. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Task force staffs tend to lack an appreciation for the technical abilities of the unit's assets and the force protection and sustainment requirements for R&S operations.
2. Units over-task by superimposing *repetitive* and *redundant* collection requirements.
3. The S2's R&S efforts are not coordinated with the staff, to include adjacent and higher headquarters. This lack of coordination often leads to the loss of lives and poorly executed or unsuccessful plans.
4. Although task force S2s adequately identify intelligence requirements, the staffs are unable to identify and manage all available assets.

OBSERVATION 3: (Repeat of Observation 4, 3-4Q97.)

OBSERVATION 4: (Repeat of Observation 5, 3-4Q97.)

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for R&S Plan Development and Execution

1. TFs should think of R&S as a *combat operation* and produce their plan with the same detail as an *OPORD*, written by the S3 with input from all staff elements.
2. The S2 should include the enemy SITEMP in the R&S order for timely receipt of this information by the scouts.
3. Train other infantry platoon elements to augment or replace the scout platoon according to METT-T. All mechanized infantry squads, sections, or platoons should be capable of such a mission.

4. Assess the scout platoon readiness level when developing the R&S plan.
 - a. If the organic scout platoon is not at a readiness level to complete the mission, then additional trained assets should be tasked for the mission.
 - b. If the NAI coverage requirements for a particular mission exceed the scout platoon's capabilities, task other assets to augment the reconnaissance force.
5. The brigade must address R&S as a continuous operation for all phases of the mission.
6. The brigade must deconflict and integrate R&S plans into a finished brigade product; therefore, they must task subordinate units to submit their plans to the brigade.
7. The brigade must supervise the subordinate units' assigned tasks. Brigade XOs, Battle Captains, staff members, and command post (CP) personnel must be trained to support and supervise the R&S operation.
8. TFs should plan R&S operations as they would a combat operation with continuous refinement during planning, preparation, and execution.
9. The ABE should assertively participate as a key player during R&S planning.
10. Engineer terrain products that support the R&S plan should be produced, and when engineers are to accompany TF scouts or COLTs on a collection mission, engineer-specific NAIs should be developed and refined.
11. Consider using dismounted scouts when infiltration is *required* to achieve the reconnaissance objective. Because the scope and sustainability of dismounted operations are limited, OPFOR security forces should be identified and destroyed before conducting a dismounted infiltration. This will open a lane for the reconnaissance force to penetrate the enemy's security zone.
12. Bradley-equipped scouts are better suited for the reconnaissance mission. Scouts should be carried by Bradleys or escorted in their HMMWVs by Bradleys to a dismount point in order to be in position to observe the enemy's defensive preparation.
13. Integrate mission analysis products into R&S planning to allow battlefield calculus to determine the required composition of the reconnaissance force.
14. Task force commanders and S3s must recognize their role in R&S planning and supervision. This will allow task force and squadron S2s time to analyze reconnaissance data and recommend redirection of collection efforts.
15. If task force S2s are on the "blame line" for planning and supervising R&S operations, it is essential that they receive all required protection and sustainment support, and have full authority to execute fire missions, etc., required for success.

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Process and Application

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	2	3	3	2	4

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Task force (TF) staffs routinely omit or do not integrate the air portion of the IPB during the TF planning process. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Most S2s integrate air avenues in the SITEMP, but few conduct a detailed air threat analysis.
2. The most likely COA for enemy air is rarely identified. As a result, the TF commander, staff, and company commanders gain little appreciation for the enemy air threat and capabilities.
3. Air defense plans are oriented on unit movement instead of concentrating available assets to defeat the air threat.
4. The TF commander's guidance to the air defense officers (ADOs) is ambiguous and unfocused (for example, "ADA: protect the force").

OBSERVATION 2: Air Defense Officers (ADO) have a tendency to wait until the brigade receives the formal order from Division before they begin the aerial IPB process. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. ADOs rarely develop an aerial IPB based on the initial warning order (WARNO), and for this reason, the brigade ADO's aerial portion of the IPB is rarely developed prior to mission analysis.
2. The ADA BOS rarely incorporates the ADA third dimension analysis into the maneuver S2's IPB prior to COA development.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97.)

OBSERVATION 2: Engineer battalions seldom define the battlefield environment in the brigade intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer battalions rarely conduct an engineer terrain analysis during IPB.
2. An inability to "see" the terrain severely restricts the brigade's ability to understand the battlefield situation.

OBSERVATION 3: (Repeat of Observation 2, 3-4QFY97.)

OBSERVATION 4: Mechanized task force staffs are not developing IPBs with sufficient detail. (TA.5.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. IPB products do not provide the task force commander with sufficient information about the terrain and use of the terrain by friendly and enemy forces.
2. Little emphasis is placed on developing a viable IPB prior to mission analysis. The result is a flawed commander's guidance that puts little emphasis on the terrain in the area of operations and *no* emphasis on the terrain in the area of interest.
3. Task force XO and S3s do not require that each staff member participate in the IPB process. Instead, the entire IPB mission is normally given to the most inexperienced member of the staff...the S2. Even if the S2 understands OPFOR tactics and techniques, he has neither the time nor resources to produce all the required products.
4. The fire support officers are seldom involved in the IPB; the targeting process is usually not included.
5. Staffs do not analyze weather. Weather conditions are usually given in the mission analysis brief as a "weather forecast."
6. Staffs do not analyze terrain; state whether each terrain feature has a positive or negative effect on the mission, or develop threat models based upon the terrain.
7. Staffs do not come to LTP or the NTC with the products to complete a good *assessment of the threat*.
 - a. Few staffs create and bring with them different threat models based upon terrain and missions.
 - b. Few staffs identify high value targets (HVTs) and where/when they will appear on the battlefield.
 - c. Few staffs develop possible enemy COAs based upon the terrain and OPFOR doctrine, or SITEmps for those COAs, prior to arrival at NTC.
 - d. Units do not develop operational control graphics until late in the planning process. Operational graphics usually do not support flexibility and simplicity based upon possible enemy actions, reactions, or counteractions.
8. Commander's guidance is normally weak and very general. Few understand the tactical necessity of a thorough IPB, and base their guidance on a faulty mission analysis brief that is lacking in a detailed analysis of the enemy and terrain.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Process and Application

1. The S2 should draw on the ADO for expertise on enemy air threat capabilities. Begin by referring to **FM 34-130**, Appendix C, reference the three dimensional IPB.
2. The air associated IPB cannot be treated separately. It must be used to show the synergy of air and ground threats.
3. During the mission analysis, the air threat must be briefed to the TF commander up front.

This allows the commander to “see” critical points on the battlefield where the unit is most vulnerable to air attack. The commander can then prioritize ADA coverage IAW the threat and his intent/maneuver scheme. ADA assets will be positioned to defeat the air threat while the force postures to take active or passive air defense measures.

4. A standard 1:250,000 map should be used to conduct a detailed analysis of the terrain and refined using a 1:50,000 map.

5. The air IPB should include:

a. Key Terrain:

- Airfields
- LAS and DZ
- FARPs
- Choke Points

b. Air Avenues:

- Type of Aircraft
- Max Ceiling
- Attack Profile
- Weapon Systems
- Target to be Attacked

c. Weather:

- Visibility
- Wind Speed and Direction
- Precipitation
- Cloud Cover
- Temperature

d. Threat Evaluation:

- Enemy Aircraft/Missile
- Air Order of Battle
- Aircraft Capabilities
- Ordnance
- Tactical Flight Doctrine
- Priorities of Attack
- Command and Control

e. Threat Integration:

- SITEMP
- Air Avenues of Approach
- Determine best use terrain given aircrafts' own capabilities and attack profile.

f. Event Template:

- Aerial NAIs
- Terrain constraints on air avenue to potential target
- Decision Support Template

g. Decision Support Template:

- Air Avenues
- Airborne and Air Assault Objectives
- LZs and DZs

- Ranges of enemy systems
- Aerial TAIs
- Decision points

6. References: **FM 34-130, IPB**, Appendix C; **FM 44-43, BSFV Platoon and Squad Operations**; **FM 44-64, FAAD Battalion and Battery Operations**; **TRADOC PAM 350-16, Heavy OPFOR Doctrine**.

7. The aerial IPB results in a predictive analysis of when and where the brigade will most likely see enemy air. Appendix A of **FM 44-100, Air Defense Operations**, specifically addresses the aerial IPB process. It emphasizes that the aerial IPB is a time consuming process that is an integral part of the IPB process.

8. The ADO's development of the aerial portion of the IPB must begin immediately following receipt of the division's warning order (WARNO).

9. The air (aerial) IPB must be a part of the brigade combat team's (BCT's) enemy situational template (SITEMP).

10. The brigade S2, battalion S2 and assistant battalion engineer (ABE) should begin the IPB process prior to deployment to the theater. Develop the following items prior to deployment:

- a. Modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO).
- b. Analysis of time and distance in mobility corridors.
- c. Engineer threat model, to include threat mines.

11. Further refine the initial IPB estimates that were developed at Home Station during reception, staging, and onward movement, and integration (RSO&I) and combat operations.

12. Task force staffs must prepare for their NTC rotation at Home Station. This includes developing threat templates/models and doing a thorough terrain analysis of each corridor.

- a. A simple MCOO does not provide the necessary detail.
- b. The terrain at the NTC is not going to change, and the way the enemy fights will change very little. The missions will remain somewhat similar to those in the past. With the advent of terrain analysis computer programs, units can assemble a detailed library of the NTC terrain.

13. The complete staff can accomplish a large portion of any mission analysis prior to their arrival at NTC. Staffs have access to factual information and they certainly have the ability to make assumptions. Some suggested techniques follow:

- a. Task force engineers should accomplish a detailed terrain analysis of each NTC corridor using computer programs. Early identification of advantageous terrain is critical. This procedure must include identification of inter-visibility lines that can provide a platoon fire and maneuver advantage. The same procedure can be used to develop observation plans and enhance the effects of all BOS.

- b. S2s should develop threat models based upon the different missions that occur at the NTC. Those models must be related to the terrain in the different corridors. The models could then be transferred to templates, which could provide staffs with enemy COAs and lessen the time required to produce a good SITEMP.

- c. Task force S3s can develop flexible but simple operational control graphics. Each unit can tailor those graphics to fit a specific mission. It would also provide a common base from which other graphics could be tailored to the scenario.

- d. Air defense officers (ADOs) can easily identify air corridors by doing a Home Station terrain analysis of each corridor.

e. High-value target (HVT) lists can be produced at Home Station and incorporated into threat models. Planned position areas (PAs) can be templated based upon the existing models.

f. Task force commanders should develop a detailed commander's guidance checklist. The commander cannot expect to provide precise guidance based upon a 30-minute mission analysis brief. He must have assistance in this endeavor. A good checklist can provide that assistance.

g. S2s must understand the effects of weather in relation to the terrain, enemy, and mission. The effects of the sun, wind, inversion times, etc., are critical at certain times and in certain locations. The S2 must explain the advantages and disadvantages of the predicted conditions.

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Threat Evaluation and ECOA Development

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	2	0	0	2	2

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Task force (TF) S2s are often coming to LTP with a rudimentary knowledge of OPFOR composition and tactics. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Planning processes are continually slowed down because of lengthy discussions on how the OPFOR fights.
2. Lack of a thorough knowledge of OPFOR doctrine adversely affects battle tracking during execution because the S2s have difficulty trying to identify the "big picture."

OBSERVATION 2: TF S2s have difficulty developing complete enemy COAs to assist the commander and staff to visualize how the enemy will fight using combat multipliers and the terrain. (TA.5.4.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Mission analysis is frequently rushed by the TF. S2s usually have the competence, but often do not have sufficient time to complete their products.
2. Very few S2s are able to develop multiple enemy COAs or threat models.
3. S2s too often do not incorporate all threat combat multipliers and the terrain in the enemy COA.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Light infantry task force staffs are often unfamiliar with enemy tactics and composition. (TA.5.2.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

S2s and staff members struggle with the current threat model throughout their planning exercise.

OBSERVATION 2: Task force S2s seldom develop several enemy courses of action (COAs). (TA.5.4.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Most often this problem is *not* due to a lack of competence on the part of the S2, but rather a result of a restricted planning timeline. S2s are allowed sufficient time to develop only one threat COA, and the staff has no appreciation for the various avenues of approach or forms of contact available to the enemy.
2. The enemy often executes a COA that the task force has not planned for. When this occurs, the task force does not have the systems in place to defeat the threat and is unable to react in a timely manner.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Threat Evaluation and ECOA Development

1. S2s should deploy to the NTC with a comprehensive knowledge of how the OPFOR fights. There are several Krasnovian threat documents available through LTP, the OPFOR, **CALL Quarterly Bulletin 97-4, *Decision Point Tactics*, TRADOC Pamphlet 350-16, and FM 100-60.**
2. Commanders must familiarize their staffs to understand the Krasnovian threat prior to an NTC deployment.
3. The task force S2 should coordinate with the brigade S2 for early receipt of the situation template (SITEMP) to allow for more time to develop task force level threat COAs.
4. The S2 must use a checklist to cover all combat multipliers, identifying the capabilities of enemy ADA, indirect fires, and engineers on the SITEMP. This will help the task force plan for various encounters with threat forces during the battle.
5. S2 sections must practice SITEMP drills at Home Station so that SITEMPs are produced quickly to address all forms of contact and battlefield conditions.
6. Develop numerous threat COAs on concept sketches to give the battle staff an opportunity to visualize the threat and plan accordingly.

TREND 4**SUBJECT: S2 Situation Template (SITEMP) Development**

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	2	1	0	1	1

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Brigade S2s have difficulty adjusting their situation template (SITEMP) as intelligence information is received. (TA.5.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Initially, brigade S2 situational templates (SITEMPs) contain a generally comprehensive analysis of the threat and have multiple enemy courses of action. However, as more intelligence is provided to verify or deny a specific enemy course of action, the S2's adjusted situational templates usually become lacking in specificity.
2. Adjusted SITEMPs usually do not differentiate between actual (based on collected intelligence) versus templated enemy positions.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: While developing updated SITEMPs, S2s often do not differentiate between the *confirmed locations* and situationally *templated* gaps in known intelligence. (TA.5.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

Without a differentiation of confirmed and templated enemy locations, the staff is led to develop plans to counter a threat that may not be at that specific location.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for S2 Situation Template (SITEMP) Development

1. S2 sections should use a checklist that includes the different elements of the threat that the brigade will encounter. Such a checklist will ensure that each element is addressed. Recommend the following:

When facing a threat force, the S2's adjusted situational template should include the following components:	When facing an attacking threat, the following components of the attack should be included:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Divisional Reconnaissance - Regimental Reconnaissance - Artillery range fans - Ambush positions - Combat Security Out Posts - Nonpersistent chemical - Persistent chemical - FASCAM. MRC positions - Direct fire weapon positions - Direct fire range fans - Obstacles and the consequent fire sack created by those systems. - Dismounted infantry positions - Air defense weapons systems - RAGs/DAGs - Battalion reserve - Regimental Reserves - Routes for those reserves and timelines for the commitment of those reserves. - Air avenues of approach for fixed and rotary winged aircraft and firing positions for rotary winged aircraft 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Divisional reconnaissance team positions (DRTs) - Regimental reconnaissance routes - Combat Reconnaissance Patrol routes - Forward Security Element axis - Advance Guard main body axis - Regimental main body axis - Task Force “A” objective - Task Force “B” objective - AT-5 positions - RAG - Templated Nonpersistent and Persistent chemical strikes - Templated FASCAM - Air avenues of approach

2. The adjusted SITEMPs should differentiate between items that are confirmed from the reconnaissance and surveillance effort and those items that remain templated. To do this, the S2's subsequent SITEMP updates can define the differences using dotted lines for templated positions and solid lines for confirmed positions.

3. Recommend other brigade staff officers be given individual responsibilities to assist the S2 with development of the SITEMP (i.e., the engineer should assist in templating obstacles, FASCAM, and the employment of a Mobile Obstacle Detachment/Mobile Support Detachment. The Chemical Officer should assist in templating persistent and nonpersistent strikes. The Air Defense Officer should assist in identifying the enemy air avenues of approach.)

TREND 5

SUBJECT: S2 Analysis and Reporting

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	1	1	1	2	0

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Brigade S2s often deploy to the NTC without formatted charts, checklists and reporting materials. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

Brigade S2s seldom prepare their charts and intelligence reporting materials at Home Station, requiring them to prepare these items during intelligence collection and evaluation processes. As a result, the S2 is often unable to provide timely support for the brigade planning process.

OBSERVATION 2: Brigade S2s are consistently challenged by the requirement to track the enemy battle damage assessment (BDA). (TA.5.2.2.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. There is no system in place to track enemy losses as they are identified on the battlefield.
2. There are routinely no dedicated OPs that can provide surveillance of the enemy forces during the battle.
3. Without an accurate enemy BDA, the S2 cannot identify weaknesses or vulnerabilities as they develop as a result of the actions during the battle.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES **for S2 Analysis and Reporting**

1. Each S2 section should develop an SOP with a checklist and formatted charts.
 - a. The SOP should address the products that will be routinely required of the S2 section for each phase of the staff planning process and for battle tracking.
 - b. Prepare charts for products that will be needed to support standard requirements as well as staff and commander-driven requirements.
2. Recommend the following items be developed as part of the unit S2 Home Station preparation:
 - a. Terrain analysis in the form of a Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) and Intervisibility Line (IV) overlay.
 - b. Light data chart.
 - c. Doctrinal templates.
 - d. S2 mission analysis and battle tracking charts.

3. S2s should develop enemy BDA charts that reflect an enemy in the defense by platoon positions and in the offense by each component echelon of the attacking force, rather than by gross numbers of combat systems.
4. The R&S plan should address the assets that have surveillance responsibility during the battle. These assets must be tracked and queried to provide updated combat information, to include BDA.
5. Subordinate units that have the task of destroying a particular enemy element are also responsible for providing the disposition of the threat they are required to act upon.

TREND 6

SUBJECT: Terrain Analysis

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	0	0	1	2	4

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Task Force (TF) S2s seldom adequately analyze the terrain in sufficient detail. (TA.5.3.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. TF S2s accurately define and incorporate enemy avenues of approach (AA) into their sectors/zones; however, they are *not maximizing the MCOOs and other products* for terrain analysis.
2. S2s identify enemy kill sacks, potential friendly engagement areas, defensible terrain, and specific system and equipment locations but *do not integrate their product with the TF engineer*.
3. S2s do not routinely use the Terrabase products or the 1:24,000 scale maps.
4. The commander and staff are denied opportunities to exploit the terrain when determining friendly and threat COAs.

OBSERVATION 2: Engineer units seldom make use of the Terrabase computer software program. (TA.5.3.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Appendix C of FM 5-71-3 is entirely devoted to the uses and capabilities of Terrabase; however Terrabase is not routinely used at brigade level or below.
2. Most engineer units are unfamiliar with the Terrabase computer program and use either “stubby pencil” line-of-sight (LOS) diagrams or completely ignore their terrain analysis responsibility in the engineer battlefield analysis (EBA) process.

OBSERVATION 1: Assistant brigade engineers (ABEs) and engineer battalion S3s do not fully understand the Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA) process. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. The engineer battalion S3 and ABE rarely develop a detailed EBA based on the initial division Warning Order (WARNO).
2. The EBA is seldom developed prior to mission analysis and is not available for use in conjunction with the S2's development of the IPB.
3. Most ABEs do not assist with terrain analysis. It is normally left to the S2.
4. The engineer battalion S3 rarely helps the ABE with the EBA process.

OBSERVATION 2: Engineer units are seldom using Terrabase products to meet terrain analysis requirements. (TA.5.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Some brigade engineer units are using Terrabase II to analyze the effects of terrain and assessing the impact on military/engineer operations. Unfortunately, Terrabase II has not been distributed throughout unit staffs.
2. Most primary staff officers who do not have Terrabase II or are unfamiliar with it are developing simple line-of-sight (LOS) diagrams or completely ignoring their internal responsibility to analyze terrain.
3. Most staff officers do not know that Terrabase II can create three-dimensional representations of terrain and provide LOS profiles for placement and locations of weapons, radar, and radios.

OBSERVATION 3: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97)

OBSERVATION 4: Brigade staffs are currently unclear as to who is responsible for terrain analysis. (TA.5.3.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Most brigades have given the responsibility for terrain analysis to either the S2 or the assistant battalion engineer (ABE). Some units require the ABE to provide the terrain analysis brief during mission analysis while other commands require the S2 to fulfill this responsibility.
2. The terrain analysis has historically been an S2 function but with the advent of the engineer battalion TOC collocated with the brigade main, additional staff planning support can be levied from the engineers. Brigade staffs seldom utilize this valuable asset.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

for Terrain Analysis

1. Terrain analysis is an *engineer* responsibility. **FM 5-71-3, *Brigade Engineer Combat Operations***, states that the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) has the responsibility for developing the engineer battlefield assessment (EBA).

a. It lays out specific requirements for the development of the EBA.
b. Chapter 2 states that the EBA consists of three parts, all of which must be analyzed in detail:

- **terrain analysis**
- enemy mission
- Mobility/Survivability (M/S) capabilities, and friendly mission and M/S

capabilities.

2. Terrabase or other terrain analysis tools should be required during Home Station training.

- a. Train key personnel.
- b. Identify the required brigade and task force products during Home Station training.
- c. Appendix C of **FM 5-71-3, *Brigade Engineer Combat Operations***, identifies

Terrabase as a computer software program that aids in the analysis of terrain. Terrabase does the following:

- Creates line-of-sight profiles.
- Assesses placement locations for weapons, radar, and radios.
- Displays three-dimensional representations of terrain.

3. Terrabase II became available to the Army in October 1997. Acquire it by submitting a request to the U.S. Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood, MO.

4. Give the ABE the responsibility for terrain analysis as a matter of SOP. The engineers routinely use and have terrain analysis tools, such as Terrabase and WINCATS. However, this responsibility must be identified early on and trained at Home Station. By routinely employing the ABE and the engineer TOC for terrain-related products, this association will become SOP.

5. The ABE should begin developing the EBA immediately following the receipt of the initial WARNO. The engineer battalion S3 should assist in developing and conduct a review of the EBA. Staffs must understand the significance of a timely and detailed EBA; it is the basis for the entire intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process.

6. TF S2s must improve their ability to articulate how the terrain will impact COAs. S2 use of terrain analysis during mission analysis and COA development would greatly improve their threat and friendly COAs products and those of the S3.

a. S2s should train to produce detailed terrain analysis using Terrabase products and 1:24,000 scale maps. Use of these products would allow the commander and staff to “see the terrain” in greater detail prior to mission execution.

b. S2s should guard against making general assumptions regarding the “open terrain” in the desert.

TREND 7**SUBJECT: Event Template/Event Matrix**

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	0	0	1	1	1

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Task force S2s are generally not producing their event template or event matrix. (TA.5.3.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. S2s do not understand the use of the event template or the items that should be included on the event template.
2. Event templates and event matrices that are produced are usually incomplete.
 - a. S2s do not include a friendly COA development product.
 - b. S2s do not include the R&S plan product.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97)

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for the Event Template/Event Matrix

1. TF S2s must learn the importance of the event template. They cannot delete this step from the planning process.
2. Read and comply with **FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield***. Phase lines, NAIs, and enemy decision points are critical to friendly COA development.
3. Use the event matrix as a companion to the template. Use of the event matrix should also help distinguish between the enemy COAs.
4. Conduct Home Station drills to develop the S2 section's product development skills.

TREND 8

SUBJECT: Scout Platoon Execution of R&S Operations

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	0	0	1	1	0

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Task Forces (TFs) do not adequately train reconnaissance planning, preparation, execution, and support at Home Station. (TA.5.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Home Station reconnaissance training is often left up to the scout platoon leader.
2. Reconnaissance training is limited to section or platoon training with very narrow objectives and no integration of other TF assets.
3. HMMWV-equipped scout platoons are often used for the reconnaissance mission; their limitations are often not discovered until the platoons are rendered combat ineffective and unable to contribute to TF success.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES **for Scout Platoon Execution of R&S Operations**

1. Reconnaissance is a *mission*, not a unit. The TF must take responsibility for the integration of all available assets toward achieving the reconnaissance objective.
 - a. First, the commander and S3, with the S2's recommendation, identify what information is required for the TF to be successful in the upcoming operation. This information should focus on both friendly and enemy decision points and how to influence (enemy) or facilitate (friendly) decisions. Setting these priorities normally provides sufficient focus for the limited assets available to the TF and prevents overwhelming reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) tasking.
 - b. Second, the S3 determines the force necessary to defeat enemy forces templated or known between his TF and the reconnaissance objective.
 - c. Third, the S3 creates a reconnaissance force that has sufficient combat power to achieve that objective or recommends a new objective based on availability of forces.
2. Consider the following planning factors in reconnaissance operations:
 - a. CASEVAC
 - b. Indirect fire support
 - c. Communications
 - d. Resupply

Against an armored and dedicated enemy, all of these things quickly exceed the capabilities of a HMMWV-equipped scout platoon. Bradley-equipped scouts are more likely to achieve reconnaissance objectives without TF support, but the planning factors remain the same.

3. The TF must ensure the integration of reconnaissance training at Home Station. R&S planning must be integrated into every orders drill so that usable products are produced prior to R&S execution.

4. The TF reconnaissance assets must have sufficient force to accomplish the mission.

MANEUVER BOS (TA.1)

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Direct Fire Planning and Execution

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	3	5	1	3	1

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Company/teams do not effectively use direct fires during offensive missions. (TA.1.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. In the offense, company/team commanders seldom conduct advanced planning for the use of direct fires during maneuver.
2. Commanders have only graphic control measures to control direct fires.
3. Commanders are required to execute supporting fire while in contact.

OBSERVATION 2: Company commanders seldom conduct sufficient direct fire planning. (TA.1.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Company commanders tend to lack understanding of where and when direct fire planning occurs in the battalion engagement area development process.
2. Company commanders seldom synchronize the direct fire plans among the companies within a battalion engagement area.

OBSERVATION 3: Planning for and execution of shifting of direct fires is inadequate at company level. (TA.1.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

Commanders do not plan or execute shifting of fires to:

1. Allow a team that is decisively engaged to maneuver and maintain standoff; or
2. Focus fires on critical enemy weapons systems or enemy concentrations.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97.)

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Direct Fire Planning and Execution

1. The focus of offensive fires is to control and distribute those fires while on the move against a generally static enemy. Company/team commanders must have an offensive fire plan to maximize the principles of direct fire and allow the commander to focus, distribute and shift fires.

See the following references:

- a. Chapters 2 and 3, **FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***
- b. **FM 17-12-1-1 and 1-2, *Tank Gunnery (Abrams) Volumes I and II***
- c. **FM 23-1, *Bradley Gunnery***
- d. **CALL Special Study, Mar 98, "*Closing With The Enemy, Company Team***

Maneuver"

- e. SH 7-45, available through the CALL homepage

2. Company/team commanders can control offensive direct fires with the same tools that are used in the defense:

- a. Engagement areas (EAs)
- b. Target reference points (TRPs)
- c. Fire patterns
- d. Fire commands

3. The offensive fire plan should provide the company/team commander the ability to orient his force and transition it from a moving force to a base of fire and maneuver.

a. There are several techniques that can assist the commander in planning and controlling his direct fires, including:

- Sectors
- Quadrants
- Target array
- Closest TRP
- Fire patterns
- Grids

b. The first four techniques use TRPs to control fires. TRPs assist in focusing fires on a point, on multiple points, or an area. They are preplanned to support the scheme of maneuver and may be oriented on either enemy or terrain. Some TRPs are planned on enemy positions or surrounding terrain to focus platoon fires against the enemy. Others are planned on terrain features throughout the zone of attack. This allows flexibility controlling fires if the actual enemy disposition does not match the SITEMP, or in the event of chance contact.

4. The battalion S3 or battalion commander conducts a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) with the entire staff and company commanders, working through the battalion engagement area development process. At the end of the exercise, company commanders should know:

- a. where direct fire planning occurs in the process.
- b. what battalion warning orders (WARNOs) will initiate the company direct fire.
- c. what planning products and resources the companies should expect from battalion.
- d. what products the company should produce for a complete direct fire plan.

Eight steps of engagement area development

Battalion

IPB
 Select the ground for the attack
 Integration of the engagement area
 Plan the direct fire fight
 Fire commands
 Review the plan
 Rehearse
 Execute

Direct fire planning principles

Company

Mass fires
 Focus fires
 Distribute fires
 Shift fires
 Leaders control fires
 All crews know the plan
 Rehearse the fire plan

5. Commanders must plan and rehearse *critical events* that would require a fire command to shift fires.

EXAMPLES:

- a. Enemy closing within direct fire engagement range of a firing team.
 - b. Enemy forces selecting a COA that changes the initial fire distribution plan.
 - c. Enemy rate of march that exceeds friendly ability to destroy all targets from initial set positions.
6. Companies should conduct tactical chalk talks or walk-through drills where they outline the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) they will use to shift fires during the direct fire fight.
- a. Incorporate these TTPs into team and platoon battle drills and validate them during company situational training exercises.
 - b. Capture validated TTPs in a company SOP or battle book.

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Movement Formations and Techniques

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	1	1	2	0	2

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: FA battery commanders often do not conduct proper planning and preparation for their tactical moves. (TA 1.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Commanders typically give little thought to control measures for ensuring timely, controlled tactical moves.
2. Most moves consist only of sending a move order to the guns with no thought of land deconfliction, boundaries, terrain, movement aid for limited visibility, reconnaissance, survey points, or movement control measures.

OBSERVATION 2: Most DS battalion staffs understand Paladin movement techniques; however, they do not maximize the employment techniques of the Paladin system in supporting the combined arms team. (TA.2.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Artillery movement is rarely adequately planned for and, therefore, not synchronized with maneuver or based on execution of essential fire support tasks (EFSTs).
2. Clear movement triggers are not developed, most moves being on order.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Movement Formations and Techniques

1. Paladin movement requires great detail in planning and flexibility in execution. Commanders should look early for potential problems, define specific control measures for the movement, and then position key leaders where they can see and influence the movement.
2. Movement planning must begin during the commander's mission analysis. Even if the battalion does not provide sufficient guidance for movement, the battery commander is not absolved from planning movement in-depth to support his battery mission.
3. An initial examination of the scheme of maneuver, coupled with the Paladin zones provided from the battalion, will give the commander a starting point for his maneuver plan.
4. The commander should look for obvious conflicts in the movement plan. He should determine conflicts early to find solutions or work with the battalion staff to modify the plan.
 - a. Are several batteries taking the same route at the same time?
 - b. Does the route given by battalion violate unit boundaries?
 - c. Is there a specific route or is that left to the commander's discretion?
 - d. Does the movement guidance conflict with the maneuver forces plan?
5. The commander must then make specific decisions concerning his planned movement.
 - a. What type of formation will he use?
 - b. Move by platoons or by battery?
 - c. Move in a wedge or in column formation?
 - d. Give a specific route or specify an axis of advance?
6. If they know to do so in advance, the gunnery sergeants can assist the commander by easily placing survey control points along the route. By conducting a route reconnaissance within

limits of the tactical situation, the gunnery sergeants can advise the commander on the terrain, routes, and possible conflicts. If ground reconnaissance is not possible, then the commander must conduct a detailed map reconnaissance.

- a. How far will each movement take the battery?
- b. When will navigation updates be needed?
- c. Who will provide the survey support?
- d. What are the specific triggers to initiate movement?

7. The commander then determines how best to pass his movement plan to his platoons. One successful method is to develop battery graphics and disseminate them while issuing the WARNO or OPORD.

a. Use basic graphic control measures to help ease movement problems and add flexibility to the entire plan. Graphics should include battery boundaries, routes, or axis of advance depending on how much movement control the commander needs, Paladin zones, survey control points and any start points, check points, or release points.

b. By getting these graphics down to the section chief level, the commander can ensure all leaders have an understanding of the scheme of maneuver and can allow him to issue FRAGOs based on the graphics should the situation change.

8. Control during movement execution is critical. Commanders often have the gunnery sergeants link in with the rear elements of the maneuver forces. This gives the commanders eyes forward while positioning themselves forward to make their own assessment of the movement.

9. Commanders should plan for contingencies in their scheme of maneuver. By planning alternate Paladin zones and alternate routes of march, the commander can easily shift his unit when the situation changes.

a. The ability of the Paladin to conduct “hipshoots” means the commander can support maneuver from almost all points of his march.

b. Specific essential field artillery tasks (EFATs), such as Copperhead or FASCAM, may require specific range or angle-T positioning factors. Alternate Paladin zones, developed during mission analysis, allow the commander to quickly shift his forces into areas where he knows he can meet range requirements necessary to accomplish his EFATs.

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Use of Dismounted Infantry

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	2	0	1	1	2

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Heavy task forces (TFs) do not utilize their dismounted infantry.

(T.A.1.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Dismounted infantry are often not integrated into the TF scheme of maneuver.
2. Dismounted infantry lack a clear task and purpose in conjunction with the mounted elements.
3. When heavy TFs are forced to use their dismounted infantry, the soldiers are often unprepared to accomplish their mission.
 - a. Soldiers are unclear of the tactical situation and how their task and purpose relates to the company's task and purpose.
 - b. NCOs often leave behind or do not inspect essential equipment to accomplish their mission (graphics, radios, NVGs, binoculars, AT weapons, etc.).
4. Infantry units are often consolidated within the TF at the last minute, preventing any meaningful troop-leading procedures such as orders briefings, rehearsals, and pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs).

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Mechanized infantry and armor company/team commanders often do not adequately plan for the use of infantry squads with mounted forces in either offensive or defensive operations. (TA.1.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Infantry squads slow the tempo of the operation.
2. Infantry squads have insufficient Class V (i.e., AT weapons, hand grenades, and machine gun ammo) as well as inadequate obstacle breach kits to make them effective for their assigned task.
3. Infantry squads lack effective communication methods.
4. Infantry squads create a safety hazard when moving among maneuvering vehicles (at risk of being run over or becoming victims of a fratricide incident from mounted weapons).
5. The company team commander does not identify the best enemy target for the infantry squads (i.e., enemy infantry, ambush sites, reconnaissance patrols, or observation posts) or plan dismount, remount, or deployment locations.
6. Infantry squads only provide close-in support to the Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs).
7. Infantry squad leaders lack experience, and squads have worked together for less than 90 days.
8. Mechanized infantry squads are repeatedly destroyed (usually while on board their BFV) through insufficient planning and rehearsals, a disregard for needed support, and hasty execution during the battle.
9. The role of mechanized infantrymen is in jeopardy as generations of BFV squads do not meet minimum MTP standards for performance or train to their capabilities as prescribed in FM 7-7J and FM 71-1.

OBSERVATION 2: Task forces do not effectively use their dismounted infantry. (TA.1.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

Task force staffs normally *always* plan for the use of their M2 Bradleys, but if they plan for the use of dismounts, it is usually an afterthought.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES **for Use of Dismounted Infantry**

1. Use every possible opportunity during Home Station training to integrate the use of the mounted and dismounted elements. Identify shortfalls in dismounted personnel and train as a consolidated force during Home Station training.

2. The most effective infantry squad is one that has the support of the task force commander and planning attention of the company commander. The remainder of the armored force can only benefit from the successes of infantry actions. Mechanized infantry and armor commanders at all levels must train and employ infantry squads to reverse this trend. Task force commanders must meet the challenge of planning employment of the infantry in conjunction with mounted forces. The following recommendations address the most often heard excuses:

a. *Infantry squads slow the tempo of the operation.* Plan the operation at task force level for the infantry squads to have a specific task and purpose to support the task force commander's intent. Each mechanized infantry company can support the deployment of its own infantry squads if they are given an attainable task and purpose. Mechanized infantry platoon capabilities and limitations are given in **FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, on pages 1-7 and 1-8. The missions that mechanized infantry squads execute successfully most often are:

- Task: Clear a defile. Purpose: To destroy enemy overwatch elements and facilitate movement. This operation succeeds with BFV support, a detailed, repetitious rehearsal of the actual clear mission, a resourced fire support plan, and engineer squads supporting the ground force (see **CALL CTC Quarterly Bulletin 97-20, "The Defile Breach: TTPs"**).

- Task: Suppress a motorized rifle platoon. Purpose: To prevent fires on the main effort. This task *includes* securing a forward observer (FO) team to adjust indirect fires (to include smoke) onto the point of penetration and/or breach point. This mission also supports an infiltration by the infantry. The end-state for this mission is that enemy forces overwatching a key area (entrance to a chokepoint, an obstacle, a flank of the BP, etc.) are destroyed, suppressed, or obscured (See **CALL CTC Quarterly Bulletin 96-1, "Route Clearance Operations: Using Dismounted Infantry In The Attack"**).

- Task: Establish an observation post (OP). Purpose: To provide indirect fires and reconnaissance on the enemy forces. This surveillance mission secures a FO party to direct accurate artillery fires or CAS and uses infantry squads to secure the position and repel counter-reconnaissance forces.

- Task: Destroy enemy reconnaissance forces. Purpose: To prevent detection of the main body. This mission is an active patrolling operation. Most often, the edges of the main maneuver corridors are not patrolled with any regularity. An infantry patrol, with an indirect fire plan resourced with task force mortars, will detect and destroy enemy reconnaissance assets. Patrols can also link up in an OP on the morning of the fight to report progress of attacking forces forward of the BPs (see **CALL CTC Quarterly Bulletin 96-7, "The Mechanized Counter-reconnaissance Battle: A Company Team Perspective"**).

b. *Infantry squads have insufficient Class V (i.e., AT weapons, hand grenades, and machine gun ammo) as well as inadequate obstacle breach kits to make them effective for their assigned task.* Infantry leaders must anticipate, request, and follow-up on the types of Class V they need to succeed. “MRE-bag” hand grenades (manufactured IAW NTC ROE) are often forgotten. Demolition kits are frequently inadequate despite implied tasks for infantry squads to breach in the absence of engineer support. Task Force S4s must relentlessly request support to infantry squads if they are going to accomplish their task and purpose.

c. *Infantry squads lack effective communication methods.* Provide a SINCGARS radio to each squad or infantry unit operating out of the BFV to communicate with the mounted element, using the AN/PRC 126s for inter-squad and platoon traffic. Radios can be the most effective weapon for a squad, especially if properly placed. Also, when vehicles are destroyed, a radio facilitates the squad's extraction from the battlefield.

d. *Infantry squads create a safety hazard when moving among maneuvering vehicles (fratricide).* This myth has frozen mounted commanders in fear for years. Proper rehearsals, graphic control measures, redundant communications, understanding of surface danger zones and control of the moving infantry element reduce the hazard of individuals moving among vehicles. This reiterates the need for task force commanders to rehearse dismounted actions at task force rehearsals to increase awareness of all leaders.

e. *The company leadership did not identify the best enemy target for the infantry squads and did not plan dismount or deployment locations.* Commanders did not identify the most vulnerable target for the infantry. A well-positioned infantry force often goes undetected in the midst of a mass of armored vehicles, exposing the enemy to the infantry before they can protect themselves. Enemy infantry most often outnumber friendly infantry, which makes them an unfavorable target to engage. Early in the IPB process, look **first** for targets that will be vulnerable to infantry and plan to support their employment against those targets.

f. *Infantry squads only provide close-in support to the BFVs.* Per **FM 7-7J, Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley)** (pages 1 and 2), the role of the BFV is to support infantry rifle platoons and squads, yet commanders are constantly getting it reversed. FM 7-7J is written with that basic assumption in mind; do not confuse the definition and you will prevent confusion on the battlefield.

g. *Infantry squad leaders lack experience, and the squad has only worked together for 90 days or less.* Basic infantry drill training and communication are the key ingredients needed to produce an effective fighting force. Training at NTC will provide the opportunity to hone the rest of the squad's skills.

3. Lack of emphasis on use of dismounts is often due in part to manning shortfalls in mechanized units. However, even those units that are above 80% in manning have generally not trained to utilize their dismounts in their doctrinal role. Units should conduct **Home Station** exercises that include planning for and employing dismounted infantry.

- a. Use the following capabilities of dismounted infantry to enhance lethality:
 - Surveillance (R&S plan and LP/OPs)
 - Reconnoiter (IVLs, security patrols, and LD)
 - Infiltration (seize key terrain, secure FO teams, covertly reduce obstacles, objective surveillance)
 - Execute defense (utilize infantry strong points to secure mounted flanks or contact patrols to adjacent company teams or TFs)

- Construct obstacle (augment the TF engineers)
- Perform anti-armor ambush (economy of force on separate AAs)
- b. Identify dismounted missions early to enable units to task organize and properly prepare and rehearse for their mission.

TREND 4:

SUBJECT: Actions on Contact

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	2	1	1	0	1

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Units often become quickly combat ineffective upon contact with the enemy. (TA.1.1.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Units have exhibited a general inability to execute their plans effectively. This is especially true once the units are in direct fire contact with the enemy.
2. Upon contact with the enemy:
 - a. Units do not use the terrain to their advantage.
 - b. Units do not make full, effective use of fires, smoke, and other combat multipliers.
 - c. Units are invariably "surprised" when the actual enemy disposition is not exactly what they had envisioned in the planning process, and do not know what to do.
 - d. Units are rapidly attrited and do not accomplish their mission.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Actions on Contact

1. Units must not rely on the planning *process* to arrive at the best tactical solution. Branch schools should emphasize that effective use of *METT-T should drive the planning process*. The doctrinal processes themselves will not ensure tactical success. They are only effective if the planners and commanders first understand the nature of the battlefield (METT-T).
2. Units must go to the field for frequent, routine **Home Station** training at company/team and task force levels. Units must go through repetitive actions on contact battle drills until they know instinctively what actions to take upon contact with the enemy.
3. Commanders must be educated on the true nature of the battlefield and given the opportunity to work with their units in a realistic environment.

TREND 5**SUBJECT: Aviation Integration into the Scheme of Maneuver**

	<u>1-2QFY95</u>	<u>3-4QFY95</u>	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>
Observation frequency:	0	1	0	2	2

3-4QFY97**OBSERVATION 1: Commanders (air and ground) do not effectively mass the combat power of attack helicopters. (TA.4.3)*****DISCUSSION:***

1. Typically, commanders and their battle staffs do not accurately assess the threat, identify the decisive point, build a collection plan to confirm the threat's scheme of maneuver, and develop triggers for the employment of attack helicopters.
2. Normally, an attack battalion is assigned numerous missions encompassing the entire width and depth of the battlefield.
3. The battalion executes numerous "911" missions with poor situational awareness of the threat and friendly forces (resulting in fratricide or excessive aircraft losses).
4. The collection plan does not support the readiness condition sequencing and employment of attack aircraft, which causes the aircraft to remain at higher readiness levels than necessary and imposes unplanned refuel requirements before the mission is executed.
5. Poor triggers cause premature or late commitment of attack helicopters.

OBSERVATION 2: There is a lack of an integrated planning between the aviation and ground maneuver elements. (TA.4.4.5)***DISCUSSION:***

1. The aviation and ground maneuver elements plan separately, in a vacuum.
2. Aviation is usually assigned tasks after wargaming is completed.
3. The geographical distances between the aviation TAAs and the ground maneuver TOC/TACs add to the problem.
4. Lack of integrated planning results in:
 - a. Poor synchronization between air and ground forces.
 - b. Uncommon maneuver graphics.
 - c. Uncommon control measures.
 - d. Poor air/ground communication plans.
 - e. Improperly assigned priority of fires.
 - f. Attack-by-fire positions and engagement areas that do not support the ground maneuver plan.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97.)

OBSERVATION 2: (Repeat of Observation 2, 3-4QFY97.)

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Aviation Integration into the Scheme of Maneuver

1. Plan: Attack aviation needs to be integrated into the ground scheme of maneuver during the wargaming process.

a. Commanders should identify the decisive point and the task and purpose of attack helicopters in his guidance to the battle staff.

b. Based upon the commander's guidance and the wargame results, the S2 should refine the collection plan to support the commitment of attack helicopters.

c. Assign an air LNO to the ground maneuver element for the planning of all base orders and on a case-by-case basis for specific follow-on missions. A competent LNO who has the authority to speak for the attack aviation commander must participate in the BCT battle staff's military decision-making process (MDMP) to ensure the proper employment of attack helicopters.

- The air LNO must have sufficient technical and tactical competence to be a productive force in the planning process.

- If possible, the air LNO can remain with the ground maneuver TAC during mission execution.

2. Prepare: Combined arms rehearsals between the ground and air maneuver elements are essential to mission success. Attack aviation commanders need to be part of the ground rehearsal. Their maneuver graphics and decision points need to be discussed during the rehearsal to ensure all commanders understand the conditions for commitment of attack aviation and their maneuver plan. This also allows synchronization and redundant eyes on decision points and triggers.

3. Execute: The attack battalion TAC should be collocated with the BCT TAC to facilitate situational awareness and anticipate employment. Additionally, attack company commanders need to be prepared to monitor the ground maneuver units' command net to synchronize ground and air combat power and reduce the risk of fratricide.

TREND 6

SUBJECT: Actions on the Objective

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	0	1	0	2	1

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Units seldom maneuver at the objective to engage the enemy. (TA.1.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Battalions and company/teams frequently occupy their initial assault-by-fire (ABF) positions at their primary engagement area and do not continue to maneuver to engage the enemy. If the enemy is not exactly where the attacking unit predicted or if the timing is incorrect, the attacking unit may not see the enemy from their initial positions.
2. When company/teams *do* encounter the enemy where predicted and begin the engagement, they typically do not maneuver to maintain contact and maintain security of the ABF position.

OBSERVATION 2: Maneuver units seldom have an understanding of enemy engagement areas and the actions to take upon reaching their objective. (TA.1.2.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Company/team commanders have difficulty providing graphic representation of enemy engagement areas to their platoons.
2. The company/team is normally still moving on the battlefield when they receive first contact from the enemy main body. There is an immediate breakdown in command and control as individual vehicles and platoons begin to react to contact from the march.
3. Once the commander and platoon leaders regain control of their elements, the company has been fixed, loses combat power, and is unable to accomplish its mission.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 2, 3-4QFY97.)

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Actions on the Objective

WHEN THE ENEMY IS NOT WHERE PREDICTED:

1. During initial planning, the S2 must determine an intelligence handover line (IHL) where the executing unit becomes responsible for overwatch of NAIs that lead into the primary engagement area. The executing unit pushes reconnaissance assets forward which provide final guidance to attack assets.

EXAMPLE: NAI 200 is the intelligence handover line (IHL).

- a. Per the S2's decision support template (DST), the enemy is located at NAI 200. The commander decides to attack with the battalion led by reconnaissance assets to the primary engagement area.

b. The reconnaissance asset acquires the enemy at NAI 201 and confirms the main body should attack into the primary engagement area.

2. The S2 must determine early on if sensor capability, availability, and down link provide the capability to perform a precision/max destruction attack. If this capability does not exist, then the attack unit prepares to conduct movement to contact to find and destroy the enemy in a given zone. The staff determines triggers for execution of alternate engagement areas and alternate schemes of maneuver.

EXAMPLE: Collection breakdown at NAI 200.

a. The commander decides to maneuver to the primary engagement area and occupy initial attack-by-fire positions.

b. The battalion occupies initial attack-by-fire positions and does not locate the enemy.

c. After a specified time in the initial attack-by-fire positions (as determined by the staff during COA wargaming), the battalion begins to execute one of two maneuver methods:

- a *movement to contact* to locate and destroy the enemy, or

- *bounding to subsequent attack-by-fire positions* which correspond to alternate engagement areas.

Both methods are effective. Available time, type of terrain, and enemy situation determine the method to use -- or perhaps a combination of the two methods.

3. Regardless of the method used, ***battalions must plan to maneuver at the objective area.*** Even with perfect intelligence, our planned attack-by-fire positions may not accommodate destruction of the enemy. Battalions must be prepared to maneuver to subsequent/alternate attack-by-fire positions to initiate or continue the attack.

4. Establish triggers for this movement.

5. Conduct rehearsals.

WHEN THE ATTACK UNIT BECOMES ENGAGED WITH THE ENEMY:

1. The staff must wargame the attack unit's actions and the enemy reactions during integration of the engagement area.

a. The wargaming process ensures appropriate integration of indirect fire systems, direct fire systems and countermobility.

b. The S2 must disseminate expected OPFOR actions to the company commanders.

2. Company commanders should attend the wargaming session to enhance their knowledge of the overall engagement area plan and how the enemy is expected to react. Through this process, the S3, S2, fire support officer (FSO), and company commanders begin to visualize how the enemy will react and can develop plans to maintain contact and shift fires to destroy the enemy.

a. The company commander leaves the wargame session with a plan to maneuver his company to ensure mission success.

b. The battalion S3 leaves the wargame session prepared to maneuver the battalion to ensure mission success.

GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF ENEMY ENGAGEMENT AREAS:

1. The unit commander must paint the picture for his subordinates. He must build a *mental* and *physical* picture of the enemy's battlespace/engagement area (or "red zone") beginning in the planning phase.

a. He develops and refines the actual location of vehicles and enemy positions from reports prior to crossing the LD.

b. *He must transmit these updates with graphics and FRAGOs to subordinates.*

2. Plan. The commander combines the range arcs of all potential enemy locations and designates the enemy's kill-sack during the development of his order.

a. He refines the S2's threat COA:

- Plans for visual contact and when and where it will occur.

- Plans the ranges from likely security zone locations.

- Plans likely locations for enemy air and NBC agents to be used.

b. He analyzes his portion of the fight and begins building maneuver transition locations (probable lines of deployment, checkpoints, or phase lines). These will aid in the deployment of his force from the march.

c. The commander then focuses on actions on the objective from this line into the enemy rear or to the LOA.

3. Prepare. *Rehearse the transition from **movement** to the company/team **maneuver*** (platoons in overwatch; platoons bounding) and then analyze terrain in depth to determine where advantage over the enemy can be gained.

a. The company will already be within direct fire range and must act independently; its platoons must maneuver without excessive guidance once they reach the enemy "red zone" (the "red zone" fight equals actions on the objective). Plan for enemy air and artillery to attrit the company.

b. Rehearse several approaches as contingencies tied to decision points and what criteria would cause the plan to change.

c. Ensure the plan is rehearsed on a very detailed terrain board and then reinforced, time permitting, with a key leader rehearsal or full rehearsal (see **CALL Newsletter 98-5, Rehearsals**).

4. Execute.


a. Prior to LD, with all reported enemy locations and disposition at his disposal, the commander releases a final graphic, using actual enemy positions to represent the "red zone" (see example below).

b. He issues a FRAGO with any last instructions, and selects the company maneuver transition point. This may be a location of the last covered and concealed spot prior to the enemy's "red zone," or a criteria (i.e., two or more tanks engage lead platoon).

c. Once in the enemy's "red zone," all platoons move deliberately but with coordination conducted over company radio net to ensure maximum, focused firepower.

d. The commander deconflicts maneuver space with adjacent companies.

e. The XO reports the situation to the task force (TF).



Sample enemy "red zone" graphic.

The company/team maneuver and actions on the objective begin just beyond where the enemy main body can influence the unit.

TREND 7

SUBJECT: Engagement Area Development

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	0	0	0	1	3

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Attack helicopter units do not adequately develop the engagement area. (TA.1.2)

DISCUSSION:

1.The overall goal of attack helicopter operations is to destroy enemy formations in a given engagement area. To accomplish this goal the battalion staff must understand and exercise the

eight step engagement area development process outlined in Chapter 3 of **FM 1-112, *Attack Helicopter Operations***.

2. Units commonly conduct an inadequate IPB which causes the attack unit to “miss” the enemy in the indicated engagement area.

3. Units commonly do not properly integrate the massed effects of direct fire systems with other battlefield operating systems (BOS) in the engagement area. As a result, the effectiveness of the attack helicopter unit is significantly reduced.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97.)

OBSERVATION 2: Task force (TF) fire support officers (FSOs) and fire support teams (FISTs) do not adequately complete engagement area (EA) development during defense in sector missions. (TA.2.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Not all triggers are emplaced.
2. Time distance factors for some triggers are miscalculated.
3. Targets are not tied into obstacles.
4. All primary and alternate observers cannot see triggers.
5. Target area survey is usually inadequate.

OBSERVATION 3: Task forces are experiencing difficulty in integrating fire support into engagement area (EA) development during defensive missions. (TA.2.3)

DISCUSSION:

None.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Engagement Area Development

ATTACK HELICOPTER EA DEVELOPMENT:

1. The resources expended and risks associated with attack helicopter operations are substantial. From deep attacks behind a mature enemy front line trace (EFLT) to attacks against first echelon forces in the main battle area (MBA), *success is based on detailed planning and development of the engagement area.*

2. Although the process involves eight steps, the following paragraphs highlight two steps that are commonly neglected.

a. STEP 1 - IPB: The S2 begins the process of IPB given primary and alternate EAs.

1) The S2 should concentrate, initially, on answering the following five questions, which, when answered, will yield the enemy's most probable COA:

- Where is the enemy currently located?
- Where is the enemy going?
- Where can we best engage the enemy?
- When will the enemy be there?
- What weapons systems does the enemy have that can affect the unit?

2) It is imperative that the S2 provide the best possible prediction of the enemy's route. This provides focus for planning and should lead to a primary COA with branches.

3) The S2 must also predict how the formation will look (i.e., number of vehicles, types of formations, march speeds) during movement through NAIs and on arrival at the EA.

4) Finally, the S2 must predict how the enemy will react at TAIs and under direct fire in the engagement area. The S2 provides a description of these reactions (in detail) while wargaming integration of the EA.

5) Upon determination of where the unit should attack the enemy, the S2 must determine quickly the collection assets that are available. The S2 considers the following:

- Sensor capabilities (accuracy, required redundancy, etc.).
 - Higher headquarters' collection plan and priorities for sensors.
 - Sensor scheduling (Do the JSTARS, UAV, SOF, etc., schedules coincide with the attack unit's requirement for coverage?)
 - Is there real-time downlink to the requesting unit?
 - Is there overlapping coverage on critical NAIs, and do we have the capability to shift sensor orientation as the formation proceeds to subsequent NAIs?
- Where is the intelligence handover line (where will higher headquarters hand over the NAI tracking responsibility to the attack unit - this is critical in determining scheme of maneuver).
- Do the NAIs support Redcon level upgrades?
 - Do the NAIs support time/distance requirements from the AA/HA to initial ABF positions?
 - Are NAIs covered by ground maneuver brigade assets, and, if so, do we have appropriate links?

6) Answers to these considerations allow the S2 to establish a realistic decision support template for employment of the attack battalion.

b. STEP 2 - Integration of the engagement area: In short, adequate integration of the engagement area ensures all available BOS assets are considered and employed to ensure maximum destruction of the enemy formation at a given engagement area.

1) Intelligence: As discussed earlier, the S2 must provide accurate predictions of how the enemy formation will look when it enters the engagement area. The S2 must be prepared to present enemy actions during the staff's wargame of events at the engagement area:

- Rates of march (how long the enemy will be visible).
- Key terrain (that gives the enemy advantages for specific avenues of approach).
- When and how the enemy will conduct counter-engagements.
- When and where indirect fire can affect ABFs.
- Where the dead space is in the engagement area.

2) Maneuver: The battalion S3 determines where and when direct fire systems can best be used against the enemy formation the S2 describes.

- The S3 establishes initial ABFs at a primary weapon range (i.e., Hellfire missile) that will ensure a 75 percent probability of hit (Ph).

- The S3 must consider alternate and subsequent ABFs in the objective area.

- If ground maneuver forces are attached or OPCON and will attack into the same engagement area as air maneuver forces, then the S3 must consider fire distribution and deconfliction of fire between the two forces.

- Finally, the S2 and S3 wargame friendly actions versus enemy reactions and determine where in the engagement area artillery, CAS, mortars, obstacles etc., are needed to shape the battlespace for the direct fire fight.

3) Following the wargame: The following questions must be considered:

- What is the end state of the indirect fire plan?

- How much artillery/CAS/mortars are available for employment in the engagement area?

- Who will initiate fires?

- How will the unit shift fires?

- Who will clear fires once the direct fire fight begins?

4) Additional considerations: The staff must also consider and integrate the company commander's direct fire plan from given ABFs and the effects of obscurants in the engagement areas.

5) Extended range deep attacks: Employment of joint nonlethal EW may be the only direct fire complement to the extended range engagement area. Commo and radar jamming can be very effective in and around the engagement area particularly during ingress to initial ABFs and attack of critical ADA targets and in support of movement to subsequent ABFs.

3. Attack battalion staffs should practice wargaming given engagement areas using large scale terrain models.

- a. The FSO should be a participant during wargaming to provide answers early for what indirect fires can and cannot do.

- b. After the unit feels comfortable with the general concept on a terrain model, it should practice on cartoon sketches which represent terrain, ABFs, enemy formations, etc.

- c. As an end state, the staff should be able to wargame the engagement area using a 1:50,000 map.

- d. While practicing the wargame technique, the staff should record techniques that work best.

4. The S2 should keep a battle book of sensor capabilities and enemy orders of battle to expedite the IPB process.

5. The FSO should record potential essential fire support tasks that become evident during practice engagement area wargaming.

FIELD ARTILLERY EA DEVELOPMENT:

1. The task force FSO should develop a scheme of fires to support the task force commander's decisive point. This includes:

- a. Observer planning.

- b. Target emplacement based on sighted obstacles.

- c. Target refinement based on the actual obstacle emplacement.
 - d. Trigger emplacement - both tactical and execution (include limited visibility/thermal).
 - e. An engagement area mounted rehearsal.
2. Tasks must be prioritized with an established timeline and the status of preparation reported. This must be a coordinated effort between the task force FSO/FSE and company/teams. Execution can be centralized or decentralized.
3. The task force fire support sergeant is the SME and should supervise and coordinate the overall effort.
4. Trigger kits must be standardized and resourced.
- a. Time distance factors are different for an enemy moving during day and night, and response and shift times for mortars and artillery are different.
 - b. Establish both tactical and execution triggers. Use procedures established in **FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire** to achieve effective moving target engagement. Emphasis must be focused on emplacing tactical and execution triggers based on precision time distance factors IAW FM 6-30.
 - c. Primary and alternate observers should observe the marking of targets and the emplacement of triggers from their OPs to ensure they can see them, and they must record lased (AZ, VA, range) data to both.
 - d. FISTs conduct target area surveys and prepare terrain sketches and visibility diagrams.

TREND 8

SUBJECT: Integration of Light and Heavy Forces

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	0	0	0	1	1

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Task forces (TF) do not adequately integrate heavy and light forces.
(TA.1.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Light task forces (TFs) are having difficulty integrating heavy units for which they have operational control (OPCON) into their scheme of maneuver.
2. Operations graphics lack the necessary control measures to reposition heavy forces during combat operations.
3. Light TF staffs generally do not understand heavy forces' capabilities and limitations.
4. Heavy company team commanders do not receive clear and defined tasks and purposes.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97.)

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Integration of Light and Heavy Forces

1. Consider having an armor officer serve as a LNO to the light task force staff during light-heavy rotations. Light TF staffs should include the heavy force commander or a heavy force LNO in the planning process.
2. Have more detailed discussion on employment of heavy forces during light-heavy classes at LTP.

FIRE SUPPORT BOS (TA.2)

TREND 1:

SUBJECT: Fire Support Planning

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	0	0	0	2	2

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Task forces (TFs) do not develop the fire support plan to standard.
(TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Key members of the task force (TF) staffs often do not provide mission analysis briefings to the commander.
2. Poor information dissemination inadequately prepares the TF fire support officers (FSOs) and fire support elements (FSEs) to participate in the planning process.
3. FSOs/FSEs cannot provide timely and essential information to the subordinate fire support teams (FISTs). The FISTs, in turn, have no time for concurrent planning.
4. In spite of battle staff focus on synchronizing fires with the TF scheme of maneuver, the commander's guidance for fires does not cover the entire operation.
5. Resulting fire support plans lack sufficient detail and coordination to carry through the entire TF mission.

OBSERVATION 2: The brigade fire support element (FSE) does not develop a complete scheme of fires during the planning phase. (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Brigade FSE personnel do not normally have available all of the tools needed for wargaming and do not have a complete understanding of the product they are expected to produce.
2. The scheme of fires is normally completed *after* the wargame is finished. As a result, the brigade FSO must go back and capture target grids, observer locations, FA position areas, and graphical control measures.
3. Combined arms and fire support rehearsals do not meet the needs of the brigade in ensuring the fire support plan is integrated with maneuver and synchronized.
4. The effects that fire support was to achieve (i.e., suppress, destroy, and obscure) are rarely addressed in detail. Methods are incompletely determined for fire support events.
5. The brigade deep fight quickly becomes ineffective after the first deep engagement and the transition from deep to close to rear normally does not take place.
6. Close air support (CAS) is not effectively integrated into the brigade fire support plan.
7. Artillery movement plans are only loosely tied to fire support events.
8. Staff supervision of the brigade fire support plan is not conducted with a keen eye toward ensuring subordinate organizations are planning and preparing along a course that would result in success for the brigade.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Fire support officers (FSOs) seldom adequately develop and provide resources for the essential fire support tasks (EFSTs). (TA.2.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

Although FSOs are usually able to identify the essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) and develop subsequent scheme of fires necessary to execute and successfully complete those tasks, they seldom adequately allocate available resources or identify the required volume or duration of fires necessary to shape the battlefield and mass fires at the decisive point.

OBSERVATION 2: Brigade fire support element (FSE) personnel often struggle with providing timely and essential information to the battalion/task force (TF) fire support officers (FSOs) to permit concurrent planning. (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Although brigade FSEs normally adequately prepare the FSOs/FSEs for participating in the planning process, the battalion/TF FSOs are often unable to conduct concurrent planning because of missing information.
2. The brigade FSEs often do not:
 - a. Plan fires in support of the close fight.
 - b. Anticipate and provide for the transition from the deep to the close fight.
 - c. Assign specific tasks to battalion FSEs for execution.
3. The resulting fire support plans lack sufficient detail, flexibility, and synchronization necessary to enable the brigade to attack the enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield and appear to the enemy as fighting one continuous fight.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES **for Fire Support Planning**

TASK FORCE FIRE SUPPORT PLAN:

1. Mission Analysis. Upon receipt of the new mission, the FSE begins a battle drill to confirm the current status of the fire support (FS) system and to gather the other needed inputs for the first step in FS planning. These are:

- ♦ Higher headquarters' warning order (WARNO)
- ♦ Facts from FA battalion, ALO, and others
- ♦ Facts from higher/subordinate FSE & FIST
- ♦ IPB products
- ♦ Enemy COAs as developed by S2
- ♦ High-value targets (HVTs) by enemy phase or critical event

a. The TF FSO must:

- Understand the higher maneuver and FS plan.
- Organize and analyze facts.
- Identify specified and implied tasks.
- Translate status of assets into capabilities and limitations.
- Analyze effects of IPB on FS.

b. The TF FSO must *brief the results of his mission analysis to the commander* and conclude his brief with recommended essential fire support tasks.

c. Prior to COA development, the TF FSO should receive the commander's approved essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) and issue a WARNO to his subordinate FISTs, the brigade FSE, and the FA battalion.

2. Course of Action Development. As COA development begins, the TF FSO must conceptualize how to integrate fires into the developing COA. The commander's guidance becomes the start point for where and how the FSO allocates assets to each COA.

a. The results of the mission analysis become the foundation for FS COA development. The FSO uses these results to plan the method for accomplishing the EFSTs. As a minimum, the FS portion of a COA allocates acquisition assets (collection plan), attack assets, planned attack locations (target/TAI/EA), and the sequence (concept of fires) of these attacks required to achieve the effects specified in the EFSTs.

b. The desired output of COA development is a draft fire support plan. The draft FS plan provides the sequence of EFSTs and outlines the task, purpose, method, and end state for each EFST of the operation. The plan must include:

- Concept of fires/draft fires paragraph.
- Draft fire support execution matrix.
- Draft target list worksheet and overlay.
- Draft target synchronization matrix.
- Collection/reconnaissance and surveillance plan.

3. Wargaming. The more complete the FS plan is before COA analysis and comparison, the more efficient and effective the wargame.

a. The wargame provides final detail and refinement, validates capabilities, and synchronizes the fire support plan. Based on issues identified by the wargame, the FSO can

modify the draft FS plan and products to improve the plan.

b. The wargame also provides a means to test the strength of the plan and build in flexibility by identifying decisions and branches for the FS plan.

c. At the conclusion of the wargame, the FSO should have:

- Final fires paragraph.
- Final fire support execution matrix.
- Final target list and overlay.
- Final scheme of fires.
- Final target synchronization matrix.

4. The Fire Support Annex. Using a cartoon sketch, map overlay, or terrain model can help convey the details of the FS plan more clearly. Once approved, the consolidated products become the fire support annex and are added to the maneuver order.

5. References:

a. **CALL Newsletter 95-12, Update, May 97, *Military Decision-Making: "Abbreviated Planning"***.

b. White Paper: "Fire Support Planning for the Brigade and Below," Fire Support Division, USFSCAOD, USAFAS, Fort Sill, OK, 6 June 1997.

BRIGADE SCHEME OF FIRES DEVELOPMENT:

1. Discuss and synchronize events and decision points during COA development and wargaming, so that the scheme of fires allows subordinates to clearly follow the sequence of events. Provide detailed information. The brigade staff should thoroughly wargame the basic task force fight with specific timelines and triggers. The fire support plan, when issued to subordinate organizations, should give the staff a planning framework that will not undergo massive changes as execution time draws near.

2. Plan the scheme of fire support throughout the brigade's battle space, deep, close, and rear. Too often, the brigade does not plan the close fight, and rear operations are seldom considered.

a. The brigade fire support plan often ends after the last deep engagement, which doctrinally, as well as practically, is not correct. If the brigade only plans deep and puts the burden for all close planning on the task forces, the transition from deep to close will never take place as envisioned by the brigade fire support officer.

b. If, instead, the brigade plans the fire support fight throughout the zone or sector by planning one continuous fight, the fire support officer can force the transition from deep to close to rear. There will be no gaps in the transition because it is a single integrated plan developed by a single headquarters.

3. The very essence of top-down fire planning is that the brigade fire support element develops the fire support plan and subordinate fire support elements refine it. In transitioning from deep to close to rear, the brigade is not handing off *fires* to subordinate headquarters. Rather, it is handing them the entire *responsibility for execution* of the brigade fire support plan. The scheme of fires worksheet has proven effective for facilitating this planning and refinement. An example of a completed worksheet for a portion of the scheme of fire support is shown below as a way to capture results of the wargame.

PHASE	I - DEEP FIGHT			This line corresponds to maneuver phases
TRIGGER/DP	CRPs at NAI 4	CAS Tot - 2 min	N. MB MRC at AN 9000	This line is used to provide the trigger to execute the FS event or to indicate a DP that would move us to another event - top-down .
			Panel marker NK 123456	This block is for the specific on-the-ground trigger - bottom-up refined .
FS EVENT	1. AN 9001	2. AN 0001	3. CTB 2	Event sequence # and target or CTB #.
	FASCAM	SEAD for CTB 2	CAS on N. MRC	Description of event - asset and HPT.
PRI OBS/EXE	COLT 1	COLT 1	ETAC 1	Primary executor - may need bottom-up refinement .
OP LOCATION				Primary executor location to execute from – bottom-up refinement .
ALT OBS/EXE	COLT 2	COLT 2	COLT 1	Alternate executor - may need bottom-up refinement .
OP LOCATION				Alternate executor to execute from - bottom-up refinement .
TASK	Emplace FASCAM minefield to delay N. MRB in passes	Suppress AA in MRC/mark TGT area	Destroy 1 tank and 3 BMPs in N. MRC	Task of this event: Tells observer what he is trying to do with this event = attack guidance. Enemy formation and effect .
PURPOSE	To allow attack by CAS	To prevent losses to CAS aircraft while attacking N. MRC at FASCAM	To attrit 1/3 from N. MRC and delay N. MRB	Purpose of this event: Tell observer why he is attacking the event so he can do the right thing without additional guidance. In terms of friendly maneuver .
EFFECTS	N. MRB delayed 10 min	AAA suppressed at H-1 UP mark	N. MRB delayed 5 min	Effects or end state of event - gives us criteria to assess our event and reattack if required.
WPN/UNIT	R BN 155	DS BN 155	2 A-10s	The top-down asset to accomplish task.
MUNITIONS/VOLUME	96 RAAMs 24 ADAMS med density	BN 3 DPICM 1 GUN WP	8 Maverick	The bottom-up refinement from FA or ALO on the specifics of the attack asset.
FSCM	CFL PL BLOOD NFA 1, NFA 2	CFL PL BLOOD NFA 1, NFA 2	CFL PL BLOOD NFA 1, NFA 2	The FSCM that supports the event or changes with the event.
ACA			ACA BLUE	ACA in effect
NOTES		CTB 2: 1234-1236-1638-1644	CTB 2: 1234-1236-1638-1644	Other notes or remarks

4. Conduct complete and thorough staff supervision of the plan. The scheme of fire support worksheet provides an excellent staff supervision document.

a. To alert the brigade FSE and subordinates, highlight with dark lines any areas that require bottom-up refinement. Subordinate elements should be required to submit the execution details of that event, to include:

- Exact trigger description and grid
- The time the trigger was emplaced
- Refined target number and grid for the same task and purpose
- Refined primary target number and grid for the same task and purpose
- Refined primary and alternate observers and OP grid
- Refined weapon/unit/munition/volume

b. As the information is received from subordinates, the brigade FSE can determine whether the subordinate's plan will accomplish the event properly (i.e., triggers in the proper location, volume of fire sufficient to achieve the required effects, etc.). If further refinement is necessary, direct that the refinement take place.

ESSENTIAL FIRE SUPPORT TASKS (EFST):

EFSTs are refined from the commander's intent and guidance for fires. They form the foundation for the concept of fire support, for developing the COA for fire support, and for COA analysis, validation, and synchronization with maneuver (wargaming). EFSTs are identified by task, purpose, method, and end state:

1. **TASK**. Describes the targeting effect (targeting objective) fires must achieve *against a specific enemy formation's function or capability*. These formations are high-payoff targets (HPTs). (Memory Aid: Task = Effect, Formation, Function.) Pages 1 and 2 of **FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process**, outline several terms to describe targeting effects or objectives that can be used. The terms disrupt, delay, or limit are most commonly used.

a. **Disrupt** means to preclude efficient interaction of enemy combat or combat support systems. More simply, it means to not let an enemy formation do *what* it is supposed to do. (Example: "Disrupt the AT battery long-range fires against the TF flank companies...")

b. **Delay** means to alter the time of arrival of specific enemy formation or capability. It focuses on not letting the enemy do some function *when* it wants/needs to. (Example: Delay the ability of the AGMB to support the FSE with direct fires until...)

c. **Limit** means to reduce an enemy's options or COAs. It normally focuses on not letting the enemy function *where* he wants. (Example: Limit the ability of the enemy air assault company to establish an LZ in the high ground west of the firebase....)

2. **PURPOSE**. Describes the maneuver or operational purpose for the task. (Memory Aid: Purpose = maneuver purpose.) This should identify as specifically as possible the maneuver formation that will benefit from the targeting effect and describe in space and time what the effect will accomplish. (Example: To allow our advanced guard company to destroy the FSE with direct fires before the AGMB arrives.)

3. **METHOD**. Describes how the task and purpose will be achieved. It ties the detect function or "observer" (COLT/scout/FIST/TA/IEW sensor) with the deliver function or "shooters" (lethal and nonlethal assets) in time and space and describes how to achieve the task.

a. For the observer, it can assign priority of fires (POF) to execute the task outlined. It assigns FA or maneuver observers or other acquisition means. (The assignment of the observer

requires the consideration of target selection standards.) When a specific asset (i.e., CAS) is to focus exclusively on a task, that information can be communicated here. (Example: Priority of CAS is to destroy the tanks in the enemy CAR.) This part of the method can also provide focus by using NAIs, TAIs, targets, CAS target boxes, or engagement areas to describe where the attacks will occur.

b. For the shooter, it describes the allocation of fire support assets to accomplish the EFSTs. Assets may include artillery, mortar, or mechanical smoke, FA fires (suppress, neutralize, destroy, obscure, screen), FASCAM, CPHD, CAS, IEW jamming, and/or attack helicopters. In method, the artillery and other “Deliver” assets can identify their part of accomplishing the EFST. It is from the method of an EFST that the FA and other FS/TA assets get their essential tasks.

c. The method can also outline any limitations or restrictions on accomplishing the tasks such as ammunition (i.e., no ICM on the objective), FSCM (i.e., ACA Blue in effect) or other restrictions that may affect the accomplishment of the EFST.

EXAMPLE:

COLT 1 (W/ETAC) (PRI) and COLT 2 (ALT) POF to attack AGMB. FA will emplace FASCAM in TAI 1 behind the FSE (AB 9000). FA will neutralize the lead MRC of the AGMB as it tries to breach or bypass the FASCAM (AB 2001). CAS will simultaneously attack the trail MRCs of the AGMB west of the FASCAM in CTB 1 or CTB 2. IEW will identify the ADA net and then jam it as the CAS departs the IP.

4. END STATE. Attempts to quantify the successful accomplishment of the task. If multiple shooters are involved, it helps delineate what each must accomplish. End state provides a measure of the point of task completion. It also provides a basis for assessing the situation and making the decision to re-attack or not.

EXAMPLE:

AGMB delayed in the pass for 20 minutes. FASCAM (400X400 SD) behind the FSE and in front of AGMB. One tank/four BMPs destroyed by FA behind FASCAM. CAS destroys four tanks/two BMPs behind FASCAM. Enemy ADA command and control net jumps 5 + times during CAS attacks.

BRIGADE FS PLANNING:

1. Mission Analysis. Upon receipt of the new mission, the FSE begins a battle drill to confirm the current status of the fire support system and to gather the other needed inputs for the first step in fire support planning. These are:

- ♦ Higher headquarters’ WARNO or order
- ♦ Facts from FA battalion, ALO, others
- ♦ Facts from higher/subordinate FSE and FIST
- ♦ IPB products
- ♦ Enemy COAs as developed by S2
- ♦ HVTs by enemy phase or critical event

a. The FSO must:

- Understand the higher headquarters’ maneuver and fire support plan.
- Organize and analyze facts.
- Identify specified and implied tasks.
- Translate status of assets into capabilities and limitations.
- Analyze effects of IPB on fire support.

- b. The FSO should brief the results of his mission analysis to the commander and conclude his brief with recommended essential fire support tasks (EFSTs).
 - c. Prior to COA development, the FSO should receive the commander's approved EFSTs and issue a WARNO to his subordinate FSOs **and** to the FA battalion.
2. Course of Action Development. As COA development begins, the FSO should conceptualize how to integrate fires into the developing COA. The commander's guidance becomes the start point for where and how the FSO allocates assets to each COA.
 - a. The results of the mission analysis become the foundation for fire support COA development. The FSO uses these results to plan the method for accomplishing the EFSTs. As a minimum, the fire support portion of a COA allocates acquisition assets (collection plan), attack assets, planned attack locations (target/TAI/EA), and the sequence (concept of fires) of these attacks required to achieve the effects specified in the EFSTs.
 - b. The desired output of COA development is a draft fire support plan. The draft fire support plan provides the sequence of EFSTs and outlines the task, purpose, method, and end state for each EFST of the operation. The plan should include:
 - Concept of fires/draft fires paragraph.
 - Draft fire support execution matrix.
 - Draft target list worksheet and overlay.
 - Draft target synchronization matrix.
 - Collection/R&S plan.
3. Wargaming. The more complete the fire support plan is before COA analysis and comparison, the more efficient and effective the wargame.
 - a. The wargame provides final detail and refinement, validates capabilities, and synchronizes the fire support plan. Based on issues identified by the wargame, the FSO can modify the draft fire support plan and products to improve the plan.
 - b. The wargame also provides a means to test the strength of the plan and build in flexibility by identifying decisions and branches for the fire support plan.
 - c. At the conclusion of the wargame, the FSO should have:
 - Final fires paragraph.
 - Final fire support execution matrix.
 - Final target list and overlay.
 - Final scheme of fires.
 - Final target synchronization matrix.
4. The Fire Support Annex. Using a cartoon sketch, map overlay, or terrain model can help convey the details of the fire support plan more clearly. Once approved, the consolidated products become the fire support annex and are added to the maneuver order.

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Integration of Fire Support with Maneuver

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	0	1	0	2	5

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Task forces (TFs) are not conducting sufficient planning for integrating fires into the scheme of maneuver. (TA.2.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. During wargaming, fire support officers (FSOs) do not understand the scheme of maneuver and what fires are necessary, given the constraints, to support the maneuver plan.
2. TF FSOs plan the use of fires without a thorough knowledge of the critical fire support tasks.
3. When a TF has priority of fires, it does not maximize the use of fires, and fires do not have a significant impact during the execution.

OBSERVATION 2: The brigade fire support element (FSE) and the brigade staff have a difficult time integrating fires with maneuver. (TA.2.3)

DISCUSSION:

Fires are normally planned *after* and not concurrently with the other BOS during the planning process. This problem begins with mission analysis and continues through COA development, wargaming, and rehearsals.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Task force Fire Support Officers (FSOs) often do not conduct fire support planning outside the allocations of the established brigade fire support plan. (TA.2.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Most *brigade* FSOs develop and disseminate detailed and directive fire support plans based on essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) received from the brigade commander. Brigades do a good job of planning and fighting the brigade's deep fight; however, *fires from the task force close fight is often inadequately planned or do not support the task force scheme of maneuver.*
2. Many task force fire support plans lack flexibility because the FSO has not planned in depth or developed a plan for use of all fire support assets (i.e., CAS or MLRS fires) just because brigade did not allocate any of those assets.

OBSERVATION 2: Brigade level employment of CAS and artillery fires usually does not set the conditions for success on the objective during the attack. (TA.2.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Units do not understand the volume of artillery required for mission accomplishment.
2. Units do not understand the importance of synchronizing these tasks to the scheme of maneuver.

3. Artillery fires are often lifted and shifted before the task is complete.

OBSERVATION 3: Light task force fire support plans often lack specificity to support the scheme of maneuver. (TA.2.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Plans and orders do not clearly designate when units have priority of fires.
2. Staffs do not effectively plan triggers to shift priority of fires.
3. During direct-fire fights, task forces do not use fire support to assist them in setting the conditions to defeat the enemy. Specifically, smoke or suppressive fires are overlooked to assist maneuver.

OBSERVATION 4: Staffs do not fully integrate destructive fires, such as CAS, indirect fires, and air Volcano, to limit enemy reaction to the fire and maneuver plan. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. Higher headquarters often push combat-multiplier resources to the executing unit with little or no planning guidance. This lack of guidance and coordination/refinement often desynchronizes the unit's maneuver plan.
2. Brigade staffs normally select air Volcano targets with no consideration of the supported unit's maneuver plan. Consequently, air Volcano planning is not to standard.

OBSERVATION 5: Fire support is rarely integrated into the task force wargaming process. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

During the wargame, the battle staff frequently does not effectively arrange activities in time and space. As a result, task forces frequently do not develop a scheme of fires with adequate triggers or with an observation plan that is synchronized with the scheme of maneuver.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for the Integration of Fire Support with Maneuver

1. Task force fire support officers (FSOs) need to understand how artillery is being used in the brigade fight and must articulate the use of artillery by the brigade combat team (BCT) to the TF staff during course of action (COA) development and wargaming. This would provide them a better understanding of what close support assets can do to support the TF scheme of maneuver.
2. Develop fire support element (FSE) battle drills that ensure the following results occur in each phase:

<u>Step</u>	<u>Results</u>
Mission Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - HVTs by critical events - Fire support capabilities - Impact of IPB, TVA, and battlefield geometry on fire support - Recommend tasks for fire support
Commander's guidance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Task: formation, function, effect - Purpose: How task contributes to our success - Nominated HPTs
COA Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Concept of fires - Tentative PSNs, triggers, and FSCMs - Tentative R&S/observer plan and attack system - Nominated HPTs
Wargame	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Detailed scheme of fires - Clear sequence of FS events - Final triggers, PSNs, FSCMs, observer plan, attack system, and volume - HPTs defined clearly
Rehearsal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Synchronized execution - Deconflict FA PSNs and movement - Ensure understanding of scheme - Practice branches and sequels

3. Current doctrine outlines a top-down fire planning process with bottom-up refinement.
 - a. If the brigade has done an adequate job of synchronizing fires with maneuver at the brigade level, the only refinement that should be needed is target location based on SITEMP refinement at task force level and triggers based on the task force scheme of maneuver.
 - b. However, if the brigade has done an *inadequate* job or the scheme of fires does *not* support the task force scheme of maneuver, the FSO must plan fires to support his commander.
4. If any changes to the scheme are made:
 - a. They should be within the framework of the brigade EFSTs.
 - b. The task force FSO must advise the brigade FSO and FSCoord that the task force commander will be seeking approval for his new plan from the brigade commander.
5. Brigades often experience spans of time when a particular fire support asset is not used (or in the case of CAS, diverted) due to deviation from the original plan. If the task force FSO has a plan for these assets that supports the task force scheme of maneuver, often the brigade will re-allocate assets to the task force.
6. The FA battalion must be able to provide the fire support that maneuver forces require. This means the battalion must plan for repositioning. Coordination of real estate requirements with the supported maneuver unit is a continuous process.
7. Brigades must better integrate the use of CAS and artillery fires to set the conditions for success on maneuver objectives. This is accomplished with an effective observation plan and scheme of fires specifically *focused* on destroying the motorized rifle platoon (MRP) at the point of penetration.

8. Suppression and obscuration fires facilitate the positioning of the support-by-fire (SBF) force and fires to support the breach, followed by fires to support the assault of the objective. These fires must be event-driven versus time-driven (i.e., the support force commander lifts smoke/suppressive fires when he is ready to begin his mission in the support-by-fire position). Suppression and obscuration fires must be defined in terms of specific areas and duration.

9. CAS employment must be wargamed during the planning process to ensure proper focus. This must include use of ACAs and SEAD. ALOs must be involved in this process.

10. Task force staffs must improve clarity and specificity for priority of fires and triggers to shift priority of fires. This must be articulated in a clear, detailed concept of fires.

11. During COA development and wargaming, staffs must consider smoke and suppressive fires to help set favorable conditions in the close operation.

12. The commander must clearly state his intent/concept for fire support. To be useful, the commander's intent/concept for fire support must be both understood and feasible, and must articulate:

- a. Commander's battlespace: his vision of lethality projection. It should answer the question, "What do I want to do to the enemy?" and articulate more than just, "Defeat him." It should not refer to a specific scheme of maneuver or to specific organizations.

- b. What must be accomplished, when, and why.

- c. How the commander intends to shape the battle to his advantage in terms of time and space.

- d. The critical enemy vulnerability (center of gravity) the commander believes will lead most directly to mission accomplishment.

- e. Places and times in the fight which are critical.

- f. Desired end-state in terms of time, force, enemy, and terrain.

- g. Units having priority of fires.

- h. Preliminary guidance on high-value targets/high-payoff targets (HVTs/HPTs).

- i. The commander's special concerns.

13. The FSO and battalion commander should mutually articulate and understand what fire support can and is expected to accomplish during an operation.

14. The commander's requirements must be within the capabilities of the resources available.

15. The FSO must know and communicate fire support capabilities, limitations, and risks during the process of developing the commander's intent/concept for fire support.

16. The fire support plan outlines the way artillery, CAS, and other fire support systems will be used to complement the scheme of maneuver and provides instruction for executing those fires. It is used to rank targets in priority order, match them with available fire support systems, eliminate duplication with the targets of the echelon that the attack helicopter battalion (ATKHB) is supporting, and allow fires to be executed quickly without specific direction from the commander once the battle starts.

17. CAS is normally planned through FSO channels to the Air Force tactical air control party (TACP) located at a ground maneuver brigade, division, or corps headquarters. Because each member retains his own C2 system, mission planning must be a coordinated effort. Constant coordination is required between the ground maneuver commander, aviation commander, TACAIR flight leader/ALO, and FSO. As elements of the mission change, all members must be informed so that they can adjust their plans accordingly. Success depends on proper synchronization of assets and how well each member understands the operation.

18. The task force S3 and FSO ensure that fire support is completely integrated into the wargaming process of the military decision-making process (MDMP). Refer to **FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process**, **FM 6-20-20, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Battalion, Task Force, and Below**, and ST 100-9.

19. The FSO advises the task force commander and S3 when they have asked fire support to execute unrealistic tasks.

20. Fire support tasks and events are arranged in time and space in relation to terrain, the enemy, and the TF scheme of maneuver in order to develop adequate triggers.

21. The end-state should be a complete scheme of fires, an observation plan, and refinement submitted to brigade. This end state produces a plan that provides all targeting functions (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) per **FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process**.

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Fighting and Observation Positions/Observation Planning

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	0	1	0	2	3

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Task forces (TFs) have difficulty synchronizing the establishment of support-by-fire (SBF) positions. (TA.1.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Company/teams are given inadequate clarification of the SBF purpose and associated tasks. They continually assume they have a *destroy* mission when, in actuality, a fix or suppress mission may accomplish the purpose of the SBF.

2. TF staffs do not accomplish a detailed terrain analysis of the planned SBF position and generally establish an SBF within the enemy “kill sack.”

3. Little consideration is given to the effects of weather, enemy disposition, and the need to establish conditions prior to occupying the SBF.

4. Effective triggers, assault positions, and observation points are not planned, and, if planned, usually ignored during execution.

5. Smoke plans are rarely made, and coordination of the targeting process between fire support and maneuver does not occur.

6. TF mortars are given the task of obscuring an enemy position in order to permit occupation of the SBF. Even with 120-mm mortars it is difficult for a mortar platoon to initiate and maintain a smoke screen of any significant size.

7. Inability to establish an effective SBF will normally result in the breach and assault force not accomplishing their mission. The rapid demise of the SBF element gives the enemy freedom to reposition at will.

OBSERVATION 2: Observation plans often lack sufficient detail to provide the company fire support team (FIST) a focus for planning, preparing, or executing their mission.
(TA.2.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

None.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 2, 3-4QFY97.)

OBSERVATION 2: Task forces experience difficulty developing and executing an observation plan to support essential fire support tasks (EFSTs), the scheme of fires, and the scheme of maneuver. (TA.2.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Observers frequently commit errors in observed fire procedures resulting in inaccurate target locations.
2. The FSO frequently does not synchronize the observer plan with the scheme of maneuver during the wargaming process.
3. Company/team level refinement of the observer plan does not always happen.
4. Rehearsals are frequently inadequate.
5. Fire support teams (FISTs) have difficulty getting into position at the right time and place to acquire the enemy before the task force finds itself decisively engaged in the enemy commander's battle space.

OBSERVATION 3: Task force observer plans are usually developed *after* wargaming.
(TA.4.3.2)

DISCUSSION:

When observer plans are not developed until after wargaming, they lack the detail and synchronization required to ensure observers are in position and prepared to execute the scheme of fires.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Fighting and Observation Positions/Observation Planning

SUPPORT BY FIRE (SBF) POSITIONS:

1. There is one short page on this subject in **FM 71-123, *Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team***, leading the reader to conclude that the SBF mission is a simple task that needs little emphasis.

This doctrinal reference should be expanded to thoroughly address the importance of establishing and executing an effective SBF.

2. TF commanders and staffs must realize the criticality of the SBF mission.
 - a. A thorough threat and terrain analysis must be conducted to support the SBF.
 - b. The staff should conduct a detailed wargame of the SBF mission.
3. Early in the planning process, establish a clear purpose for the SBF and assign specific tasks to support that purpose.
4. Require the S2/battlefield information coordination center (BICC) and staff to complete a detailed threat and terrain analysis. Advantages and disadvantages of key and/or decisive terrain must be recognized and integrated into the wargaming process.
 - a. Make maximum use of Terrabase.
 - b. Identify multiple enemy COAs, to include the use of his combat multipliers.
 - c. If possible, conduct a physical reconnaissance of the area.
5. Establish criteria, decision points, triggers, and conditions during wargaming that will synchronize the establishment of the SBF. Anticipated enemy events must be included in the wargaming.
6. Develop an observation plan to execute the planned synchronization. Ensure the SBF position is not occupied until it has been reconnoitered and observation is conducted on the enemy position to be suppressed, fixed, or destroyed.
7. The TF fire support officer (FSO) should plan fires to cover the positioning of the SBF force.
 - a. He must clearly define the essential fires support tasks associated with the SBF.
 - b. He must understand the capabilities of each fire support asset and then translate that into a realistic fire support execution matrix. The matrix must clearly define task and purpose of fires and address the “decide-detect-deliver-assess” aspects as related to the scheme of maneuver.
8. Priority of fires should be given to the SBF force until their task/purpose is accomplished. The SBF commander should be the responsible leader for determining when fires can be shifted to support the breach force. A technique is to position the TF commander in a position where he can make that assessment.
9. Smoke plans should be developed by the S3, FSO and chemical officer to support maneuver into and occupation of the SBF. The plan must address all types of smoke, to include FA, mortar, vehicle generated, and smoke pots.
10. The S2 must continually update threat COAs, based upon gathered intelligence, and disseminate them on the command net.
 - a. Information must be rapidly analyzed and disseminated to all elements but immediately to the SBF force.
 - b. Staffs should be skilled in visualizing the battlefield and capable of completing a predictive analysis.
11. Operational control graphics must be developed to permit flexibility. Decision points should be developed to support occupation of multiple SBFs.
12. TF commanders should require detailed rehearsals by the SBF force and elements in support. A complete understanding by everyone of tasks and purpose is critical by the end of the rehearsal.
13. TF TOCs should closely track the success or failure of the SBF force. That success or failure should be associated with a decision point to continue as planned or to execute other branches or COAs.

OBSERVATION PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION:

1. The observation plan, as an integral part of the fire support plan, should provide the task and purpose for each observer by phase of the operation. As part of the scheme of fires worksheet, the following format may be useful:

FIRE SUPPORT OBSERVATION PLAN

	PHASE 1	PHASE 2
FS EVENT		
Task		
Purpose		
Trigger		
Observer		
Method		
Remarks		

This focus enables the company FIST to plan, conduct appropriate pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs), and execute their mission according to the task force (TF) commander's intent.

2. Maneuver commanders must maintain the tactical patience necessary to allow observers to get into position and execute their assigned task and purpose, in order to set conditions for maneuver. **FM 6-71, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander***, states that company/team commanders are the executors of the plan. FISTs are the maneuver commander's precision target acquisition assets. Success can be achieved with top-down planning, bottom-up refinement, and decentralized execution.

3. Construct an observer plan in concert with the S2 and S3, and use Terrabase computer programs to assist in position selection. This provides the detect functions of the targeting process IAW **FM 6-20-10, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process***.

4. The task force FSO must plan to have observers in position to support the maneuver commander's decisive point and each essential fire support task (EFST). Address where observers need to be, how they will get there, security measures, and communications requirements.

a. Remember that forward observers (FOs), scouts, COLTs, and maneuver shooters are viable observers to utilize. Consider employing the reserve company/team FIST as a task force COLT (a doctrinal option in **FM 6-20-20, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Battalion, Task Force, and Below***).

b. If an observer must be in position to see the commander's decisive point or EFST, the maneuver commander must be willing to commit the assets necessary to get the observer into position.

5. Synchronize the observation plan with the scheme of maneuver during the *wargame*. To do so, you must have a thorough terrain analysis, coupled with a complete understanding of the enemy's capabilities, that defines the enemy commander's battle space. The task force FSO provides the top-down plan that is refined by company FSOs in conjunction with company/team commanders.

6. The plan must be *rehearsed* during both task force and company/team rehearsals.

7. Initiative, cross talk, and coordination between FISTs are imperative during execution.

8. Observers must employ their precision target acquisition equipment IAW the appropriate TMs and follow the observed fire procedures in **FM 6-30** for manual target location.

TASK FORCE FS OBSERVER PLANS:

1. Task force (TF) observation planning should *begin* during course of action (COA) development and be *refined* during the wargaming process.

Step 1. The FSO must clearly identify the task force essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) in terms of task, purpose, method, and end-state. By doing this, the FSO can concentrate on how and where to position available observers to best accomplish the EFSTs.

Step 2. The FSO must coordinate with the task force S2 to determine enemy information as portrayed in the situational and event templates. This helps the FSO to visualize what the enemy formations will look like in relation to the terrain and when/where enemy actions/events should occur in terms of time and space. Additionally, the S2 can provide a thorough terrain analysis to help the FSO in determining possible OP locations in terms of line-of-sight, trafficability, and survivability.

Step 3. The products included in the task force OPORD should include detailed guidance for each planned observation post (OP). Address the following items:

- OP location with visibility/equipment requirements.
- Time to occupy (friendly/enemy event).
- Route.
- EFST to execute (specific and detailed task and purpose).
- Security requirements/arrangements.
- Disengagement criteria.

2. The FSO should develop a checklist of OP selection tasks for inclusion in the SOP. An example listing of tasks follows:

Step 1. Identify the requirements for an OP during the wargaming. The OP may be required to execute the R&S plan or to trigger fire support targets.

Step 2. Conduct terrain analysis. Terrabase is an effective tool to accomplish this task. Run a shot from the NAI/TAI or the target to determine possible OP locations. This method saves time by identifying all possible OP locations.

Step 3. Allocate assets. Choose based on the mission of the OP. If Copperhead is used, a G/VLLD equipped observer is necessary; a reconnaissance observer may need SAPPERS; a surveillance OP may use scouts. Consider brigade COLTs and brigade reconnaissance teams (BRTs) in addition to task force observers or scouts.

Step 4. Select the OP site. Select from likely OP sites developed during terrain analysis. Consider mission and capabilities of the asset (i.e., angle-T, limited visibility, enemy situation, etc.).

Step 5. Plan movement and occupation of OPs within the constraints of the scheme of maneuver.

Step 6. If the observer is a company/team FIST, specify tasks to subordinate units responsible for executing.

Step 7. Confirm requirements of observation plan and disseminate changes.

Step 8. Facilitate execution.

AIR DEFENSE BOS (TA.3)

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Early Warning Dissemination and Reaction

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	2	3	2	1	2

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Directed early warnings are not rebroadcast in a timely manner to soldier/crew levels. (TA.3.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Breakdowns begin at task force (TF) level because there is no ADA representative in the TF tactical operations center (TOC) during the battle (the ADO fights from his Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV).

2. Breakdowns continue when company commanders do not explain their active or passive air defense measures during rehearsals.

3. The breakdown is complete when the soldiers do not hear or understand the directed early warning.

4. Inadequate rebroadcast of directed early warning reduces the unit's ability to take active or passive measures, resulting in unnecessary attrition to enemy CAS or Hinds.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97.)

OBSERVATION 2: Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) platoons do not adequately develop or execute a communications plan to disseminate early warning to company/teams, and do not react to early warning. (TA.3.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Squads are not monitoring the proper early warning NET.

2. When platoons *do* develop a plan, they do not factor adjustments to their plan based on combat attrition.

3. Company/teams do not react to air attacks with Combined Arms for Air Defense (CAFADS) or passive measures.
4. BSFV crews do not react to “RED TIGHT DYNAMITE” and do not dismount the Stinger weapon in time to defeat the air threat.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES **for Early Warning Dissemination and Reaction**

1. Early warning continues to be the pivotal factor during air defense operations.
 - a. Directed early warning is designed to alert a particular unit, units, or area of the battlefield of an immediate or possible threat. It is passed over unit command net or nets designated by the unit as flash precedent traffic.
 - b. Directed early warning defines the local air defense warning (LADW), gives aircraft status (friendly, hostile or unknown), and identifies the approaching cardinal direction.
2. Commanders must ensure that directed early warnings are rebroadcast immediately down to soldier/crew levels.
3. Commanders must ensure that soldiers understand and act on directed early warnings.
 - a. Air defense operations should be addressed in the unit TACSOP.
 - b. Cover, concealment and dispersion are key to successful passive air defense measures.
 - c. Any successful air defense plan must include the consideration of Combined Arms for Air Defense (CAFADS).
4. Company-level actions to defeat the air threat include a CAFADS plan, the use of air guards, and engagement techniques to achieve the following:
 - a. Destroy the threat.
 - b. Force the threat away from friendly positions.
 - c. Force the threat to fly higher.
 - d. Spoil the hostile pilot's aim.
5. References: **FM 44-43, BSFV Platoon and Squad Operations**; **FM 44-64, FAAD Battalion and Battery Operations**.
6. BSFV platoons should follow the communication procedures outlined in **FM 44-43**.
7. Platoon leaders should develop SOPs regarding adjustments to their commo plan once crews are attrited. The SOP should assign at least one BSFV per section to broadcast early warning to the supported company/team. This will ensure that early warning is passed down to company/team level.
8. The platoon leader should prioritize NETs so crews will know what is most essential to the mission.

MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY/NBC BOS (TA.6)

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Force Protection

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	2	7	5	2	2

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP) area security is often not adequate. (TA.6.3.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Units routinely do not establish basic security, from initial occupation of the UMCP through construction of individual fighting positions.
2. There is little uniformity in the way units occupy UMCPs or establish the UMCP area.
3. Individual soldiers are rarely oriented on defensive positions or where each individual goes when directed to defend.

OBSERVATION 2: Brigade fratricide risks are high during brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations. (TA.6.3.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Brigade reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) is poorly supervised by the S3, exposing friendly soldiers to high-risk, friendly fire conditions.
2. Too many brigades view the R&S effort as a secondary or separate planning effort.
3. Brigades commonly have 15 to 20 soldiers infiltrating or air inserted throughout the depth of the brigade's area of operations. Task force (TF) scouts can add an additional 20 to 30 soldiers operating in the same general areas. Brigade S3 sections seldom practice battle space management and expose their scouts, COLTs, and ETACs to potential fratricide incidents.
4. Every unknown, unsupervised, or poorly planned insertion of a surveillance asset exponentially increases the potential for disaster.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Task force (TF) CSS elements, particularly the CTCP, UMCP, and medical platoon, often do not take measures to protect themselves from enemy ground, artillery, air, or chemical attacks. (TA.6.3.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. CSS assets rarely have effective security or defense plans with sectors of fire, rehearsed or understood save plans, or adequate coordination with adjacent units for security. These units are highly vulnerable and an easy target for enemy attacks.

2. Often CSS soldiers do not have ammunition for their personal weapons and are unprepared for enemy contact, resulting in disrupted support and unnecessary casualties.

OBSERVATION 2: Engineer battalion headquarters and headquarters companies (HHCs) are not trained to standard on defending their portion of the BSA perimeter against threat Levels 1 and 2. (TA.6.3.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

None.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Force Protection

UNIT MAINTENANCE COLLECTION POINT (UMCP) SECURITY:

1. Battalion maintenance officers (BMOs) must develop SOPs that provide for security while moving and halted.
2. UMCPs must rehearse occupation of the UMCP area.
3. UMCP NCOs must utilize all available personnel and equipment at the UMCP for security.
4. The UMCP NCOIC should assign security duties to *M1/M2 crews* waiting on repairs to their vehicles:
 - a. M1/M2 crews can dig in UMCP fighting positions.
 - b. M1/M2 crews can take an active role in the UMCP security plan.

FRATRICIDE RISKS DURING RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE (R&S) OPERATIONS:

1. R&S efforts are operational missions and intrinsically high-risk in nature. R&S planning and execution requires the knowledge, experience, and supervision of the primary maneuver BOS representative.
 - a. Use WARNOs and FRAGOs to get tasks and coordinating instructions out early to subordinate units. This will allow the unit maximum parallel planning time.
 - b. If a separate R&S order is published, it should be incorporated into the brigade's base order as one of the first phases of the OPORD.
 - b. As with all maneuver operations, develop and issue graphics, adequate control measures, and unit locations to all subordinate units involved in the operation.
 - c. Brigade and subordinate units must exchange their plans and graphics and ensure assigned soldiers are instructed in higher and adjacent unit activities, and locations of other units operating in their areas.
 - d. The brigade operations section must review subordinate plans and identify potential BOS problems supporting the operation. Deconflict C2 and maneuver problems and notify BOS representatives of CS and CSS problems. The operations section must follow-up on BOS representative solutions to problem areas.

2. The brigade operations section must practice battle space management. The current operations section must track current unit movement, activities, and locations and provide FSE accurate information to clear fires.

CSS UNIT PROTECTION:

1. CSS elements should address security plans in their SOPs.
2. They should conduct troop-leading procedures (TLP) just as they would for any other unit.
3. Units should plan for and rehearse actions under each of the seven forms of contact. Train the battle drills in **FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, FM 17-15, Tank Platoon, or FM 7-7J, Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley)** to provide the basis for this reaction.
4. CSS elements should stress terrain selection for trains locations.
5. Give additional attention to basic soldier skills and NCO supervision of security efforts.

DEFENSE OF THE BSA:

1. There are three key factors to successful defense of the BSA:
 - a. The company commander clearly establishes the priorities of work with standards and a not later than (NLT) completion time in his company OPORD.
 - b. The unit leadership tracks and inspects the priorities of work and adjusts timelines IAW METT-T.
 - c. Subordinate leaders are:
 - Trained on the various essential tasks (i.e., construction of fighting positions and reaction to contact drills).
 - Given time to train their soldiers on individual and collective tasks.
 - Held accountable for the execution of the priorities of work IAW the commander's

OPORD.

2. HHCs should develop SOPs for company defense operations.
3. HHCs should use "sergeant's time" to train basic skills such as construction of fighting positions with range cards and rehearsing reaction to contact drills.
4. HHCs should execute a Home Station FTX to train collective tasks such as displacing to a new BSA site and executing the priorities of work.

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Obstacles Coordination and Integration

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	1	4	0	1	2

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Obstacle groups typically lack density and integration with direct and indirect fires. (TA.6.2.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. During the defense, many assistant task force (TF) engineers (A/TFE) do not develop a complete Engineer Battlefield Assessment (EBA). The EBA usually focuses on friendly engineer capabilities, often omitting the impact of terrain or the enemy breaching capability.
2. While the TF commander's intent is understood, the A/TFE does not develop an obstacle group design based on the resource planning factors and the width of the avenue of approach (AA). As a result, the TF does not achieve the intended obstacle effect of DISRUPT, FIX, TURN, or BLOCK on the enemy formation.
3. Obstacles are not designed to defeat enemy breaching assets. Designs do not use combinations of "more-visible" and "unseen" obstacles in each group to manipulate the enemy's maneuver in the desired direction. The A/TFE's countermobility timeline does not consider emplacing obstacles during the day versus night based on enemy reconnaissance in sector.
4. Many TFs do not array obstacles with sufficient depth. Obstacles are rapidly bypassed or reduced by enemy engineers.
5. The company/team fire plans do not effectively integrate direct and indirect fires to support the obstacle group design.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Most assistant battalion engineers (ABEs) develop the situational obstacle plan based on the very narrow band of battle space in which the brigade expects to make contact. (TA.6.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

Brigade planning staffs often focus their planning only on where they most likely expect to make direct fire contact with the enemy. The ABE follows suit, limiting his situational obstacle plan to that narrow area. As a result, the brigade and ABE are caught without a plan if the enemy exposes a weakness elsewhere, is moving slowly and does not enter the band, or the brigade makes contact with the enemy before the brigade arrives at the band.


OBSERVATION 2: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97.)

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES **for Obstacles Coordination and Integration**

1. Tactical obstacle design should be based on the formation of the attacking enemy and intended obstacle effect.
2. Initial design and array of each obstacle group should incorporate the commander's intent, the resource planning factor (RF), and the total width of the AA.
3. Determine the total quantity of standard minefields required to achieve the intended effect using the obstacle group design calculation shown below. Other anti-vehicular obstacles such as AT ditch or 11-row concertina roadblock can substitute for up to 20 percent of the standard

minefields in a group. Situational obstacles such as VOLCANO, MOPMS, or ADAMS-RAAMS can be planned as part of the groups or used to reinforce an AA based on a new threat. By understanding the task and purpose of fires for each obstacle group design, all units can achieve the intended obstacle effect of DISRUPT, TURN, FIX, or BLOCK on the enemy's formation.

STANDARD MINEFIELDS: A KEY COMPONENT OF OBSTACLE GROUP DESIGN



OBSTACLE GROUP DESIGN CALCULATION:


$$\# \text{ STANDARD MINEFIELDS} = \frac{(\text{TTL WIDTH OF AA}) \times (\text{RESOURCE FACTOR})}{(\text{STANDARD MINEFIELD FRONTAGE})}$$

OBSTACLE EFFECT	RESOURCE FACTOR	STANDARD MF FRONTAGE
DISRUPT	0.5	250m
FIX	1.0	250m
TURN	1.2	500m
BLOCK	2.4	500m

INTEGRATION OF FIRES AND OBSTACLE EFFECT


- DISRUPT GROUP** - BREAKS UP ENEMY FORMATION AND TEMPO.
 - FORCES ENEMY TO DEPLOY AND BREACH EARLY.
 - SLOWS PART OF ENEMY FORMATION AND FRAGMENTS C3.
 - ALLOWS PART OF ENEMY TO BYPASS PIECEMEAL INTO MAIN ENGAGEMENT AREA.
 - SHALLOW OBSTACLES NOT VISIBLE AT LONG RANGE BUT SHOULD BE EASILY BYPASSED AS ENEMY NEARS.

RF = .5
SF = 250m



- BLOCK GROUP-** MASSES FIRES / OBSTACLES TO STOP ENEMY ATTACK ALONG SPECIFIC AA OR TO PREVENT ENEMY FROM PASSING THRU AN E
- NO BYPASS AVAILABLE; THE EA MUST COVER THE ENTIRE AA.
 - HIGH VOLUME OF INTERLOCKING FIRES ACROSS THE ENTIRE AA.
 - BLOCK OBSTACLES MUST DEFEAT ENEMY BREACHING EFFORT.
 - GROUP CONSISTS OF COMPLEX OBSTACLES WHICH REQUIRE MUPLTIPLE BREACHING TECHNIQUES TO REDUCE A LANE.
 - INCORPORATES BOTH "VISIBLE" AND "UNSEEN" OBSTACLES TO DISCOURAGE BREACHING.
 - BLOCK OBSTACLES DO NOT STOP AN ENEMY ATTACK BY THEMSELVES: THEY MUST BE INTEGRATED WITH INTENSE FIRES

RF = 2.4
SF = 500m



4. ABEs should consider the following three areas when developing their situational obstacle plans for the BCT scheme of maneuver:
- Shaping the battle space to the brigade's front in order for the BCT to gain the advantage through the depth and width of the brigade zone.
 - Protecting the brigade's flanks through the depth and width of the zone.
 - Initial plans for follow-on hasty defense prior to resumption of offensive operations.

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Security Operations

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	1	0	1	3	0

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Field trains security plans are inadequate. (TA.6.3.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Field trains security is not planned and integrated within the brigade support area (BSA).
2. Units generally do not address security in the priorities of work when establishing the field trains as part of the BSA.
3. The security plan is not developed, disseminated, or rehearsed.

OBSERVATION 2: Air and ground operations are seldom integrated during security missions. (TA.6.3.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. The aviation unit's friendly situational awareness of the ground maneuver elements is usually lacking, particularly the front line ground trace, COLT and scout locations, and artillery firing positions.
2. Ground observation plans and aviation observation plans are not integrated or synchronized to enhance each other's capabilities and provide mutually supporting OP positions.
3. The aviation limit of advance (LOA) is often tied to the ground maneuver LOA, which limits aviation's early warning capability.
4. Although aviation assets usually make first contact with enemy forces in security missions, they seldom have priority of fires.
5. The ground commander too often does not identify the decisive point for his engagement, causing aviation forces to piecemeal their assets to meet the continuous security requirements defined by the ground maneuver commander.

OBSERVATION 3: HMMWV scout platoons do not contribute significantly to security operations. (TA.6.3.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. HMMWV scouts have very limited night viewing capability when compared to M1 tanks and Bradleys, and are unable to destroy anything they do observe. Scouts located behind "shooters" cannot see as far as the "shooter's" systems.
2. Scouts often prevent the TF from being successful in security operations by confusing the "shooters" on identification of enemy vehicles, especially beyond 1200 meters. Scouts often observe enemy reconnaissance targets for only three to five minutes, which is not enough time to accurately vector a direct fire killing system onto it.
3. Similar looking vehicles such as HMMWVs and BRDMs, operating in the same area, create confusion.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES **for Security Operations**

INTEGRATING AIR AND GROUND OPERATIONS:

1. Aviation planners should have early and direct involvement in the planning process, and conduct joint rehearsals with the ground maneuver element. These practices will resolve the issue regarding friendly situational awareness.
2. Aviation units should have priority of fires in security missions.
3. The limit of advance (LOA) for aviation must be *forward* of the ground LOA.
 - a. Aviation's maneuverability and flexibility allows them to move well forward while still maintaining survivability.
 - b. The forward LOA for aviation, along with priority of fires, will increase the reaction time and maneuver space for the protected force.
4. In order to support extended security mission requirements, aviation commanders must learn to stagger their crews and integrate dismounted OP positions.
5. Aviation commanders must know the ground maneuver commander's decisive point in his plan to surge aviation assets to meet the objective.

SCOUTS USED FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS:

1. Security operations should be given solely to company/teams.
2. Scouts contribute more to the defense by establishing observation posts (OPs) *behind* the security force. This enables the TF to track the enemy through the sector and call accurate and timely indirect fires while the TF is in the direct fire fight.
3. Screening involves destruction within capabilities, and scouts are limited to destruction with indirect fire.

FIELD TRAINS SECURITY PLANS:

1. The HHC commander, 1SG, and XO must take a proactive role in establishing field trains security.
2. The security plan must be coordinated with the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) and integrated into the BSA defense plan.
3. Security of the field trains must be addressed in the unit's priorities of work.
4. The field trains leadership must execute troop-leading procedures (TLP).

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS (TA.7)

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Supply Management

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	3	2	8	2	3

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Units do not adequately report and track Class III and V supplies.

(TA.7.5.2)

DISCUSSION:

The field trains command post (FTCP) generally does not receive accurate logistical status from the company/teams and separate platoons in the task force (TF). This impacts the field trains' ability to replenish personnel and combat systems and forecast Class III and V requirements.

OBSERVATION 2: Task forces have difficulty planning and distributing Class IV and V materials to engineer units for defensive operations. (TA.7.5.2)

DISCUSSION:

None.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Units have difficulty tracking task force (TF) key classes of supply within the CTCP or FTCP. (TA.7.5.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Units do not know how much fuel and ammunition are in the field trains, combat trains, or the company/teams.
2. Daily logistics status (LOGSTAT) reports are bypassing key people in the task force CSS team. Either they go straight to the field trains without the S4 knowing what is on them, or they go to the CTCP and then are either late to the field trains or do not go there at all.
3. Supply crises arise without warning and require immediate resolution by the unit S4.
4. Supplies cannot be predicted, which forces the S4 to make decisions regarding the allocation, forecasting, and cross-leveling of scarce supplies without accurate information on which to base this decision.

OBSERVATION 2: Units too often deploy with no developed or published unit basic loads (UBLs). (TA.7.5.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. The battalion is not aware of what they need and have not divided the required classes of supply into battery amounts.
2. The requirements are not part of the battalion SOP so batteries cannot properly develop their load plans.

3. Distribution plans are not developed, resulting in the unit's inability to identify what host nation support they may need.

OBSERVATION 3: Field artillery battalion staffs usually identify rearm, refuel, resupply, and survey point (R3SP) requirements but often do not integrate or synchronize the operation with the tactical plan. (TA.7.5.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. There is a lack of discussion of R3SPs during the planning process, causing poor site selection and unsynchronized execution within the battalion movement plan and logistics plan.
2. The S3s give poor or untimely ammunition guidance, which impedes the S4's effort to consolidate the necessary R3SP assets (CL III [B], V, survey, and LOGPAC if available) at the correct time and location.
3. There is often no effective timeline and/or trigger. The R3SP often turns into a refuel operation or unit distribution effort because of inadequate triggers.
4. The required equipment and assets, although available, are not postured forward to execute an R3SP.
5. A typical R3SP location is along the brigade MSR in an open field with no concealment and poor dispersion.
6. There is poor coordination between unit advance parties and the R3SP site OIC, causing delays and confusion during the operation.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Supply Management

CLASS III AND V REPORTING AND TRACKING:

1. Put into place a redundant system to receive accurate logistics status from TF subordinate units.
 - a. Have the Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) submit an initial report via FM or MSE.
 - b. Follow this report with a "hard copy" logistics report from the unit supply sergeants.
2. Key FTCP personnel (S1 and S4 NCOIC) must use this status to replenish personnel and combat systems.

ENGINEER CLASS IV AND V MATERIALS:

1. Per **FM 5-10, *Combat Engineer Platoon***, there are two types of Class IV and V loads: *mission* and *basic*.
 - a. Mission loads consist of those materials required for a specific mission (i.e., a standard-fix minefield).
 - b. Basic loads consist of those materials that the platoon carries to protect itself.
 - c. For the purpose of saving time, the basic load can be used for specific missions; however, the basic load must then be replenished from the materials in the mission load.
 - d. Basic loads are pulled; mission loads are pushed.
 - e. Mission loads are a TF responsibility regardless of the command and support relationship specified for the supporting engineers.

2. Class IV and V resupply for the defense is one of the most demanding logistic operations the task force (TF) must carry out and requires all the assets that can be made available. A total cooperative effort by the TF, including engineers, is required if the defense is to be adequately resourced.

3. Units must exercise and wargame Class IV and V supply and distribution at Home Station. Develop and refine SOPs for resupply operations before deploying to the NTC.

a. Maneuver support is essential for command and control, haul assets, and manpower.
b. Engineer units must provide quality assurance/control to ensure proper handling and breakdown.

4. Palletized standard loads (combat configured loads [CCLs]) and use of the palletized loading system family of vehicles help solve the planning and distribution problems commonly seen at the NTC.

TRACKING TASK FORCE SUPPLY STATUS:

A good track of the supply status allows good decisions and enables the resupply effort to be more responsive and timely for the unit's needs.

1. Develop a system of charts that easily and accurately displays the logistics status of the unit.

2. Ensure that the LOGSTAT report includes a column for on-hand as well as requested quantities of supplies.

3. Determine standard times or events that cause the CTCP and FTCP to share logistics information.

4. Ensure that unit LOGSTAT reports go to the CTCP as well as to the FTCP. (Method: Turn in two copies at LOGPAC pickup. The S4 or his representative makes notes on and approves the requests. *He takes a copy with him to the CTCP, and the support platoon leader or some other field trains person takes a copy to the FTCP.*)

FA UNIT BASIC LOADS (UBLs):

1. Refer to historical data, supply usage requirements, operations logistics planner software, FORSCOM Reg 700-3, **FM 101-10-1/2**, **FM 8-10-5**, and SB 8-75 for guidance on UBLs.

2. Units need to have a clear understanding of all classes of supply, and pertinent information should be included in the unit TACSOP.

3. Appoint an OIC/NCOIC for each class of supply.

4. Deploy a robust advance party that can open all accounts and begin drawing supplies.

FA BATTALION R3SP OPERATIONS:

1. The R3SP's principle mission is to rearm and refuel the battalion with secondary missions of providing survey update for the M109A6 and linking up LOGPAC vehicles (if possible) or required unit supplies. The R3SP is not the only resupply technique. The most efficient method, however, is to rearm, refuel, and resupply a battalion conducting a deliberate movement. A properly planned, prepared, and executed R3SP is the combat multiplier necessary to allow the battalion to continue the fight uninterrupted.

2. The S4 integrates and synchronizes the execution of the R3SP with the battalion's tactical plan.

3. The S4 should position the R3SP site central to the Paladin position areas to facilitate rapid execution. It must be tactically positioned with good concealment, as survivability is a primary consideration for site selection. Maximize terrain for cover and concealment and ensure good dispersion of assets.

4. The S3 provides guidance (ammunition types and powders) to the S4 with sufficient time for the battalion logisticians to execute the plan.

5. The S4, considering battery ammunition status, remaining mission requirements (estimate), and the battalion's on-hand ammunition, gives guidance to the Battalion Ammunition Officer (BAO) who, in-turn, begins configuring ammunition.

a. The BAO should focus on configuring pure PLS loads of killer ammunition with the correct powders.

b. Special munitions (i.e., FASCAM or smoke) can be linked up with the appropriate unit at the R3SP or in the unit location.

c. The BAO notifies the S3 and units what is available at the R3SP to include ammunition types.

6. The ammunition platoon sergeant (PSG) configures the R3SP in the field trains and possibly stages it in a forward location.

7. Combat trains assets are for emergency resupply during the battle and should not be used. If they are used, they must be resupplied, reconfigured, or replaced immediately.

8. Ensure all assets are assembled early enough to conduct a rehearsal.

9. The R3SP site layout should facilitate rapid execution.

a. Establish an entry point, track plan, multiple ammunition upload lanes, by-pass lanes for vehicles not requiring ammunition, refuel points with survey control points, and a LOGPAC/supply linkup point at the exit.

b. Each element within the R3SP should maintain tactical dispersion.

c. The R3SP site should be set up to maximize the use of the multiple assets and be able to conduct multiple operations simultaneously.

10. The S4, CAT CDR, or BAO should be the R3SP site OIC and be responsible for site reconnaissance, communications checks, and establishment of the R3SP prior to units arriving.

a. The R3SP OIC ensures the site layout facilitates rapid execution of R3SP.

b. Batteries should upload howitzers from battery ammunition vehicles prior to arrival, thus minimizing vehicles that rearm at the R3SP.

c. Batteries should transload ammunition from battery ammunition resupply vehicles (PLS) to section FAASVs, again minimizing R3SP execution time and reducing the ammunition burden on the R3SP assets.

11. The R3SP site OIC positions the refuel point after the rearm point allowing simultaneous operations, e.g., refueling howitzers while rearming ammunition vehicles.

12. The reconnaissance survey officer establishes the survey control points at the refuel sites to facilitate simultaneous operations.

13. The S4 should position LOGPAC vehicles (if available) near the R3SP exit to link up with their unit as they depart the R3SP site.

14. Inclusion of the R3SP in the battalion TACSOP is the key to success. The TACSOP must establish responsibilities, timelines, a pre-R3SP advance-party link-up checklist, security responsibilities, and a site layout diagram.

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Logistics Estimates/CSS Planning and Integration

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	4	3	2	0	5

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Task force CSS elements frequently make no effort to conduct a formal or informal logistics, casualty, or personnel estimate. (TA.4.2.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. CSS units are unable to identify key logistical shortcomings and tactical resupply requirements or consider how to resolve these shortcomings.
2. Units conduct the planning process with no consideration of the current maintenance posture or projected combat power in the next 6, 12, or 24 hours. They then enter the COA development and wargaming process with a distorted view of potential combat power.
3. Unit casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) planners do not balance anticipated casualties against their available evacuation resources, and do not estimate casualty densities or identify likely casualty zones. As a result, shortcomings in CASEVAC capabilities are not identified.
4. Requirements for, positioning of, and command and control requirements for nonstandard medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets are not identified, resulting in soldiers who could otherwise have been saved becoming DOW casualties.

OBSERVATION 2: Maintenance planning at the task force (TF) level is poor. (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. The battalion maintenance officer (BMO) is frequently left out of task force planning, OPORD preparation, and the rehearsal process.
2. The BMO, unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) personnel, and forward recovery teams are not aware of the enemy situation or the task force mission.

OBSERVATION 3: CSS is rarely integrated into the brigade planning process. (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

Some units do not consider bringing the necessary personnel to LTP to effectively integrate CSS into the brigade planning process.

OBSERVATION 4: Engineer Class IV/V operations are seldom integrated into the brigade combat team (BCT) plan. (TA.4.4.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. While most engineer battalions understand the need for a combined arms approach to logistical support of the brigade's defense, they rarely execute an *integrated* Class IV/V plan.
2. Combined arms responsibilities for packaging and moving Class IV/V barrier materials and for operating Class IV/V supply points are usually outlined in the engineer battalion tactical SOP (TACSOP), but are rarely addressed in the brigade's orders.
3. Most engineer battalions end up being the *sole executors* of the planning, preparation, and execution phases of Class IV/V logistical operations. This lack of participation by other members of the BCT in the execution of Class IV/V operations detracts from the engineer battalion's primary missions of countermobility and survivability during brigade defensive missions.

OBSERVATION 5: Field artillery (FA) battalions are not adequately integrated into the brigade's plan to build combat power during Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration (RSO&I). (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. FA units too often do not integrate their battalions into the brigade's plan to build combat power. Without an integrated brigade plan, field artillery units find themselves with no priority to draw classes of supply or receive maintenance support.
2. FA units are not identifying their own glide path to incrementally build platoons, batteries, and the battalion.
3. FA battalions are not including radar, survey, metro, command and control headquarters, and CSS assets.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Logistics Estimates/CSS Planning and Integration

ESTIMATES:

1. Incorporate estimates into the staff planning process and *train at Home Station*.
2. Involve the S1, BMO, and medical platoon in the CSS estimate.

MAINTENANCE PLANNING:

1. The BMO should be included in the planning process. At a minimum, there must be a maintenance representative for the task force commander or TOC.
2. At the end of each battle, the task force must focus on the combat power that could be developed over the next 2, 6, and 12-hour periods using sound maintenance practices.

CSS INTEGRATION: Brigade commanders wanting to maximize their unit's training time need to bring the right players. Doctrinally, the planners are the brigade's S1, S4, surgeon, and the FSB SPO. The brigade surgeon is not trained as a planner, so the Medical Company commander is the logical medical planner. For brigade CSS planners, the brigade's S1 and S4, FSB SPO, and Medical Company commander must attend LTP to achieve full training value.

INTEGRATION OF ENGINEER CLASS IV/V OPERATIONS:

1. Engineer planners at all levels should campaign for the active support of other members of the combined arms team in support of Class IV/V operations.
2. This support must be addressed in the maneuver order. Class IV/V operations are so critical to the defense that these responsibilities should be addressed in the Scheme of Maneuver and Sub-unit Mission subparagraphs, and not simply relegated to the Engineer Annex.
3. In addition to the engineer battalion TACSOP, the task force and BCT TACSOPs must also delineate responsibilities for Class IV/V operations.

FA UNIT BUILDING OF COMBAT POWER DURING RSO&I:

1. Plan early with the brigade. Remember that RSO&I is an operation heavy with logistical implications. Battalion XOs and S3s need to take an early interest in the plan and not depend totally on the battalion S4 to "make it happen."
2. Organize requirements in a logical sequence and assign responsibilities.
3. Establish priority vehicles and units, manage and supervise the plan, and adjust as necessary.
4. A recommended force package 1 to be ready NLT RSO&I 02 would consist of:
 - a. Firing battery platoon
 - b. Firing battery platoon with battery trains
 - c. Ammunition section
 - d. Survey team
 - e. Recovery team
 - f. Retrans
 - g. POL tanker
 - h. Battalion TOC
 - i. Metro section

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Materiel Readiness

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	3	2	4	2	2

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Battalion maintenance officers (BMOs) frequently get directly involved with recovery operations rather than remaining the command and control node for all maintenance operations within the task force (TF). (TA.7.3.2.2)

DISCUSSION:

None.

OBSERVATION 2: Reporting of non-mission capable (NMC) vehicle status within the task force (TF) is not to standard. (TA.4.1.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. There is inadequate communication between company maintenance team chiefs and the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP).
2. There is seldom an established system or SOP to track vehicle damage during the battle and enforcement of the repair timeline for evacuation to the field trains.
3. The lack of adequate communications and tracking SOPs result in confusion on the status and location of non-mission capable (NMC) vehicles, which slows recovery and repair time.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1. CSS units consistently experience problems with their maintenance information flow. (TA.7.3.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. An inadequate flow of DA Form 2404/5988E from the company/teams to the UMCP often causes a serious breakdown in the maintenance system.
2. ULLS clerks have no daily tracking system.
3. Company/team level maintenance mechanics rarely verify deficiencies.
4. Inaccurate reports are provided to the task force commander.

OBSERVATION 2. A majority of engineer units deploy to NTC with non-mission capable (NMC) VOLCANO and MICLIC systems. (TA.7.3.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Units often arrive at the NTC thinking their systems are fully mission capable (FMC), and are surprised when their system is deadlined due to improper conduct of -10 PMCS.
2. Units are often using the wrong PMCS -10 manual and have no change updates; they claim they are unable to get the manual or did not know there was a change published.
3. Units do not know what seemingly minor mechanical faults will deadline their key weapons systems.

4. Most leaders do not take the time to understand the specific mechanical requirements of the VOLCANO and MICLIC warfighting systems, and the proper conduct of -10 PMCS is not enforced to standard during Home Station training.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES **for Materiel Readiness**

RECOVERY MISSIONS:

1. The BMO can move forward with the forward recovery assets, but should not become decisively engaged with recovery operations.
2. The BMO must establish a good recovery plan during the planning process, ensure that his recovery assets are briefed on the plan, and attend the TF CSS rehearsal prior to the mission.

NON-MISSION CAPABLE (NMC) VEHICLE STATUS REPORTING:

Each TF must establish a reporting system to track vehicles damaged during the battle (see **CALL Quarterly Bulletin 97-20, Battalion/TF Logistics**).

DA FORM 2404/5988E TRACKING:

1. Develop a daily tracking system for the ULLS clerks.
2. Promote leadership emphasis at the company/team level.
3. Make sure the mechanics verify all deficiencies at the company/team level.
4. The team chief must ensure that *all* parts on the DA Form 2404/5988E are looked up prior to submitting the paperwork to the ULLS clerk.
5. Refer to the article “*Redesigning PMCS to Build Combat Power*,” page 28 of **CTC Quarterly Bulletin**, No. 97-18, 4th Qtr FY 97.

ENGINEER UNIT PMCS:

1. The majority of these problems would be solved if leaders would enforce the standard of “by the book” PMCS for their weapons systems.
2. Most units know 6 to 12 months out they will be coming to the NTC. They should establish maintenance “hot pits” that focus on the proper analysis of the -10 for the VOLCANO system, to include the prime mover (HEMTT/M548) and the MICLIC system. Ensure the operator conducts the proper PMCS and then verify it through company/battalion hot pit programs.
3. The battalion must have an aggressive publications program that keeps up with the latest publications and their changes. The establishment of a GTA card that focuses on specific VOLCANO/MICLIC maintenance checks may be one approach or revitalizing the technical manuals with all the latest changes may be the other solution.

TREND 4**SUBJECT: Medical Support Planning and Execution**

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	2	3	3	3	0

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Leaders lack an understanding of how to conduct company/team level health service support (HSS). (TA.7.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Medical assets are not effectively positioned or utilized from company/team through task force levels. This results in a high died-of-wounds (DOW) rate due to lack of timely medical treatment while awaiting evacuation.
2. Company teams seldom use their M113 ambulances to evacuate casualties to battalion aid station (BAS) treatment teams for fear of leaving the unit without medics. Instead, company/team first sergeants request BAS ambulances to come forward to evacuate patients from their casualty collection point (CCP). As a result, medical platoons tie up their ambulance squads evacuating casualties from the company team CCPs.

OBSERVATION 2: Combat health support (CHS) is not being integrated early enough in the planning process and is not being planned by the right people. (TA.7.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

None.

OBSERVATION 3: Units typically do not have a method to integrate the medical plan into the CSS plan and the maneuver plan. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. The medical platoon does not know the plan until the CSS rehearsal.
2. Troop-leading procedures (TLP) are not conducted and adjacent unit coordination is not completed prior to the CSS rehearsal.
3. Questions brought up at the CSS rehearsal are not answered.
4. When the battle starts, needed information is not properly disseminated to the unit.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES

for Medical Support Planning and Execution

ALLOCATION OF MEDICAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL:

1. Evacuate casualties from the point of injury or platoon CCP to the company/team CCP by using damaged combat vehicles (FM 7-7J, page 2-192) or the 1SG's and maintenance team's M113s before using the combat medic section's M113. The platoon's combat lifesaver can perform triage at the platoon CCP to set a priority for casualties to be evacuated as well as the platform needed.
2. The senior medic manages the company team CCP. If there is a shortage of medics, this triage point is the priority for manning; this allows trained medical personnel to treat patients and other personnel to transport/evacuate.
3. Prepare and utilize the commander and 1SG's HMMWVs as non-standard casualty evacuation platforms to move patients to the BAS or treatment team (see **FM 8-10-6, *Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures***, for diagrams on how to rig the vehicles).

PLANNING FOR CHS:

1. To be effective, CHS specifics (locations, times, and composition of BDE assets) should be included in the brigade OPORD so that it gets down to maneuver first sergeants via TF S4s.
2. The brigade medical planners, the brigade S1, and the medical company commander (or his designated representative) must standardize taskings to subordinate units, composition of medical assets, lines of communication, and on-hand Class VIII supplies throughout the depth of the battlefield by type of battle. This standardized information should become part of the brigade tactical SOP (TASCOP).
3. The brigade medical planners must begin planning after receipt of the initial warning order and go forward with an initial plan to the brigade planning process. The brigade order should include specific information such as locations (grids) of planned ambulance exchange points (AXPs) and times they will be active.

INTEGRATION OF THE MEDICAL PLATOON INTO THE PLANNING PROCESS:

1. The S4 should develop an SOP for dissemination of information during the planning process. Include a process for receiving input from all CSS operators to synchronize the CSS plan.
2. Develop and disseminate information early to permit CSS operators to conduct adjacent unit coordination and have answers to all questions at the CSS rehearsal.
3. When the CSS battle is rehearsed, all participants at the CSS rehearsal must leave with a true understanding of how all aspects of the CSS battle will flow.

TREND 5**SUBJECT: Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)**

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	2	1	0	1	2

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Task forces (TFs) seldom have an adequate CASEVAC or maintenance evacuation plan for scout platoons. (TA.7.4.4.2)

DISCUSSION:

Scouts must often rely on platoon assets which are unsuitable and which degrade reconnaissance capabilities to conduct MEDEVAC and maintenance evacuation on the battlefield. As a result, the scout platoon is slow to fully regenerate personnel and vehicles and is unable to conduct further reconnaissance, surveillance, or security missions.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Casualty reporting and tracking within the combat engineer battalion administrative and logistics command post (ALOC) is not to standard. (TA.7.4.4.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Recently, engineer battalion ALOCs have not used tracking methods that maintain detailed and accurate accountability of casualties on the battlefield.
2. Units have relied solely on FM radio casualty reports that lack the detail necessary for PAC personnel to generate required feeder reports and awards. Reports usually include little more than battle roster numbers.
3. Engineer units, which usually rely on supported unit assets to evacuate casualties, often send formal feeder reports only through those supported unit channels, bypassing engineer channels altogether.

OBSERVATION 2: A Casualty Feeder Report (DA Form 1156) is not being filled out and collected for each casualty assessed on the simulated battlefield. (TA.4.1.3.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Units use non-doctrinal methods of collection, usually at the battalion aid station, instead of using the chain of command.
2. Soldiers and leaders do not know what DA Form 1156 is, what it does, or how to properly fill it out.
3. Responsibility is not clearly assigned to someone to ensure that 100 percent of DA Forms 1156 are collected, or the person with the responsibility is not in a position to accurately or effectively execute that responsibility.

4. Soldiers do not have the form available to fill out.
5. The results of improperly completing, verifying, or submitting DA Form 1156 are:
 - a. Soldiers and their families are not taken care of.
 - b. Next of kin are not notified.
 - c. The serviceman's group life insurance (SGLI) is not distributed.
 - d. Purple Hearts are not awarded.
 - e. Letters of sympathy/condolence are not written.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES **for Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)**

SCOUT PLATOON MAINTENANCE AND CASEVAC:

Task forces (TFs) should assign responsibility (as a sub-unit task) to the closest company/team for the medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and maintenance evacuation of the scouts. The TF should consider providing additional assets to the company/team for this medical and maintenance coverage.

CASUALTY REPORTING AND TRACKING:

1. Units should accurately track casualties by event and type as well as by individual.
2. Units must receive formal Casualty Feeder Reports/Witness Reports *as well as* the initial FM radio report. Initial reports need to include the details necessary to allow ALOC personnel to track casualty by type (i.e., return to duty, litter, or killed) and by incident. Brief but detailed information in initial casualty reports provides a tool by which ALOC personnel can better track losses, generate reports and awards in a timely manner, and provide immediate analysis and feedback to the commander. A suggested method is shown below.

a. Subunits should send an initial report via FM radio with the necessary data for ALOC personnel to anticipate the movement of casualties on the battlefield and to begin planning for replacement operations. This information allows the ALOC to assess combat losses, not only in terms of individual personnel, but also in terms of personnel as they relate to combat systems. The information also allows the ALOC to identify early on those soldiers who will be pushed back through the replacement system. At a minimum, the initial report should include:

- Battle roster number.
- Type of casualty (RTD, WIA, KIA, non-battle).
- Location.
- Date-time.
- A quick event description so that personnel losses are tied to specific actions or equipment losses on the battlefield.

b. Following the initial reports, formal Casualty Feeder Reports/Witness Reports, action summaries, and personnel status reports should be sent through battalion FM radio channels or through the LOGPAC. These follow-up reports provide verification of initial reports and information necessary to generate awards, letters, and action summary reports as necessary.

CASUALTY FEEDER REPORTS:

1. Use the chain of command to fill out, collect, verify, and pass on DA Form 1156. This begins at the team leader/tank commander level.
2. Assign somebody in the company with the primary responsibility (i.e., 1SG, XO, or commander) to ensure that 100 percent accountability is achieved and that the form is completed accurately.
3. Conduct training in the use of DA Form 1156 at NCO/SGT's time, and use the form when conducting force-on-force field operations.
4. Ensure that an adequate supply of forms is available. Each soldier should carry a form *filled out* with his information along with *two blank forms to use for other casualties*.

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (TA.4)

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Battle Tracking and Predictive Analysis

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	2	6	7	7	4

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Mechanized and armor company/teams do not adequately control information flow and conduct battle tracking. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Mechanized and armor company/teams often do not control the flow of information, process the information, and then apply the information to their upcoming fight.
2. The company/teams do not manage information received from higher headquarters and subordinate units. They frequently do not succeed when trying to use a "company command post (CP)":
 - a. No single individual or shift coordinates actions in the CP.
 - b. Communications with the task force (TF) are not maintained or rehearsed.
 - c. Vital information is not processed.
 - d. The commander does not identify his critical information requirements (CCIR) to enable collection of important information.
 - e. The situation map (SITMAP) is not plotted and maintained with all pertinent data.
 - f. The company preparation timeline is not tracked for adherence.
 - g. Unit status of supply, personnel, and readiness (e.g., boresighting) are not tracked.

OBSERVATION 2: Task force (TF) fire support elements (FSEs) do not adequately maintain situational awareness. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION:

Units do not closely coordinate with adjacent units to exchange information on clearance of fires, transition of priority of fires (POF), or security/control measures. As a result, TF FSEs repeatedly experience difficulty maintaining situational awareness and conducting battle handover.

OBSERVATION 3: Battle tracking in the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) command post (CP) is not to standard. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. UMCP CP personnel do not maintain current company/team positions on the tracking boards.
2. UMCP CP personnel do not update situation templates (SITE MPs) on their maps.

OBSERVATION 4: Battle tracking in the field trains command post (FTCP) is not to standard. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. There is generally no accurate and up-to-date picture of the task force (TF) mission and tactical situation in the FTCP. As a result, the HHC commander is unable to anticipate logistical requirements based on the tactical situation.
2. Unit positions and status are not tracked in the FTCP during the battle.
3. FTCP personnel are unable to monitor the TF command net.

OBSERVATION 5: Task force (TF) staffs do not effectively battle track during the planning and preparation phases of an operation. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. TF tactical operations centers (TOCs) set up during planning and preparation for combat do not have a central nerve cell or an established tracking system to ensure critical tasks, events, or information are tracked.
2. Information is not shared, disseminated, and tracked by all the BOS elements.
3. Critical information concerning the R&S effort and "hard-intel" passed from brigade often never reach the S3, Battle Captain, or other BOS elements.
4. The commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) are not proactively tracked, inhibiting the staff's ability to accurately depict the status of the TF to the commander in their preparation.

OBSERVATION 6: Battalion tactical operation centers (TOCs) often do not disseminate the current enemy situation to subordinate units. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION:

S2s are tracking the battle at the battalion TOC; however, the current situation is not being disseminated down to the TAC command post (CP) and companies.

OBSERVATION 7: Company/team commanders are often unable to develop the situation when they make contact with the enemy. (TA.4.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. Inadequate reporting by subordinates negatively affects the company/team commander's situational awareness.
2. Common results of a commander's lack of situation awareness:
 - a. The company/team is unable to move in and out of contact.
 - b. The company/team cannot react to contact.
 - c. The company/team cannot clearly report to higher headquarters what is happening.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Task force tactical operations centers (TOCs) do not adequately track the battle and manage information. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Task force TOCs frequently do not have established procedures for information display, message handling, and battle tracking.
2. There appears to be a lack of training on information management; most units do not know what information to track. They often track information that is *not* critical, are unable to identify information that *is* critical, or attempt to track an overabundance of information that makes it unmanageable.

OBSERVATION 2: The engineer battalion tactical operations center (TOC) staff has difficulty with clearly and accurately tracking mobility, countermobility, and survivability data. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION:

None.

OBSERVATION 3: Light infantry task force staffs do not have good situational awareness from mission analysis to execution. (TA.4.1.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Tactical operations centers (TOCs) do not have or are not updating the adjacent task force's mission, disposition, and task and purpose.
2. Task forces plan their operation in a vacuum, not considering the impact of the heavy task force operations on their actions.

OBSERVATION 4: The main command post (CP) is rarely able to provide the task force commander with a predictive analysis during the fight. (TA.4.2.2)

DISCUSSION:

The main CP is not able to analyze information that they receive, provide the commander with a picture of what the enemy will do, or make recommendations.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Battle Tracking and Predictive Analysis

MECHANIZED AND ARMOR COMPANY/TEAMS:

1. Information on the company CP is now found in **FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team***, pages 2-53 and 2-54 (January 1998). Additional TTP for a company level CP or operations center are found in **FM 17-97, *Armored Cavalry Troop***.
2. Company/teams can establish a CP of any configuration, but clear designation of *what information* needs to be tracked, and *for what purpose*, is critical.
3. Commanders should establish a timeline with their first WARNO. They must ensure that the TF timeline is adhered to and incorporated into the company timeline.
4. Unit SOPs should ensure that:
 - a. All required steps to preparing for combat are listed.
 - b. Completion times are assigned.
 - c. Persons responsible for ensuring that each action is complete are identified.
5. CP personnel must maintain contact with subordinate elements and track progress of task completion.
6. The CP must track vital reports such as:
 - a. Enemy contact.
 - b. Current and proposed friendly locations of both adjacent units and subordinate elements.
 - c. Indirect fire requests and reports.
 - d. Strength reporting.
7. A tracking *routine* should be established.
 - a. Shift supervisors must be able to routinely check the progress of battle tracking.
 - b. The commander, XO, or 1SG must receive periodic updates on a situation map.

TASK FORCE (TF) FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT (FSE):

1. Close coordination between adjacent units is *mandatory*. This ensures that each unit fully understands how the other intends to operate. Coordination includes:
 - a. Exchanging unit SOPs, target lists, and fire support plans.
 - b. Exchanging front line trace and any control measures in effect.
 - c. Coordinating recognition signals, security measures, and resolving any communications differences.
2. References:
 - a. **FM 6-20-20, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Battalion, Task Force, and Below*.**
 - b. **FM 6-20-40, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations*.**
 - c. **FM 71-3, *The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade*.**

UNIT MAINTENANCE COLLECTION POINT (UMCP) COMMAND POST (CP):

1. The UMCP CPs post current graphics/company positions and enemy situation on their map.
2. The CP NCOIC ensures that all recovery assets and personnel leaving the UMCP have the current graphic posted on a “take along” map.

FIELD TRAINS COMMAND POST (FTCP):

1. The FTCP must receive and post TF operational and enemy situational overlays.
2. A method to track unit positions and status must be developed, posted, and updated as the battle progresses.
3. The FTCP must be able to monitor the TF command net through a retransmission or relay element.
4. The HHC commander must anticipate logistical requirements (specifically Class III and V) and be prepared to provide these to the TF.

TASK FORCE (TF) STAFFS AND COMMAND POSTS (CPs):

1. The chief of staff must identify what information he wants to track, establish how it will be tracked, and monitor his staff sections to ensure that it is tracked. End state: The commander can go to one source inside the TOC and quickly visualize the status of the TF in preparation for combat operations.
2. During planning and preparation, TF TOCs should establish a central node similar to the one in place during the fight and track it with the same aggressiveness. This will enable the unit to prepare for combat and re-prioritize efforts.
3. Effective battle tracking begins with:
 - a. The establishment of the TF timeline prior to mission analysis.
 - b. The development of CCIR that must be tracked.
4. Units should develop SOPs for standardized missions at Home Station and implement or modify these tracking requirements based on METT-T.
5. **CALL Newsletter 95-7, *Tactical Operations Center***, provides some examples of standardized tracking methods and techniques.

BATTALION TACTICAL OPERATION CENTER (TOC):

Place command emphasis in dissemination of current enemy situation to TAC CPs and line companies.

COMPANY/TEAM COMMANDERS' SITUATIONAL AWARENESS:

1. For the company/team commanders to make timely decisions on the battlefield, the subordinates must know how to completely and adequately report what is developing and make recommendations for the appropriate actions/reactions.
2. All members of a unit, including elements that are or can be attached, must be knowledgeable of and thoroughly trained in the proper reporting format (by SOP) and its contents, and have a basic understanding of the appropriate Army doctrine and how this is applied to the current situation.
3. The company/team commanders must train their platoons at Home Station on SOP reporting formats. At a minimum the platoons should know how to:
 - a. Move tactically in and out of contact.
 - b. React to contact.
 - c. Assess the situation quickly.
 - d. Make clearly understood recommendations to the commander in order to maintain the initiative and preserve freedom of action on the battlefield.

TASK FORCE TOC BATTLE TRACKING:

1. Decide what standard information the TOC expects from subordinate units.
2. Ensure subordinates understand what information is expected and when it should be provided. Units must ensure that a satisfactory number of individuals, other than and including the battle captain, understand the system for information management. Information is lost when only a few individuals understand the system.
3. When a task force commander decides additional tracking information is required for a specific mission, these new requirements must be disseminated to subordinate units.
4. The task force XO must monitor his staff sections to ensure that the information management system is to standard.
5. The task force commander and staff should be able to quickly visualize the accurate status of the task force from one source in the TOC.

ENGINEER BATTALION BATTLE TRACKING:

1. A clear, visible tracking system that combines map and wing board data is the most effective. If you do not use it, you do not need it (see **CALL Newsletter No. 95-7, *Tactical Operations Center***).
2. Information must be accurate, and organized so it is easy to read. Key graphics and charts required in the engineer battalion TOC to sustain combat operations are:
 - a. Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO).
 - b. Situation Template (SITEMP).
 - c. Priority intelligence requirements (PIR).
 - d. Maneuver graphics.
 - e. Execution matrix.
 - f. Situational obstacle matrix.

- g. Obstacle overlay.
- h. Fire support plan.
- i. Combat power status.
- j. CSS graphics.
- k. Subordinate unit locations, tracked two levels down.

LIGHT INFANTRY TASK FORCE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS:
Position a disciplined liaison officer at the brigade main.

TASK FORCE PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS:

1. The battle staff should provide the commander with a clear picture of current and future events and COAs to assist him in the fight. The event matrix, SITEMP, and decision support matrix are tools for tracking events and making recommendations.
2. The task force XO, S2, assistant, and FSE need to track the battle at the map board or table and think one step ahead of friendly/enemy forces.

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	1	8	4	5	8

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: The battalion maintenance officer (BMO) is seldom integrated into the task force (TF) military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. The battalion maintenance officer (BMO) is frequently left out of TF planning, OPORD preparation, and the rehearsal process.
2. The BMO, unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) personnel, and forward recovery teams are not aware of the enemy situation or the TF mission.

OBSERVATION 2: Brigade staffs demonstrate a lack of understanding of the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Most brigade staffers report little recent exposure to the MDMP.
 - a. Many brigade staffs have not collectively practiced staff planning prior to LTP and have no planning SOP.

- b. Brigade staffs attending LTP have three to five month's time in position.
 - c. Most brigade staff officer roles and responsibilities have not been clearly identified or defined, and most brigade XOs spend their LTP time focusing on staff roles, responsibilities, and procedures.
 - d. Many staff members have not previously held a staff position, and most S3 planners and assistant BOS representatives reported no staff experience at all.
- 2. Untrained staffs seek TTP as a *method* to facilitate planning shortcuts. However, most LTP brigade staffs lack doctrinal and practical staff experience required to apply TTP. In fact, planning TTP confuse, complicate, and frustrate untrained staffs.
 - 3. While at LTP, XOs and staff members are normally unsuccessfully at applying planning TTP to the staff MDMP.

OBSERVATION 3: Aviation liaison officers (ALOs) are rarely integrated into the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

- 1. New ALOs, especially those assigned to recently formed staffs, are not always integrated into the staff.
- 2. Many ALOs are unfamiliar with the Army's decision-making process, especially *wargaming*.
- 3. Close air support (CAS) continues to be cited at NTC as the largest killer during brigade force-on-force engagements.

OBSERVATION 4: Armor task force (TF) staffs are consistently unable to plan following the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

- 1. TF staffs are unfamiliar with the MDMP—the sequence, the events constituting the planning process, and what products are generated.
- 2. Failure to understand and be able to apply the MDMP makes transitioning to an abbreviated format nearly impossible for the staff, given the limited level of experience the staff members have in planning combat operations.

OBSERVATION 5: The special staff is seldom integrated into the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

The forward support battalion (FSB) commander and XO rarely ensure integration of the special staff into the MDMP and orders drill.

OBSERVATION 1: Task forces (TFs) do not adequately integrate CSS into the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Task force planning cells and chain of command display an indifference to CSS integration and do not supervise the BOS, resulting in a lack of integration among the CSS staff and their products.

2. The S4 is not fully integrated into the planning process at the task force level. While the S4 is present at times for mission analysis, he is not fully integrated into any formal process and in effect is not part of the battle staff. Lack of integration results in an obvious disconnect between the battle staff and the CSS side of the planning process. Ultimately, this disconnect results in a CSS plan that does not effectively support the task force scheme of maneuver.

a. The S4 often conducts his own CSS mission analysis at a separate location (CTCP) and includes only some key CSS players in this process.

b. The S4 and other CSS players are not included in COA development or the wargaming process.

3. The S4 writes an OPORD Paragraph 4 and issues this in the task force orders process; however, there is no identification of who has ownership for the CSS players (support platoon, medical platoon, BMO, chaplain, S1) and who is responsible for delivering these key players an OPORD. The trend is that the S4 does *not* take ownership of these players and does *not* give an OPORD to the CSS players.

4. CSS rehearsals are “hit or miss” and not an institutional part of task force operations. When they are conducted, they are not to standard.

5. CSS annexes are not produced.

6. CSS graphics continue to be inadequate and are incomplete. Graphics do not include main and alternate routes (MSRs and ASRs), dirty routes, decontamination points, aid stations, maintenance collection points, graves registration points, casualty collection points, etc.

7. CSS sub-elements are left to fend for themselves, are not read in on the plan, and do not have adequate situational awareness to be effective.

OBSERVATION 2: The signal officer (SIGO) does not participate early enough in the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

Task forces seldom integrate the SIGO into the planning process early enough to develop a plan and make recommendations for command and control assets.

OBSERVATION 3: The fire direction officer's (FDO's) responsibilities during the military decision-making process (MDMP) are not well defined. (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

The staff does not analyze the essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) further than broad statements such as suppress lead MRBs, attrit the lead MRB, and provide smoke, FASCAM, Copperhead, etc.

OBSERVATION 4: Combat Service Support (CSS) is not adequately integrated into the battalion military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Most battalions demonstrate the ability to plan, prepare, execute, and reconstitute logistics. However, CSS operations are seldom integrated into the battalion's battle rhythm and do not facilitate the battalion's tactical posture.

2. The S4, S1, and XO are not primary players during the orders process. CSS is often an afterthought and seldom addressed.

3. The S4 often leaves the wargame to gather information or solve problems that should be handled by the administrative/logistics operations center (ALOC).

4. CSS is briefed but rarely rehearsed during battalion rehearsals. Who, what, when, where, and how should be briefed during the battalion rock drill for R3SP, LRP, medical support plan, MSRs, resupply triggers, and reconstitution of battalion assets.

5. The S4s are not using a CSS execution matrix and their CSS plan is rarely rehearsed.

6. The S4s are not using a checklist during the battalion orders process, hindering their ability to both validate and synchronize the plan and ensure it supports the essential field artillery tasks (EFATs).

7. The S3 does not provide timely ammunition guidance or establish future requirements, thus hindering the S4's ability to develop an adequate resupply plan.

8. Battlefield calculus is rarely conducted, and ammunition requirements/triggers are not clearly identified (155-mm).

OBSERVATION 5: An engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) is rarely completed as part of the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

Most assistant battalion engineers (ABEs) are proficient in completing an engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) in accordance with FM 5-71-3 prior to arriving at the NTC. However, due to battlefield friction, reduced planning timelines, and simultaneous monitoring of current operations, EBAs are generally not conducted to standard during the MDMP.

OBSERVATION 6: Engineer staffs are prepared to conduct *horizontal* planning to a degree, but the *vertical* planning process remains unstructured. (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer staffs do not conduct planning in accordance with FM 5-71-3.
2. The engineer battalion XO does not closely coordinate with the battalion S3 and is seldom able to establish any type of battalion planning timeline.
3. Although the battalion S3, S2, and the assistant battalion engineer (ABE) participate together in brigade mission analysis and the brigade wargaming process, critical steps in the development of the engineer estimate are missing, as the engineer battalion is not planning concurrently.
4. The brigade engineer (battalion commander), with his staff, is not developing a detailed scheme of engineer operations (SOEO) to support each maneuver course of action (COA) and then integrating the SOEO for the selected COA into brigade wargaming. Key engineer tasks are left out of both the brigade's SOEO and the engineer battalion's plan as each works through his respective processes.
5. The engineer battalion conducts its own separate wargame and identifies critical vertical tasks *after* the brigade plan is completed, so the tasks are not integrated or coordinated.
6. Published engineer orders lack sufficient detail and specificity to conduct successful operations. Since the engineer battalion did not conduct a structured planning process, the battalion order is merely a plagiarized version of the engineer annex. It does not provide the detailed sub-unit orders and service support instructions to units remaining under battalion control.
7. The brigade engineer annex is incomplete. The annex does not include all information critical to the brigade engineer plan or required for subordinate engineer planning.

OBSERVATION 7: Brigade staffs do not possess an understanding of the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Prior to LTP, active component (AC) brigade staff members have only approximately three to five months in position.
2. During unit in-briefs, staffs report that their Home Station training had not focused on “staff planning procedures.” In fact, most AC brigade staffs state that they have had little recent exposure to the MDMP.
 - a. Planning at the staff level is slow and inefficient due to individual staff inexperience.
 - b. The commander’s staffs have not yet had the time or opportunity to define their roles, responsibilities, and procedures in MDMP.
 - c. The XO’s and staff’s first MDMP attempts results in a *trial and error* approach. Their time is consumed in refining staff procedural issues and not the tactical issues.
3. Reserve component (RC) staffs *have a tough time applying planning TTP to doctrine* to be successful in a time constrained, planning environment.
4. *All* brigades attending LTP come without a working or validated *planning* standard operating procedure (SOP) or tactical SOP (TACSOP). Staff officers cannot reference their unit’s SOP to understand how to accomplish their individual and collective tasks.

OBSERVATION 8: Task forces have difficulty completing the military decision-making process (MDMP) in a time-constrained environment. (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Task forces are well aware of the necessity to perform MDMP in a time-constrained environment during their NTC rotation. However, far too many task force staffs arrive for their LTP experience without *first* making an assessment of their ability to perform the MDMP; they then attempt to force their staffs toward a performance standard that they are unable to achieve.

2. The frustration of identifying training weaknesses in the midst of the LTP planning process does little to aid the task force staff in becoming more proficient with the MDMP in a time-constrained environment. When a task force staff has difficulty performing the MDMP, attempting to conduct it rapidly often leaves the task force with a plan that lacks both detail and synchronization.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for the Military Decision-Making Process

MAINTENANCE PLANNING AT TASK FORCE (TF) LEVEL:

1. The BMO should be included in the planning process. At a minimum, there must be a maintenance representative for the TF commander or TOC.
2. At the end of each battle, the TF must focus on the combat power that could be developed over the next 2, 6, and 12-hour periods using sound maintenance practices.

BRIGADE STAFF UNDERSTANDING OF THE MDMP:

1. Brigade commanders and staffs must collectively practice and gain full understanding of the MDMP before their LTP session. Regardless how well the staff understands doctrinal planning procedures, they must collectively experience the process before they become efficient and proficient planners. LTP provides time away from Home Station training detractors for the XO and staff to work on those staff planning skills.

2. Brigade commanders cannot maximize their unit's LTP experience when their staffs are struggling with fundamental doctrine and unit planning procedures. Commanders should accomplish the following prior to their LTP session:

- a. Develop a unit planning SOP defining commander and staff roles, responsibilities, and procedures.
 - Submit planning SOP to LTP 60-90 days prior to the LTP session.
 - LTP coaches will review the unit's planning SOP and provide the unit feedback prior to the unit's LTP rotation.
- b. Ensure staffs are trained and understand MDMP IAW **FM 101-5**.
 - Units with successful LTP experiences have conducted staff planning drills in the weeks and months prior to their LTP training period.
 - Work out problems associated with commander/staff planning procedures and responsibilities at Home Station.

3. When brigade commanders receive the NTC CG's 120-day LTP letter, they have an opportunity to input their training objectives and schedule training for their brigade.

- a. If the staff has had little experience with planning, use the “crawl, walk, run” training approach.
 - b. Schedule time for the battalion/brigade XOs and staff members to review unit planning procedures.
 - c. Focus on the AAR process. The *lessons learned* from the individual and collective analysis of what happened, why it happened, and solutions found in that process is the single most effective way the staff will improve its ability to function.
4. Center the reconnaissances on the terrain that the unit is planning to fight in the LTP order. With sufficient time, Operations Group can deconflict the rotational and LTP schedule and develop the order on terrain available on days of the reconnaissance. Unit commanders and staffs can focus their reconnaissances on the terrain as it relates to the order and make better use of their reconnaissance time. If there is specific terrain that the brigade commander wants his units to see, then he should schedule it at another time during the training.
 5. In an effort to save time, brigades have tasked subordinate units to see specific terrain in their AOI. In the LTP, brigade reconnaissance days are generally centralized at brigade level, offering the brigade commander time to address issues and concerns to the entire brigade. Once the commander has completed his reconnaissance objectives, the LTP will decentralize the reconnaissance to task force and company level. Assigning specific reconnaissance objectives to subordinate commanders will prevent an unfocused reconnaissance. Again, there is time in the schedule to reconnaissance other maneuver areas if the brigade commander plans wisely.
 6. The best use of staff AARs is afforded to units who elect to conduct two orders during their LTP session. Here is why. The first order allows the XO and staff to work on the process and staff procedures. The AAR, followed by another planning exercise, allows the staff to immediately train the lessons learned instead of weeks after the staff returns to home station. Units electing the two-order option usually plan both orders and fight only the second one on the JANUS system. Unit staffs that exercise the two-order option have had tremendous improvements. Once again, scheduling the two-order option must be carefully planned and scheduled well before to the unit’s LTP arrival date.
 7. All units conduct at least one brigade staff AAR and one brigade execution AAR while at LTP. While the LTP theater is fairly hi-tech, it does not provide units with recorded AARs to take home. Appoint someone as scribe during the AAR to record the valuable lessons learned.
 8. Plan and schedule early.

AVIATION LIAISON OFFICER INTEGRATION INTO THE MDMP:

1. The brigade’s ALO is responsible for employing CAS IAW the commander’s intent. He is the ground commander’s senior Air Force advisor and often controls a brigade asset with the equivalent destructive combat power of a mechanized task force.
2. When ALOs fully participate in staff planning sessions, the potential for enormous target effect exists. Training time with the units, Air Force/Army doctrinal expertise by ALO and Army staffs, and everyday Army “lingo” contribute to the ALO’s ability to do his job.
3. Successful employment of CAS is dependent on the ALO’s ability to fully understand his role, responsibilities, and contributions during MDMP.
 - a. ALOs need to understand the Army’s MDMP.

b. The ALO's CAS planning is accomplished concurrently with the development of the ground scheme of maneuver. Concurrent CAS planning will help prevent CAS from becoming an "add-on" after completion of the plan.

c. Coordinate collective training events with S3 air, ALO, FSO, and FSCOODs.

- Incorporate the brigade's CAS METL battle tasks into brigade staff training.
- Focus on tasks assessed as training weaknesses.
- Coordinate in advance for ALO/BALOs/ETACs participation.

4. As a doctrinal self-help tool, staffs can use the Integrated Task List for the Air-Ground Training Feedback System available from the CALL Web Site, URL <http://call.army.mil/call.html>.

ARMOR TASK FORCE UNDERSTANDING OF THE MDMP:

1. The MDMP is thoroughly described in **FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations***. Units should practice the process during Home Station exercises so that they are familiar with the sequence, events, and products before deploying to NTC.

2. Total familiarity with the MDMP before arriving at NTC gives brigade and TF staffs the foundation needed for transition to an abbreviated process when time is limited. When staffs are unfamiliar with the MDMP upon arrival at NTC, they must be trained on each event of the process, followed immediately by a "hot-wash" AAR. Unfortunately, this is a time-consuming technique that the LTP schedule seldom permits. On those occasions when we can afford these "hot-wash" AARs, they prove extremely profitable to the unprepared unit.

INTEGRATION OF SPECIAL STAFF INTO THE MDMP:

Integration of the FSB staff and special staff can be accomplished if participation is required at all levels, from brigade order drills through NTC rotations. By enforcing the integration of special staff at Home Station until it is routine, the proper mix of players will be present for advanced training at NTC.

TASK FORCE INTEGRATION OF CSS INTO THE MDMP:

1. Mirror the task force maneuver format for the orders process and state the task and purpose of each CSS asset.

2. Clarify which unit is responsible for supporting another and when that support begins and ends.

3. Ensure that the CSS BOS is integrated into the task force orders process and that the S4 issues an order to subordinate leaders and soldiers. He must *issue a five-paragraph order* to the CSS operators to address how the CSS plan will happen.

a. At the task force orders process, the S4's target audience is the company commanders, to whom he tells when and where assets will be. The "how" of the operation is not addressed.

b. If the key CSS players are not integrated fully into the task force orders process, they will not know the plan. An OPORD delivered by the S4 to the CSS players will fill this void.

4. Once all the players know the plan, conduct a CSS rehearsal. *Do not wait until the rehearsal to develop the plan.*

5. The problem with inadequate graphics can be fixed by implementing a checklist and following it. Develop the checklist during a properly conducted mission analysis, identifying all required CSS control measures and graphic symbols. Make sure the S4 has the checklist for reference.

INTEGRATION OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER (SIGO) INTO THE MDMP:

1. The task force should integrate the signal officer into the planning process at the early stages.
2. The SIGO and NCOs can make a tentative plan as long as they have a general idea of the enemy situation, the friendly situation, and the commander's intent.
 - a. The executive officer or the operations officer should review this tentative command and control plan.
 - b. The signal officer, at the operations order and at the rehearsal, should brief the revised and final plan, including the locations of the TOC, TAC, Jump TOC, Retrans Systems, MSE Systems, the commander, the operations officer, and special emitters like EPLRS, TAC SAT, TAC LAN, etc.

FIRE DIRECTION OFFICER (FDO) INTEGRATION INTO THE MDMP: *All* members of the battalion staff must have a good understanding of the staff planning process and *all* members must contribute to the process in varying degrees. The information and tools each member should bring to the planning table must be defined.

1. The FDO can contribute significantly to the planning process by reviewing the following information from the maneuver order:
 - a. The commander's intent or concept of fires: This answers when and where the commander wants fire support, why he wants fire support, and what he desires in the way of effects, duration, and timing.
 - b. Commander's criteria (compilation of the following):
 - Attack guidance matrix: identifies desired effects and when to attack a target type.
 - HPTs: identifies the priority to attack a target type by FS means.
 - c. Target list: Identifies where the unit plans to attack target types.
 - d. FS execution matrix (FSEM): Identifies how the scheme of fires will achieve the commander's intent.
2. By front loading the planning process with an understanding of these areas, the FDO can determine:
 - a. The *number of rounds or volleys* necessary to achieve the commander's intent. For example, if the commander wants to destroy an MRC west of PL EXCALIBUR with artillery, the S2 can provide the number and types of vehicles that an MRC would consist of, and the FDO can determine the volume of fire necessary to achieve the effect.
 - b. *Where* the commander wants to use artillery to achieve his intent. Based on the target list and the FSEM, the FDO can determine *when* the commander plans to achieve his effect. This can impact on the artillery's requirement to position units forward to mass or offset guns for special missions. It can also contribute to identification of constraints and limitations during the mission analysis that the FSCoord may have to resolve or consider.
3. After COA analysis and comparison and the decision brief, the staff begins a deliberate wargame of the selected COA. During this phase, the FDO focuses on the entire scheme of fires,

to include the specifics of the EFST (i.e., FASCAM aimpoints and number and type of rounds per aimpoint, Copperhead EAs and artillery positions, smoke aimpoints and number of rounds, mass missions, and munitions and volume required to fire).

a. The FS matrix is a systematic approach to understanding the scheme of fires. Used during the wargame, it focuses the staff on keeping elements that must be thoroughly understood. This includes triggers, FS event, observers, intent of the event, effects, and units/munitions to fire.

b. By the end of the wargame, all munitions, ammo resupply, artillery, and maneuver schemes of movement are synchronized with each other and against enemy COAs. The FDO should point out critical areas within the scheme of fires where any deviation from the plan would be difficult to execute.

CSS INTEGRATION INTO THE BATTALION MDMP:

1. A battalion logistician (S4/S1 or battalion XO) should be present at all battalion orders drills, aggressively representing the CSS arena, and ensuring integration and synchronization of CSS operations. Better integration of CSS operations provides necessary time to reconstitute Class III (B) and V and reconfigure ammunition, thus posturing the battalion's CSS for the future battle.

2. The battalion XO orchestrates the orders process by acting as the chief of staff, ensuring all necessary players are present and participating.

3. The S4 must know the battalion's current logistical status before conducting mission analysis.

4. Develop a battalion OPOD CSS checklist that lists critical CSS functions which must occur before, during, and post battle, including grid locations of CSS entities. The list should be completed by phases of the battle and should include:

a. Logistics essential support tasks (method, purpose, end state).

b. Specific CSS triggers (Class III [B], V, CASEVAC, recovery, and CAT movement),

c. MSR and ASR.

d. Location of CAT, BAS, AXPs, R3SP, UMCP, chemical CCPs, and patient decon sites.

5. At a minimum, answer the essential field artillery tasks (EFATs) before leaving the battalion wargaming process and include them in any rehearsals.

6. Clear, ***timely ammunition guidance*** from the S3, better battlefield calculus, and ammunition positioning improves ammunition operations.

7. Focus on integrating resupply operations with the battalion operation whether it be centralized or decentralized. This facilitates resupply operations in a more stable environment with less distraction and economizes the use of battalion logistical assets.

8. The S4 should maintain situational awareness and status of logistical assets and provide the S3 advice on the execution of the logistics operations.

COMPLETION OF AN ENGINEER BATTLEFIELD ASSESSMENT:

1. ABE sections and engineer battalion plans sections should incorporate the time constraints, battlefield friction, and stresses of continuous operations into Home Station training.

2. Detailed SOPs, to include distribution of labor within the sections, are a useful tool as well as cross-training among the sections to allow leaders more flexibility in who completes/assists in the completion of the EBA.

ENGINEER PLANNING AND PRODUCTS:

1. Based upon the unique relationship of having an engineer battalion whose assets are usually task organized under maneuver battalion control, the engineer battalion must conduct parallel planning with the supported maneuver brigade. Engineer parallel planning requires a focus on both vertical planning (identification, integration, synchronization of tasks to support the engineer mission) and horizontal planning (integration, synchronization of tasks to support the maneuver brigade).

2. The engineer battalion, with the assistant battalion engineer (ABE), should study and know the planning process as outlined in **FM 5-71-3, *Brigade Engineer Combat Operations (Armored)***. The battalion XO should take ownership of how planning is structured within the engineer battalion.

3. The XO and S3 must coordinate critical junctures when the engineer staff is required to supplement S3/ABE efforts in the brigade planning process. This will drive development of the battalion planning timeline.

4. Once the timeline is set, the S3/XO must determine what products will result from each part of the process and whether the products come from the battalion staff or the S3/S2/ABE. There should be a continuous exchange of products/information between these two cells to facilitate effective engineer planning for both the maneuver brigade and the engineer battalion.

COMPLETION OF THE MDMP IN A TIME-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT:

Task force XOs should have a solid understanding of where their staffs are in terms of the ability to perform the MDMP before they arrive at LTP. By doing so, they can then accurately structure the pace of planning they wish to perform for their single tactical mission at LTP and enhance their rotation training preparation.

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Course of Action Development and Wargaming

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	3	2	4	5	5

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Most task forces use poor wargaming techniques and procedures.

(TA.4.3.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Critical events, such as results of the deep operations and the current R&S plan, are not posted/set on the wargaming board.
2. Battalion staffs are often unaware of the most current situation.
3. S2s are usually dominated by S3s. A lack of S2 input results in wargaming a more “cooperative OPFOR” and an unrealistic arbitration of losses by the XO.

4. The staff begins the wargame before the course of action is fully developed. The staff then wastes time trying to understand and develop the course of action during the wargame.

OBSERVATION 2: Task force (TF) synchronization is a problem at every level. (TA.4.3.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Synchronization problems are seldom addressed because task force (TF) staffs do not understand the mechanisms of the planning process that provide synchronization.

2. Most TF staffs are not effective at wargaming and avoid wargaming in depth because of a lack of experienced personnel on the staff who understand how to wargame properly. As a result, critical operational issues are not surfaced, the wargame fails, and synchronization is not achieved.

OBSERVATION 3: The brigade targeting team does not properly focus the commander on high-payoff targets during the wargaming process to assist in the development of essential fire support tasks (EFST) during various phases of the fight. (TA.4.3.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Normally, the targeting team does not convene during the planning process and does not participate in wargaming.

2. High-value targets (HVTs) are not selected or are only briefly discussed but not defined sufficiently to allow an observer to know when and where to attack a target.

3. Observers cannot focus on what the commander wants to kill by priority/by phase. This has a direct impact on the maneuver brigade's ability to execute the battle.

OBSERVATION 4: The breach tenets are overlooked during mission analysis and COA development. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. Task force (TF) planners tend to misunderstand and incorrectly apply the breach tenets (intelligence, breaching fundamentals, breaching organization, mass, and synchronization). 2. Generally, units do not reverse plan actions on the objective. There is no specified, clearly defined end-state of what the TF should look like on the objective. As a result, the TF does not synchronize breaching operations as part of the overall scheme of maneuver.

OBSERVATION 5: Task force (TF) staffs continue to have difficulty achieving synchronization. (TA.4.4.5)

DISCUSSION:

1. Most staffs believe that there is a single planning event that results in a fully synchronized operation.

2. No TF staff attending LTP this quarter created a synchronization matrix.

3. Most staffs discount the effort of synchronizing the plan as being too time-consuming and difficult for what they perceive as a limited benefit.

4. During after-action reviews (AARs), commanders assert their desire to produce synchronization, but staffs are unwilling to dedicate the time needed to lay the framework for it to occur.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Task force S3s do not understand how to develop COAs based on the commander's decisive point. (TA.4.3.2)

DISCUSSION:

1. TF S3s are not able to define in doctrinal terms what they want the company/teams to do.
2. COAs are frequently not developed with the S2's SITEMP or on a map where the terrain can be visualized.

OBSERVATION 2: Units at all levels have the most difficulty with the wargaming phase of the military decision-making process (MDMP). (TA.4.3.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. Units have limited time training as a complete staff on the MDMP. During their rotation, most units improve their performance with the various phases of the process, with wargaming being the one exception.
2. Units attempt to wargame before fully developing a complete COA. Units develop a COA from a vague concept directed by the task force commander.
3. Units seldom wargame against several enemy COAs.
4. Wargaming methods detailed in FM 101-5 are seldom incorporated into the process because the incomplete COA will not allow the unit to select a method outlined in the manual.
5. Units have difficulty recording wargame results. Units have not trained adequately on the methods outlined in FM 101-5 or developed SOPs to record and display the results.

OBSERVATION 3: Wargaming is not focused and rarely synchronizes the task force plan. (TA.4.3.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. The task force XO does not facilitate the process. The battle staff *loses its focus* on the critical events to be wargamed and the relationship between events and the decisive point.
2. The timeline is not managed effectively, and the wargame ends up using more than half of the available time.

OBSERVATION 4: The wargaming phase of the military decision-making process (MDMP) is habitually a weakness for the task force staff. (TA.4.3.3)

DISCUSSION:

Most task force XO's and task force S3's have had little experience wargaming, and few have had experience wargaming in their current duty positions. This lack of experience results in an inability to organize an effective task force wargaming effort.

OBSERVATION 5: Wargaming continues to be the most difficult step in the military decision-making process (MDMP) for units to complete successfully. (TA.4.3.4)

DISCUSSION:

Units have struggled with wargaming as a training issue for the past 10 years.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Course of Action Development and Wargaming

TASK FORCE WARGAMING:

1. Successful wargaming depends on the staff's ability to *complete* a course of action (COA). If the staff is spending a lot of *wargaming* time developing BOS task/purpose issues to support the COA, then they are not *wargaming*. Rather, they are still in the COA development step. The staff must support the COA with the BOS "how, what and where" before it can determine the "when" in wargaming.

2. Answer the following questions *prior* to wargaming to dramatically improve overall wargaming efficiency:

a. Have all the BOS been integrated into the COA? If not, has the BOS been overlooked?

b. Did the commander forget to address a BOS in his guidance? If so, find out why the staff member responsible for the BOS has not provided support for the COA.

c. Does each BOS have a clear task and purpose for each critical event of the operation? If not, either the S3 or the BOS representative must define the task and purpose for the critical event.

3. Post critical events on the wargaming board.

4. Give the S2 sufficient time to present a complete picture of the enemy.

5. Stay informed--maintain situation awareness.

6. Determine what wargaming method/technique best accommodates the planning requirements of the unit.

7. Determine:

a. Which staff members will attend.

b. What products the staff must have to participate effectively in the wargaming effort.

c. How the staff's input will be managed throughout the conduct of the wargame.

d. How information developed from the wargame will be recorded.

e. How the recorded information is applied to enhance the OPORD.

8. Consider how time will be managed as the wargame is conducted. Staffs have shown that they are most effective during the first 50 to 60 minutes of intensive wargaming, and beyond that, a significant degradation occurs in quality.

9. References:

- a. **FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations***, dated 31 May 97, pages 5-16 to 5-24.
- b. **CALL Publications No. 97-9, No. 97-16, No. 97-17, and No. 98-4, *CTC Trends for NTC, with TTPs***.
- c. **CALL Newsletter No. 95-12 Update, *Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."***
- d. NTC "How To" video, "*Wargaming.*"

TASK FORCE SYNCHRONIZATION OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS: Wargaming should be added as an elective class to the Leader Training Program (LTP) at NTC. The significance of TF staff misunderstandings of wargaming prevents them from correcting synchronization problems at Home Station.

BRIGADE TARGETING TEAM:

1. The brigade should convene the targeting team during the planning process as well as during the preparation and execution phases.

a. The targeting team, at a minimum, should consist of the brigade XO, brigade fire support officer (FSO), targeting officer, and the brigade S2.

b. The targeting team must identify high-value targets (HVTs) and then develop high-payoff targets (HPTs) during various phases of the fight.

c. The S2 must discuss the element (potential HVT) required by the enemy to achieve each critical event of a given COA. With this start point, the commander can focus the staff with clearer guidance on interdicting key enemy critical events by attacking some of critical enemy elements to achieve a specific effect. Friendly COAs can then be built focusing on how to effectively find and attack these HPTs with fire and maneuver to accomplish the mission.

2. *The bulk of the targeting process occurs during the wargaming session* and must follow the decide, detect, and deliver methodology. Here the FSO is most effective if he is an active participant.

a. The FSO must come to the table with all of the necessary tools and information required to wargame, such as:

- The current and projected status of all fire support assets and systems.
- All the necessary planning factors that relate to fire support.
- All of the products produced during mission analysis.
- A complete understanding of the COAs.
- Knowledge of the commander's guidance.
- A method to record the results and to develop a scheme of fire support.

b. The FSO must be prepared throughout the wargaming process to make recommendations for addition or deletion of high-payoff targets to the HPT list.

- The FSO, along with the rest of the targeting team, must determine effects necessary on HPTs to achieve the commander's intent.

- The FSO, with his fire support staff (ALO, targeting officer, AVN LNO, S3 air, etc.), will be the driving force in recommending engagement means for HPTs if the targeting team

has decided that fire support should engage the target.

c. The FSO needs to be prepared to wargame each fire support event thoroughly. The FSO will then take the results of each fire support event occurring during the wargame and translate them into targets IAW the commander's guidance and the commander's intent.

BREACH TENETS IN MISSION ANALYSIS AND COA DEVELOPMENT:

1. TF commanders must ensure synchronization through proper planning and force preparation. The keys are:
 - a. Detailed reverse planning.
 - b. Clear sub-unit instructions.
 - c. Effective command and control.
 - d. A well-rehearsed force.
2. Actions on the objective should define the point of penetration and the size and type of assault force.

SYNCHRONIZATION OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS:

1. TF commanders must focus their planning process input (initial staff guidance and course of action [COA] analysis) toward the battlefield operating systems (BOS).
2. Commanders must become more involved in teaching synchronization to their staffs during Home Station planning exercises.

COURSE OF ACTION (COA) DEVELOPMENT: Doctrinal references are **FM 7-20, *The Infantry Battalion*** and **FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Graphics***.

- a. Chapter 2 of **FM 7-20** provides guidance to commanders and staffs on the development of COAs.
- b. **FM 101-5-1** provides the correct doctrinal definitions that should be used when assigning company/team tasks and purposes.

THE WARGAMING PHASE OF THE MDMP:

1. Units must train on the MDMP with emphasis on wargaming. The wargame is a disciplined process with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the battle.
2. Units must become familiar with the wargaming techniques and recording methods outlined in **FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations***. A unit SOP can be developed to enhance the process.
3. A complete COA must be developed prior to wargaming. If one friendly COA is developed in an effort to save time, the unit should wargame against several enemy COAs in order to develop branches to the base plan.
4. Adhering to the established timeline allows the staff to remain focused during the process and forces the staff to prioritize the amount of detail given to the effort.
5. The wargame should result in refining or modifying the COA, to include identifying branches and sequels that become on-order or be-prepared missions. It should refine location and timing of the decision point.
6. A synchronization matrix and decision support template (DST) should also be a result of the process. It should project the percentage of total enemy forces defeated in each critical event.

7. The task force XO or S3 should take charge of the wargaming process to ensure that the battle staff stays focused on the critical events and the decisive point.

8. Use a synchronization matrix to help facilitate and record events that are being wargamed by phase and synchronized by BOS.

9. Staffs should take a few minutes prior to initiating the wargame (while “plans CPTs” are gathering tools for the wargame) to ensure each BOS representative understands the concept for his piece of the fight.

TREND 4

SUBJECT: Troop-Leading and Discipline

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	1	6	4	3	8

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: The battalion maintenance officer (BMO) does not use troop-leading procedures (TLP) effectively or establish priorities of work at the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP). (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Timelines are inadequate.
2. Warning orders (WARNOs) and operation orders (OPORDs) are inadequate.
3. Rehearsals are inadequate.
4. Junior leaders are frequently prevented from conducting their own pre-combat checks (PCCs) and pre-combat inspections (PCIs) prior to each mission.

OBSERVATION 2: Maintenance personnel are not maintaining their crew-served and individual weapons to standard. (TA.4.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

The weapons are not being cleaned or serviced and most of the weapons observed have no ammunition. Weapons failure is catastrophic when rear areas are attacked.

OBSERVATION 3: Unit discipline is not to standard on the battlefield. (TA.4.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Unit leaders do not routinely monitor or emphasize troop discipline in the following areas:
 - a. Load plans.
 - b. Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) procedures.

- c. Uniform.
- d. Weapon security.
- e. Maintenance and personnel accountability.
- 2. Clear standards are not identified or enforced while at the NTC.
- 3. Leaders are reluctant to make corrections, assume responsibility, or be held accountable.
- 4. Unit leaders generally fail to assign responsibility for key actions and do not hold personnel accountable.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: (Repeat of Observation 1, 3-4QFY97.)

OBSERVATION 2: Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) platoon leaders do not use troop-leading procedures (TLP) or establish timelines effectively. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

- 1. Situational awareness is lacking.
- 2. Operation orders (OPORDs) are hasty and inadequate, and do not include five paragraphs or a risk assessment.
- 3. Rehearsals are ineffective or nonexistent.
- 4. Graphics are inadequate or missing.
- 5. Link-ups with company/teams are frequently late.
- 6. There is little or no face-to-face cross-talk between air defense artillery (ADA) section leaders and the element for which they are providing coverage.

OBSERVATION 3: Task force signal officer and NCOIC troop-leading procedures (TLP) are inadequate. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

- 1. Many times the soldiers do not fully understand their mission, their reporting procedures, or their route. This creates confusion during mission execution phases.
- 2. There is poor situation awareness without TLP at every level. Placing the retransmission system on the wrong slope of a hill will put the lives of the retransmission team at great risk, as well as the lives of the soldiers the commander can no longer reach.

OBSERVATION 4: Troop-leading procedures (TLP) at both company and platoon level are often inadequate and lack the required substance to properly allow the company, platoon, and squad to succeed. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

- 1. TLP are often overlooked or are completed so quickly they have no effect on the mission.
- 2. Engineer units often develop timelines (from already late maneuver timelines) that do not identify key engineer essential planning and execution tasks.

3. Development of a tentative plan usually falls short because of incomplete application or a misunderstanding by the company XO during the tactical planning process.
4. Generally, engineer company XOs do not identify essential, specified, and implied tasks that are critically important to mission accomplishment.
5. Unit orders lack clarity regarding the unit commander's intent, scheme of engineer operations, and sub-unit tasks.
6. Unit commanders misunderstand the importance of time management.
7. Rehearsals and backbriefs are executed poorly.
 - a. Most units conduct confirmation briefs and backbriefs at maneuver, TF, and engineer company levels, but engineer company commanders very seldom backbrief the engineer battalion commander or staff.
 - b. When engineer company commanders conduct a backbrief, it is usually without established formats that prescribe what is to be included.

OBSERVATION 5: Engineer battalion headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) commanders rarely conduct troop-leading procedures (TLP) after receiving engineer battalion or forward support battalion (FSB) operation orders (OPORDs). (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

None.

OBSERVATION 6: FA battery level pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs), and rehearsals are not conducted to standard. (TA.4.4.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. FA batteries generally do not effectively conduct PCCs/PCIs and rehearsals.
 - a. Battery commanders do not adequately identify their essential field artillery tasks (EFATs) and relate specific PCCs/PCIs and rehearsals to the completion of essential tasks.
 - b. The battery commanders often designate specific PCCs/PCIs and rehearsals to conduct, but because of the *lack of SOP* or clear understanding of the desired outcome for their tasks, they lead to incomplete or poor efforts.
2. Batteries normally focus on the FASCAM and do not consider the other PCCs/PCIs that allow them to survive and move on to their next essential task. They rarely add realism to their rehearsals to simulate the fog of war. Instead, they conduct a simple rehearsal in a static environment with tubes simply following along.

OBSERVATION 7: Fire support teams (FISTs) often do not conduct pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs) before a combat mission. (TA.4.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Unless PCCs/PCIs are properly conducted, leaders do not identify potential problems prior to execution, and have no time to react to correct them.

2. Many units deploy to NTC with adequate checklists in their SOPs, but units seldom follow what is published in their SOPs.

3. At pre-rotation inbriefings, task force FSOs often brief they have no knowledge of the capability of the company/team FIST to execute PCC/PCIs because this was not emphasized during **Home Station** training.

4. Often during a rotation, company/team FISTs are plagued with discovering problems with their vehicle or equipment after the line of departure (LD). EXAMPLE: FISTs are unable to use the G/VLLD because of missing or broken power cables in the targeting head, or because they have no charged batteries.

OBSERVATION 8: Personnel at the combat trains command post (CTCP) are not effectively utilized. (TA.4.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Staff officers seldom delegate or assign priorities of work. As a result, they often run the command post operation with minimal support provided by NCOs and junior soldiers. For example, S1s and S4s are often observed with two to three hand mikes and a fist full of map board markers.

2. Standard job descriptions are not defined; soldiers do not know what their function is.

a. Battle preparation is ineffective and inefficient at CTCP/combat trains because subordinates do not know what is required.

b. Drivers do not rehearse proper battle drills and do not know what their mission is or for whom they work.

3. Functions normally not accomplished include:

a. Radio logs (DA 1594) are not maintained.

b. Logistics tracking charts are not updated.

c. Information is not disseminated.

d. Attached elements of the combat trains are not integrated.

e. The rest plan for the officers is not followed.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Troop Leading and Discipline

BATTALION MAINTENANCE OFFICER (BMO) TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES:

1. The BMO and the UMCP establish a timeline that can support the upcoming missions.

2. The BMO must ensure that the maintenance platoon understands the mission requirements.

3. Maintenance platoons must stay aware of the tactical situation. The main focus is to return combat power to the battle, and maintenance leaders must ensure mission accomplishment.

MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL WEAPONS CLEANING:

1. The battalion maintenance officer (BMO) must ensure that his subordinates enforce weapons cleaning and service.

2. The BMO must coordinate with the S4 for ammunition supply.

UNIT DISCIPLINE ON THE BATTLEFIELD:

1. NCOs must be the backbone of unit standards; however, *all* leaders play a key role in setting and enforcing standards.
2. Senior leaders must assign responsibility for actions and hold personnel accountable.

BSFV PLATOON TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES:

1. Platoon leaders should follow troop-leading procedures, establish a timeline, and be persistent in application.
2. Delegate some tasks to NCOs within the platoon (i.e., graphics).
3. Develop portions of the platoon OPORD parallel with the planning process (i.e., paragraph 3 can be developed during the wargame process and paragraph 2 can be developed during mission analysis while cross-talk is being done with the S2).
4. The key is to find ways to save time and facilitate the 1/3 - 2/3 rule.

TASK FORCE SIGNAL OFFICER AND NCOIC TLP:

The SIGO, commo chief, and all the NCOs must exercise the TLP steps. They should be clear and concise when conducting a platoon or section OPORD. Signalers must fully understand the scheme of maneuver or the commander's intent in order to support the mission.

ENGINEER UNIT TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES:

1. Two elements are absolutely critical to the successful execution of superbly executed TLP-operational guidance and specific timelines. Commanders must command their company. Their focus should be on:
 - a. Troop-leading procedures.
 - b. Pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs).
 - c. Rehearsals.
 - d. Development of realistic timelines that promote unity, clarity, and synchronization within the company on the battlefield.
2. Commanders should train their XO's in the tactical planning process. This does not happen overnight, but rather with months of coaching, mentoring, and repeated, multiple warfighting experiences, coupled with focused candid feedback. The company XO needs to understand that he is a critical member of the combined arms team. He must also understand all aspects of tactical planning in order to effectively integrate and synchronize the mobility and survivability battlefield operating system (BOS).
3. **FM 5-100, *Engineer Operations***, pg. 7-1 to 7-11, and **FM 71-123, *Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team***, provide excellent cookbook approaches to tactical planning.

ENGINEER BATTALION HHC TROOP-LEADING PROCEDURES:

1. The HHC commander must use TLP with the estimate of the situation, METT-T, IPB products, and risk assessment products to develop a systematic approach to formulating tactical plans. Without using TLP, the commander will have great difficulty commanding and controlling the company.
2. The HHC commander must use TLP and risk assessment worksheets, no matter how abbreviated, to plan, coordinate, prepare, direct, and control the execution of CSS missions for

every battalion mission. It is particularly important to issue an OPORD, even if it is given vocally, to focus subordinate's efforts.

FA BATTERY LEVEL PCC/PCI AND REHEARSALS:

Battery commanders should place more emphasis on conducting PCCs/PCIs and rehearsals as part of **Home Station** training. If the battery conducts quality PCCs/PCIs and completes rehearsals, they will validate their plan, prepare for an uncooperative enemy, and be positioned for success on the battlefield.

1. PCCs/PCIs ensure the sections are prepared for their essential tasks.
 - a. PCCs are clearly laid out in a checklist fashion in **FM 6-50**, the battalion playbook, and the battery TACSOP. These checklists are very easy to follow and they ensure the sections will be able to execute the EFATs.
 - b. Once PCCs are complete, leaders must conduct PCIs. PCIs give the senior leader a chance to instill confidence in the section that it will accomplish its mission by making sure the section chiefs understand and meet the standard.
2. Rehearsals clarify the commander's intent, synchronize the plan, and ensure everyone understands their role.
 - a. A detailed plan for rehearsals at the battery level must be incorporated into battery-level SOPs.
 - b. Time is the most precious resource available to commanders and, as such, they cannot afford to waste it. Rehearsals take time and can frequently be very complex. Commanders must realize this and ensure they have a method for conducting a good detailed rehearsal in the time available.
 - c. Some critical rehearsal concepts to consider are:
 - Prioritize tasks and events.
 - Develop a detailed SOP.
 - Determine the level of participation for each rehearsal.
 - Tie essential tasks to a task, purpose, method, and end state which are clearly stated.
 - Establish high standards and ensure that they are met.
 - Use the most complete method possible given the time available.
 - Make the rehearsal realistic.

EXAMPLE using the essential field artillery task (EFAT) of “firing FASCAM”:

☞ During mission analysis, the commander develops PCCs/PCIs that relate to the EFAT. In this case, the commander determines that PCCs/PCIs need to be conducted for FASCAM, react to indirect fire, and CASEVAC.

- ◆ Each section has critical tasks that must occur for the unit to be successful.
- ◆ Each section conducts PCCs based on the unit SOP.
- ◆ A senior leader follows up each PCC with a PCI to validate the standard. Inability to complete a good PCI causes confusion at the section level and may result in the lack of success in the overall plan.

☞ Here are some examples of typical questions that might be asked for the above PCIs:

FASCAM:	How many RAAMs and ADAMs will you fire? Or for the FDC, how many aimpoints do you have, and how many RAAMs and ADAMs will you fire at each aimpoint?
React to Indirect Fire:	What is our trigger to move? Where is your alternate position, or where is the rally point?
CASEVAC:	Where is the unit CCP? Where are the current AXPs, FAS, and MAS? What is the travel time? Which vehicles will be used for CASEVAC, and what are the back-up vehicles?

☞ Each one of these PCCs/PCIs requires a *rehearsal* to validate that the battery can perform the task. In this case, let us combine all three rehearsals and add realism the way events might occur once we are in battle.

- ◆ Begin by going through the FASCAM mission the way it will be fired.
- ◆ As the unit completes the mission, use your code word for indirect fire or simulate indirect fire and have the battery react and assess casualties as this is done. Make the number of casualties realistic, not 1 or 2, but 10 or 11 soldiers.
- ◆ Treat all of the casualties to standard and actually load them on the evacuation vehicles. (Be sure to validate the evacuation plan.) Once the soldiers are treated and loaded on the vehicles, unload them, but then drive to the point you plan to evacuate the soldiers. This type of rehearsal allows you to verify all three of your critical PCCs/PCIs and does it realistically, the way it might occur in battle.
- ◆ The battery SOP must present the details for each step of the rehearsal. As the unit improves, the rehearsal can be made gradually more difficult by causing a howitzer to go “degraded” in the middle of the mission, by calling a howitzer out of the mission, or conducting the incoming in the middle of the mission and seeing how the unit will react. By preparing at **Home Station** and developing a detailed SOP for exactly how they will conduct rehearsals, a unit becomes much more efficient at rehearsals and much more successful in battle.

FIRE SUPPORT TEAM PCC/PCI:

1. The task force fire support element needs to have a standard set of mission-specific PCC/PCI checklists in the unit SOP. Once specific PCC/PCIs are identified, leaders must supervise and ensure they are conducted, and that they are conducted to standard.

2. Leaders must also ensure proper actions are taken to correct identified deficiencies.
3. Conduct of PCC/PCIs needs to be trained and supervised at **Home Station** and incorporated into FIST certification.

UTILIZATION OF PERSONNEL AT THE CTCP:

1. Develop a SOP that clearly defines the responsibilities of each member of the CTCP, both in the CP proper and outside of the CP in the combat trains.
2. Train and authorize NCOs and junior soldiers to operate the CP without the officers and to make appropriate logistics decisions in the absence of the officer in charge (OIC).
3. Get the OIC off the radio and the map so he can look at the big picture.
4. Assign enlisted soldiers as radio telephone operators (RTOs) and make them responsible for logs and updating information on charts and disseminating it to the rest of the CP personnel.
5. Put a NCO in charge of external operations for the purpose of integrating, briefing, and ensuring security to attached elements (**See CALL Newsletter 95-07, Tactical Operations Center**).

TREND 5

SUBJECT: Task Force Rehearsals

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	5	4	3	2	1

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Task force (TF) fire support rehearsals are frequently not conducted.
(TA.4.4.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

When TF fire support rehearsals are conducted, they lack a standard format and a clear task and purpose.

OBSERVATION 2: Companies seldom conduct direct fire plan rehearsals. (TA.4.4.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Maneuver companies often omit rehearsals, and when rehearsals are conducted, they do not focus on the direct fire plan or critical actions at the objective.
2. Commanders do not conduct rehearsals with a clear end-state or ensure that all crews understand the direct fire plan.
3. Commanders often do not discuss contingencies and clearly articulate how the direct fire plan will be adjusted as the situation changes.

4. Battalion commanders and S3s rarely conduct adequate rehearsals to ensure that the attack company's direct fire plans are synchronized and that they support the commander's intent.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: CSS rehearsals are often not conducted to standard. (TA.4.4.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Key leaders in the task force CSS leadership do not understand how to conduct an effective CSS rehearsal.
2. Unit SOPs do not address the conduct of the CSS rehearsal (Class III, Class V, medical, and maintenance).
3. A participant list is not defined and attendance is not enforced.
4. Rehearsals generally take the form of a briefing of the brigade and task force CSS plan.
5. Products to assist in the understanding of the plan (sketch, terrain model, etc.) are not used, do not contain sufficient detail, or are confusing to the participants.
6. Players show up without the CSS graphic or execution matrix.
7. Key CSS issues are not addressed (fuel, ammunition, medical, maintenance, etc.).
8. Players below the task force level are not actively involved in the rehearsal and do not integrate their plans with the task force or adjacent units.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Task Force Rehearsals

TASK FORCE FIRE SUPPORT REHEARSALS:

1. The types of fire support rehearsals available are:
 - a. Sand table/terrain model.
 - b. Map rehearsal.
 - c. FM (radio) rehearsals.
2. Regardless of the type of rehearsal conducted, the following must be verified:
 - a. Target list.
 - b. Observation plan.
 - c. Scheme of fires.
 - d. Execution triggers.
 - e. Timing of events.
 - f. Both primary and alternate communications nets.
 - g. Fire support coordinating measures.
3. The fire support officer (FSO) must coordinate with the TF XO/S3 to ensure that the fire support rehearsal is included in the TF timeline. Schedule the TF fire support rehearsal as early as possible after the company FISTs have rehearsed their plans. Preferably, this will occur before the TF maneuver rehearsal.
4. References: **FM 6-20-40, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Heavy)***, and **CALL Newsletter No. 91-1, *Rehearsals***.

DIRECT FIRE PLAN REHEARSALS:

1. Commanders at all levels must set the standard for rehearsals.
 - a. They must have a clear vision of the end-state for the rehearsal.
 - b. They must rehearse until all members of the team understand how the operation will be conducted.
2. Commanders should use a standardized terrain model kit, which is a useful tool and cuts down on set-up time.
3. Commanders must properly allocate time for rehearsals and closely guard this time to ensure that rehearsals are not bypassed.
4. Companies and battalions should routinely conduct rehearsals at Home Station to allow subordinates to understand the standards to which rehearsals should be conducted and work out the TTPs that best facilitate every member of the team in understanding the mission.
5. Once the unit has established and validated their TTP for rehearsals, they should incorporate them into the unit tactical SOP (TACSOP).

CSS REHEARSALS: An *effective* CSS rehearsal can multiply the effectiveness of the task force CSS plan; however, a bad or nonexistent rehearsal can have the opposite effect.

1. Develop a page in the task force SOP to address the CSS rehearsal.
2. Define the attendee list and the outline for the rehearsal.
3. Ensure that key topics are covered: For example: Give an overview of enemy COA and the friendly maneuver plan, fuel, ammunition, medical, maintenance support at BCT and task force level, and subordinate unit CSS plans.
4. Capture any issues that are identified.
5. Allow enough time to make an accurate sketch or terrain model and *use it*.
6. Develop a SOP for a radio rehearsal (Refer to **CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, Rehearsals**).

TREND 6

SUBJECT: Communication and Signal Operations

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	3	1	0	0	3

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Armor and cavalry signal officers (SIGOs) are not able to effectively employ FM radio retransmission (retrans) systems in support of the commander's scheme of maneuver. (TA.4.1.2)

DISCUSSION:

Trends show that signal officers are inadequately trained in basic tactics. Throughout mission analysis and wargaming, SIGOs are too often unable to identify critical implied tasks that are crucial for successful communications and survivability on the battlefield.

OBSERVATION 2: Battalion/brigade signal officers (BSO/SIGOs) are often improperly utilized to only place retransmission nodes. (TA.4.1.2)

DISCUSSION:

None.

OBSERVATION 3: Poor communications continue to impact engineer combat operations. (TA.4.1.2)

DISCUSSION:

Engineer battalion commanders often settle for various forms of relay, have no redundancy in systems/procedures, and do not clarify or enforce frequency management plans. These circumstances often result in poor communication architectures.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Communication and Signal Operations

ARMOR AND CAVALRY SIGO EMPLOYMENT OF FM RADIO RETRANSMISSION (RETRANS) SYSTEMS:

1. SIGOs can be successful if they apply some of the following rules:
 - a. The brigade signal officer (BSO) understands maneuver and can deduce implied tasks, such as DATK/HATK, MTC, DIS, POL, R&S and screen/guard.
 - b. The SIGO develops a flexible retrans plan:
 - Considers various schemes of maneuver.
 - Supports various COAs.
 - Pre-plans retrans repositioning.
 - Deploys back-up retrans.
 - Conducts thorough PCC/PCI.
 - Battle tracks retrans system.
 - Conducts troop-leading procedures.
 - c. The SIGO is integrated into the planning process:
 - Backward planning.
 - Establish triggers for hot time and LD time.
 - Mission brief.
 - WARNO/FRAGO.
 - Conduct rehearsals.
2. **FM 11-43, *The Signal Leader's Guide***, is an excellent guide for the SIGO.

BATTALION/BRIGADE SIGNAL OFFICER (BSO/SIGO) ROLE:

1. The BSO/SIGO should be assigned to plan and synchronize an approved command and control system. The BSO/SIGO operates in the unit to ensure the commander has command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) for his warriors.

2. The BSO/SIGO plans and synchronizes the communication nodes with the flow of the battle and recommends places for the tactical operations center (TOC), Joint-TOC, combat trains command post (CTCP), and mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) assets.

ENGINEER BATTALION COMMUNICATION PLANNING:

1. Communication planning requires the focused attention of the battalion's senior leadership. It is a top-down responsibility and requires proactive staff supervision.
2. The battalion signal NCO should develop mission-specific communications plans that support maneuver plans. To do this requires the NCO to have detailed knowledge of terrain (use available terrain visualization products) and the scheme of maneuver.
3. Use Terrabase (or equivalent) line-of-sight (LOS) shots to support triggers for repositioning the retrans team.
4. Include a clear, enforced communications annex in each OPORD.

TREND 7

SUBJECT: Operation Order (OPORD) and Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) Preparation

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	2	4	0	3	0

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: The engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) and operation order (OPORD) preparation processes of many engineer companies need improvement. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Engineer company commanders often conduct their own engineer battlefield analysis (EBA) and write both the task force (TF) engineer annex and engineer company OPORD at Home Station, during TF level engineer NTC training and during preparation computer exercises. These company commanders expect to personally produce these products during the NTC campaign as well.
2. Engineer company executive officers (XOs) are not trained to conduct an EBA or write the TF engineer annex and the company OPORD.
3. After arrival at the NTC, one of two things occurs. Either:
 - a. the company commander tries to do everything as he did at Home Station and is reduced to a frazzle by training day three; or
 - b. the commander recognizes battle rhythm demands and passes the planning and order preparation tasks to the company XO, who then struggles with a steep learning curve during the campaign.
4. As a result, both company and TF suffer incomplete engineer planning.

OBSERVATION 2: Engineer plans are seldom read or understood by task force (TF) maneuver elements. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Task forces (TFs) typically place the engineer plan in an annex of the OPORD. The maneuver elements seldom read that portion of the OPORD and do not understand the scheme of engineer operations (SOEO). This can be disastrous when it includes specified tasks to non-engineer subordinate units.

2. TFs are not allowing the engineer planner to brief during mission analysis and the COA presentations, omitting critical mobility and survivability information.

3. Engineer command posts (CPs) are not fully integrated in the TF tactical operations centers (TOCs), causing a breakdown of the brigade engineer's intent at TF level.

4. Mobility, countermobility, survivability tasks are seen as engineer-unit specific.

OBSERVATION 3: Critical fire support tasks (CFSTs) and concept of fires are seldom developed to standard. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

Fire support coordinators (FISCOORDs) and brigade fire support officers (FSOs) make attempts to identify and define critical fire support tasks (CFSTs) (task, purpose, method, and end state) based on the commander's guidance and friendly course of actions. Their stated purpose(s), however, do not always provide sufficient information to set the parameters of when, where, and how long. As a result, the FS system cannot easily or realistically quantify the required end-state in terms of volume and duration or amount of destruction, suppression, or obscuration.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for OPORD and FRAGO Preparation

ENGINEER COMPANY PLANNING PROCESS:

1. Engineer company commanders must train their XOs at Home Station to conduct EBA and to prepare both the TF engineer annex and engineer company OPORD.

2. Company commanders should be able to give the XO clear guidance on the mission, intent, and end-state, and then make the XO responsible for producing the three products. The engineer company commander can then focus on troop-leading procedures (TLP) and pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs).

INTEGRATION OF ENGINEER UNITS:

1. The TF engineer must ensure that required engineer missions, instructions, constraints, and limitations are included in the TF OPORD (not buried in the engineer annex).

2. The TF must allow the engineer planner to brief during both the mission analysis and the COA presentations so that critical mobility and survivability information is communicated to all elements of the TF.

3. The scheme of engineer operations (SOEO) should be refined during wargaming and is the basis for the engineer company order.

CRITICAL FIRE SUPPORT TASKS (CFSTs) AND CONCEPT OF FIRES DEVELOPMENT:

1. When defining CFSTs, the task should specify:
 - a. The enemy's attack formation we want to affect.
 - b. The functions of the enemy's attack formation we want to influence.
 - c. The target effect we want to have on the enemy's formation function.
2. Doctrinal terms, such as, delay, limit, disrupt, and destroy can be useful, but what is essential is that fire supporters and maneuver understand each other clearly.
 - a. *Delay* is not allowing the enemy to do something *when* he wants to.
 - b. *Limit* -- *where* he wants to.
 - c. *Disrupt* -- *what* he wants to.
 - d. *Destroy* -- requires us to quantify a specific amount to be killed.
3. The task is focused on the enemy. The purpose, on the other hand, is focused on friendly maneuver and sets the parameters on how long we must delay, where we must limit, and when we must disrupt or destroy in terms of friendly maneuver events. The clearer the effects of fires are tied to a maneuver purpose, the more likely that we can integrate fires and maneuver to achieve a unified effect.
4. The end-state should be quantifiable in terms that allow the field artillery to determine the volume of fires, munitions, duration and other technical parameters, and that will achieve the stated task and purpose.

EXAMPLE:

COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE: (*effect*) Delay the (*formation*) AGMB's (*function*) ability to support the FSE until (*purpose*) our direct fires can destroy the FSE.

CONCEPT OF FIRES: (*method*) Use ARTY-delivered FASCAM in the passes in conjunction with CAS and massed ARTY fires to delay the AGMB until our AG company can destroy the FSE with direct fires.

FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT ACTIONS: Determine good locations to emplace FASCAM based on enemy, terrain, and weapons capabilities. Determine possible OPs that could observe. Determine how CAS could be used for each COA (CAS target box data). Consider how IEW, smoke or obstacles might contribute to the desired effect. Determine the possible HPTs in the AGMB that would DELAY. List data needed from Wargame, for example:

- How long does the AG company need to destroy the FSE?
- What number and type of vehicles = delay required?

END-STATE: (Example from wargame) AGMB delayed 15 minutes at FASCAM. MSD destroyed at FASCAM. Two T-80s and six BMPs destroyed west of PL DALLAS. MRB CMD net jumps less than five times between PL OHIO and PL DALLAS.

TREND 8

SUBJECT: Development and Use of Tactical SOPs

	<u>1-2QFY95</u>	<u>3-4QFY95</u>	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>
Observation frequency:	1	3	2	2	2

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Brigade S2 sections often do not have or use standard operating procedures (SOPs). (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. S2 sections are often not sure of the intelligence requirements for the different phases of the staff planning process.
2. When a comprehensive SOP exists, it is seldom followed.
3. Some existing SOPs do not specifically address the requirements for the brigade S2 section. Each staff planning session is fraught with discovery learning to determine what is required to support the staff planning process, rather than improving requirements that are already defined.

OBSERVATION 2: Company/team tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) are incomplete or non-existent. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. In almost every instance, company commanders come to their LTP without a viable, workable TACSOP. The standard reply when asked about their TACSOPs is, “We are refining it out here.” With 120 days remaining before their NTC rotation (fewer training days for NG/USAR units), there is no time to refine, develop, and implement an effective TACSOP.
2. For a TACSOP to be effective, all members of a unit must be knowledgeable and thoroughly trained in its contents. This includes all elements that are cross-attached to a commander’s unit.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Most task force’s tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) are not adequate or are not used. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Many task forces (TFs) arrive at LTP with a TACSOP that was newly created specifically for their upcoming NTC rotation.
2. Some TFs have had the same TACSOP for years, and have not reviewed it for needed refinements.
3. Most often, the TF TACSOP is not disseminated to the lowest levels, and is seldom used as a legitimate document that governs the tactical operations of a unit.

OBSERVATION 2: Many company commanders do not have tactical SOPs (TACSOPs) or do not use them. (TA.4.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. Company commanders seldom bring a TACSOP to LTP. Those who do are unfamiliar with their content.
2. Without a unit SOP, company/team coaches cannot observe the efficient use of the unit's SOP and cannot make recommendations for improvements.
3. Commanders cannot review, test, and train with their SOPs while undergoing the unit's training.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Develop and Use of Tactical SOPs

1. At Home Station, each S2 section should develop and *use* an SOP that provides a checklist and formatted charts.
 - a. The SOP should address the products that are routinely required of the S2 section for each phase of the staff planning process.
 - b. These products would be based on standard requirements as well as staff and commander driven requirements.
2. Continually stress the importance of TACSOPs and the need for company/team commanders to come to LTP with a complete and workable TACSOP.
3. To be beneficial during the NTC rotation, TACSOPs must be disseminated, trained, and adhered to closely throughout the Home Station train-up. Some of the critical characteristics a TACSOP must possess to be adopted by task force operators include:
 - a. Simplicity. TACSOPs have to be created with the understanding that integration in the task force will be dependent on the ability of tank and Bradley commanders to extract information quickly and conveniently. TACSOPs that are not simple are routinely ignored.
 - b. User Friendliness. Available information that cannot be extracted quickly and easily is not applicable information to soldiers attempting to execute operations in a combat environment.
 - c. Strict Focus. Many of the TACSOPs that are reviewed at LTP deal with a variety of procedures that are not tactical and are better suited in a task force's unit SOP. The TACSOP is not meant to answer every issue that is remotely associated with tactical operations. Task force commanders and XO's must closely edit these documents to ensure they do not become overly burdensome.
 - d. Strict Enforcement. Develop and administer a test on the TACSOP.
4. Battalion commanders can maximize their subordinate's LTP training if company commanders bring a completed TACSOP.

TREND 9

SUBJECT: Battle Staff Mission Analysis

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	1	2	1	0	2

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Mission analysis is rarely conducted as an integrated battle staff function. (TA.4.2.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. The staff is seldom briefed on the mission analysis prior to the initial brief to the commander.
2. The battle staff does not:
 - a. Meet at the main CP.
 - b. Receive a brief of the upcoming operation by the task force XO or assistant S3.
 - c. Conduct a mission analysis of their proponent BOS while the task force commander, S3, and FSO are at the brigade receiving the brigade order.
3. Frequently, the ADO and logisticians and other attached staff officers are not informed when the main CP receives the order; they are not aware that the mission analysis is about to be conducted.

OBSERVATION 2: Battalion/brigade signal officer (SIGO) mission analysis is inadequate. (TA.4.2.1.1)

DISCUSSION:

Battalion/brigade SIGOs too often do not conduct a thorough mission analysis prior to the execution phase of some missions. They do fix problems that develop, but many of those problems could have been avoided had they anticipated them (e.g., developing a back-up retransmission, ensuring mobile subscriber radio telephone (MSRT) coverage in the TOC, and moving personnel to best support the mission).

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Battle Staff Mission Analysis

1. The battle staff should conduct mission analysis, integrating all the key players. This initial step in the decision-making process focuses the staff on the upcoming operation and provides information on tasks they must accomplish according to the brigade OPORD.
2. Refer to **CALL Newsletter No. 95-12 Update, *Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning."***
3. The SIGO should thoroughly analyze the unit's mission, determine the elements critical for success, and assign resources to ensure achievement of the commander's intent.

TREND 10**SUBJECT: Timelines and Time Management**

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	0	2	1	4	2

3-4QFY97**OBSERVATION 1: Time management within engineer companies is routinely inadequate.***(TA.4.4)****DISCUSSION:***

1. Critical pre-battle activities such as pre-combat checks/pre-combat inspections (PCC/PCIs), rehearsals, and graphics dissemination frequently suffer because of poor time management.
2. Many engineer companies are not prepared to defend themselves prior to crossing the line of departure (LD).
 - a. During the mission's combat preparation phase, the engineer companies usually accomplish only such things as personal hygiene, LOGPAC, and their sleep plan.
 - b. Time is wasted due to poor planning and lack of leader discipline at the company and platoon levels.
 - c. Companies experience loss of battle tempo, often resulting in unsuccessful mission accomplishment.
3. Commanders usually include critical activities in their company OPODs but do not monitor their accomplishment.
4. Most engineer companies arrive at the NTC with a good tactical SOP (TACSOP) that clearly addresses TAA procedures, but they *do not follow it*.
 - a. Companies frequently occupy tactical assembly areas (TAAs) with no advance party activities or reconnaissance. They are seldom prepared to defend against any type of attack in their TAA.
 - b. Few, if any, priorities of work are accomplished.
 - c. Direct fire plans and adjacent unit coordination are not accomplished.

OBSERVATION 2: Task force (TF) staffs do not effectively manage a TF timeline.*(TA.4.4.1)****DISCUSSION:***

1. Staff sections do not complete required products in a timely manner.
2. Results of poor time management include:
 - a. Critical events fail to take place.
 - b. Troop-leading procedures at subordinate levels are hindered.
 - c. Ultimately, the TF is unable to effectively prepare for combat.
 - d. The staff does not have enough time to adequately wargame the selected COA.

e. Orders lack focus on killing the enemy at the decisive point and often lead to unclear tasks and purpose to subordinate leaders.

OBSERVATION 3: Task force (TF) executive officers (XOs) do not effectively manage timelines. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. TF XOs do not successfully manage planning time. During the conduct of LTP, this responsibility is continually delegated to junior battle captains.
2. Routinely, staff members lack the experience and understanding of how long each phase of the planning process should take. As a result, the process quickly loses structure, focus, and productivity.

OBSERVATION 4: Time management at brigade and task force (TF) level remains a notable weakness. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

Commanders have dismissed the one-third/two-third planning philosophy and routinely disregard subordinate elements' need to plan.

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: ADA platoons, particularly the platoon leaders, are often not prepared to perform the air defense mission due to poor time management. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. The platoon leader's timeline seldom includes key tasks (i.e., orders issue, rehearsals, resupply, maintenance, boresight, link-up times with company/teams) or other specified tasks to be accomplished prior to the mission.
2. The timeline seldom includes who will be responsible for performing tasks and conducting the checks.
3. Platoon SOPs are inadequate; they do not address priorities of work at squad level.
4. The platoon tactical SOP (TACSOP) is not used.

OBSERVATION 2: Company/team level time management skills are poor. (TA.4.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. Company commanders tend to possess inadequate time management and delegation skills (i.e., trying to do everything themselves), resulting in a significant amount of unfinished business by the LD time.

2. Inexperienced company/team commanders are often unfamiliar with planning and preparing time for combat operations. They are often surprised and sometimes overwhelmed when experiencing the limited time available for planning and preparing for combat operations.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES **for Timelines and Time Management**

ENGINEER COMPANY TIME MANAGEMENT AND TACTICAL ASSEMBLY AREA (TAA) DISCIPLINE:

1. Engineer company commanders must conduct aggressive time management. They must be immediately informed of any problems in order to adjust priorities in tempo.
2. Platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and junior NCOs must apply the discipline to make it happen. Unit discipline must be maintained during TAA occupation, including adherence to their tactical SOP (TACSOP).
3. Critical pre-battle activities must be accomplished to ensure mission success. These activities should be integrated with:
 - a. TAA procedures.
 - b. Task force-directed events.
 - c. A timeline that specifically addresses who will do what and when.
4. Timelines must be passed to subordinate units as soon as possible. Company leaders must ruthlessly enforce the completion of these activities in accordance with the timeline.

TASK FORCE (TF) TIMELINE MANAGEMENT:

1. The TF timeline should be developed early in the planning process and then continually updated throughout the process.
2. The initial timeline should include the staff's planning cycle, critical R&S activities, and company/team troop-leading procedures (e.g., boresighting, initial movement times, etc.).
3. As the planning process continues, additional operational critical events should be added to the timeline and continued throughout the wargame process.
4. Key events from the synchronization matrix should be incorporated into the timeline. This is a valuable tool for tracking critical tasks throughout the battle.
5. Upon completion of the planning process, the staff should collate the data onto a butcher board and brief it as part of the TF operations order (OPORD).
6. In the timeline, include critical troop-leading procedures (TLP) to be conducted at the company/team level. These should include company/team OPORD times, rehearsals, boresight, and logistics package (LOGPAC) schedules. These requirements are not intended to micro-manage company/teams, but rather to provide them a common base to begin their planning and preparation. If changes are required at the TF level, the TF commander can then make an informed decision on what events he will impact.
7. Time management will improve only when it becomes an absolute priority of brigade and task force commanders. Emphasis must be placed on the application of time management techniques at all levels.
8. Adopt a structured schedule that requires brigades and TFs to issue their OPORDs on directed timelines, thus forcing one-third/two-third planning times on to the respective staffs.

ADA PLATOON TIME MANAGEMENT:

1. The platoon leader must understand his responsibilities as both platoon leader and task force ADO, and balance his time between both.
2. Information must be pushed to the platoon despite the physical separation when the platoon leader is at the task force TOC. Use a LNO, PSG, or driver to push the information to the platoons from the TOC.
3. When involved in the military decision-making process (MDMP) with the task force, the platoon leader must delegate to his subordinates, specify tasks to be accomplished, and appoint individuals to confirm task completion.
4. Use backward planning to prioritize tasks and allow subordinates the ability to develop their own timeline with any additional tasks at crew level. Many of the tasks that need to be accomplished during the preparation phase should be identified in the platoon tactical SOP (TACSOP), eliminating confusion and wasted time.
5. References:
 - a. **FM 44-43, *BSFV Platoon and Squad Operations***
 - b. **FM 44-100, *Air Defense Operations***

COMPANY/TEAM LEVEL TIME MANAGEMENT:

1. Company/team commanders must practice procedures to make best use of their planning and preparation time. Use well-trained battle drills to give the commander the flexibility to save time through standardized reactions to routine situations. Whether the subject matter is actions on contact or preparation for combat operations, commanders must develop standardized procedures for their units.
2. While LTP does not afford commanders the chance or the opportunity to delegate preparation tasks to subordinates, company/team coaches can suggest where and when planning and preparation tasks can be delegated.

TREND 11

SUBJECT: Decision-Point Development

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	0	1	3	1	0

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Engineer commanders and staffs rarely develop decision points with supporting criteria that will ensure continued support to the brigade throughout fluid combat operations. (TA.4.2.3)

DISCUSSION:

Because brigade combat missions are dynamic, the engineer unit's task and purpose change constantly. Corresponding changes to task organization and priorities are often required.

Commanders and staffs cannot anticipate all possible situations, but are often issuing incomplete and inadequately synchronized fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) as a means of adapting their units to the changing combat situations. The FRAGO method usually results in a loss of momentum at the brigade level and creates difficulties in command, control, and support for the executing unit.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES **for Decision-Point Development**

1. Commanders and staffs should develop clear decision points with pre-established plans to accomplish the identified task as part of the brigade decision making process to allow subordinate units to plan, prepare, and execute the mission to standard.
2. Refer to **CALL CTC Quarterly Bulletin No. 97-4, Jan 97, *Decision-Point Tactics (Fighting the Enemy, Not the Plan!)***.

TREND 12

SUBJECT: Planning for Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) Operations

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	0	1	1	0	1

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Brigade planning and preparation for Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) operations are rarely integrated into the scheme of fires. (TA.4.3)

DISCUSSION:

1. COLT insertions are normally planned fairly well, but detailed tasks and purpose for each COLT are not delineated during the brigade wargame.
2. Brigades often do not plan the *attack* function for the COLT, thus degrading the COLT's ability to trigger fires.
3. The brigade often does not perform battlefield calculus and analysis of where the enemy is in relation to COLT observation posts (OPs). This negates the brigade's ability to use the COLT to employ Copperhead munitions; all conditions necessary to execute the Copperhead missions cannot be met. As a result, COLTs become another source for reporting enemy movement rather than the more desirable killer source.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES **for Planning for COLT Operations**

1. The entire staff should plan for COLT employment.

2. The fire support officer (FSO) and S2 need to fully understand the capabilities and limitations of COLTs. Specifically, they must understand the ranges at which the COLT can actually acquire a particular target and under different conditions.

3. The following is a good outline to follow for the employment of COLTs:

STEP 1- Determine the need for an observation post (OP)

Once an NAI or TAI is established, an “observer” must be identified. Understanding what is to be done at the NAI or TAI is critical to assigning the proper observer, determining its position, and ensuring required resolution.

STEP 2- Conduct terrain analysis

Analyze the terrain to identify possible OPs. Terrabase is an effective tool but is time intensive. A good technique is to input the NAI or TAI as OPs and select your OPs from where converging lines of sight (LOS) exist.

STEP 3- Allocate the asset

The asset assigned to an OP is based on the mission to be conducted and the capabilities of the asset. If Copperhead is to be designated from the OP, then a laser-equipped observer must be assigned. If obstacle reconnaissance is the mission, then a SAPPER scout may be a better choice.

STEP 4- Select the OP

The OP should be selected from the possible OPs identified in the terrain analysis. Again, the mission and capabilities must be considered, including the factors of the Copperhead coverage template, effects of terrain and weather, survivability, and the enemy situation. Alternate OPs should be identified as back-up if the primary is untenable.

STEP 5- Plan for the insertion/infiltration

Plan it like any maneuver operation. Determine the method: air, mounted, or dismounted. The OP's mission and the enemy situation drive this decision. Plan routes, check points, PZs, LZs, false insertions, air corridors, extraction, resupply, etc. Issue a detailed WARNO to the selected asset(s).

STEP 6- make coordination

Forward passage, aircraft, retrans, and terrain: all must be coordinated.

STEP 7- Support the insertion/infiltration

- Indirect fires: SEAD, deception fires, defensive fires to support the OP and force protection zones.

- IEW support: Monitor reconnaissance nets to determine if insertion is detected; jam enemy counter-reconnaissance nets or ADA nets as appropriate.

- Logistics support: The resupply and medical plan must be established. Consider the use of caches. Coordinate with and task maneuver units to recover compromised assets.

STEP 8- Prepare

COLT orders, backbriefs, and rehearsal. Conduct PCCs/PCIs.

STEP 9- Execute

COLTs must have the skills to execute air insertions and infiltration and to stay alive. Brigades must oversee this insertion/infiltration and track it like any maneuver operation.

TREND 13**SUBJECT: Command Post (CP) Locations/Displacement**

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	0	0	1	1	0

3-4QFY97

OBSERVATION 1: Command post (CP) site location and displacement planning are not effectively integrated into the TF planning process. (TA.4.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. The tactical operations center (TOC) is seldom able to effectively command and control during critical points of the battle.
2. Command and control nodes are not able to support the TF, maintain situational awareness, effectively conduct predictive analysis or make timely recommendations to the commander.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Command Post Locations/Displacement

1. During the planning process, the staff must first identify the location of critical points on the battlefield. The staff then conducts backward planning to determine where the tactical operations center (TOC) must be located at that point to facilitate command and control.
2. Triggers/decision points must be developed to determine when the TOC moves to ensure that they are set during these critical points.
3. The TOC movement/displacement plan is not necessarily tied to the maneuver of the TF. For example, the TOC does not have to move in the center of the TF formation; it may travel initially behind the lead company/team or along a route that was previously cleared by the scouts or other TF assets. The imperative is that it is set and ready to fight at these anticipated critical points.

TREND 14**SUBJECT: Reporting Requirements/Procedures**

	<u>1-2QFY96</u>	<u>3-4QFY96</u>	<u>1-2QFY97</u>	<u>3-4QFY97</u>	<u>1-2QFY98</u>
Observation frequency:	0	0	0	0	3

1-2QFY98

OBSERVATION 1: Reporting within the units too often does not facilitate the commander's situational awareness and enhance battle command. (TA.4.1.1.4)

DISCUSSION:

1. SPOT reports, contact reports, commander's situation reports (SITREPs), forward area rearm/refuel point (FARP) SITREPs, and battle damage assessments (BDA) lack format, contain vague information, and are not submitted in a timely fashion.

2. Unit C2 reporting architectures cause confusion with the company commanders. Typically, company commanders do not know if they are to report to the battalion commander (in an AH-64) or the S3.

OBSERVATION 2: Fire support teams (FISTs) frequently do not report information in accordance with doctrinal report formats. (TA.4.1.1.4)

DISCUSSION:

None.

OBSERVATION 3: Casualty assessments and battle damage assessments (BDAs) are seldom to standard. (TA.4.2.1)

DISCUSSION:

1. During the brigade planning process, most units do not report realistic casualty or battle damage assessments. Some units do not complete these assessments at all.

2. Poor assessments contribute to commander's inaccurate delineation of available combat power.

3. Medical assets cannot be arrayed to support medical evacuation.

RECOMMENDED TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
for Reporting Requirements/Procedures

UNIT REPORTING:

The commander should identify reporting requirements and include these requirements in the unit SOP. Considerations for report requirements should include:

- a. Change in combat power.
- b. Crossing phase lines.
- c. Occupation of holding areas and forward area rearm/refuel points (FARPs).

- d. Start point/release point (SP/RP) of air routes.
- e. Set in attack-by-fire (ABF) (cold and hot).
- f. Remaining ammunition.
- g. 50 percent expenditure reports.
- h. Battle damage assessments (BDAs) for tanks, ADA, artillery, personnel carriers, personnel, C2 (TAAPP-C).
- i. Commander's situation report (SITREP) (enemy situation, units situation-combat power/fuel/ammo/current position, ability to accomplish assigned mission, and recommendations).

FIRE SUPPORT TEAM (FIST) REPORTING:

1. FISTs should report information and call for fire in accordance with the formats in **FM 6-20-20, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for Battalion, Task Force, and Below***, and **FM 6-30, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire***.
2. The FIST forward observer's primary mission is to call for fires for their maneuver element. But when fires are unavailable, their next responsibility is to *report*. The task force needs to enforce reporting standards (i.e., call for fire, SALUTE reports, and SALT reports).
 - a. It is imperative that forward observers (FOs) report exactly what they see, without bias or subjectivity.
 - b. FOs must be precise, objective, and not attempt to analyze what they are seeing. Let the FSO, S2, and FSE conduct the analysis.

CASUALTY REPORTING AND BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS (BDA):

1. At each phase or critical event in the planning process, the S1 should give a realistic casualty assessment and the S4 should provide the BDA.
2. The S2 should provide the BDA on the OPFOR. This will give the brigade commander an accurate picture of the available friendly combat power versus the enemy's combat power.
3. Medical planners who train at NTC must understand that casualty assessments and BDA are skewed. We often do not stop operations when units are rendered combat ineffective and are not capable of sustaining further combat operations. As a general rule, they should plan for mass casualty situations.
4. See **CALL Quarterly Bulletin No. 95-11**, "*Brigade Rear Operations: A Force Protection Dilemma*," and **CALL Newsletter No. 97-14**, *NTC Goldminer's TTPs for CSS*.